

ԵՐԵՎԱՆԻ ՊԵՏԱԿԱՆ  
ՆԱԽԱԼՍԱՐԱՆ



Gayane Girunyan

# Text-Discourse-Knowledge

(An Introductory Course  
in Text Linguistics)

**YEREVAN STATE UNIVERSITY**

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**TEXT – DISCOURSE – KNOWLEDGE**  
*(An Introductory Course in Textlinguistics)*

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## PREFACE

The interdisciplinary field of textual studies is extensive, with significant theoretical developments on the basis of impressive bodies of empirical data. Along with the wealth of information on such studies, the complexities of presenting the sphere in the form of a textbook are also conditioned by the nature of the phenomenon of text itself, whose dimensions can be discovered from a variety of perspectives: linguistic, semiotic, pragmatic, psychological, cognitive, etc.

The present textbook is an attempt to outline the sphere of textual studies along the axis text – discourse – knowledge: a framework, developing awareness of which is a worthwhile and at the same time demanding objective. And so a number of observations seem necessary from the start. The first is that no textbook can, or even should, cover all the issues of theoretical significance. Rather, it should be designed so as to enable students to explore their own routes to specialized knowledge, as well as motivate them to know more. Secondly, the now classical textbooks, or other informative sources keep their validity, and it is hardly a noble task to try to replace all of them with one book. Finally, as is the case with any textbook, this one too can be effective if it is used creatively (e.g. in choosing, or extending the readings), in accordance with the background of the students, their changing scholarly interests, etc.

The textbook comprises five sections. Section A. Text – Textuality – Interdiscursivity – Context, includes lectures and speaking assignments, and is meant to guide into the next section. Section B. Reading Assignments, is composed of diverse passages from theoretical sources, and with the

questions following each passage is meant for further discussion. The readings are presented as thematic categories for convenience. However, such grouping is conventional to a certain extent, and as required by the academic process, structural variations/ combinations are possible (in choosing the topics, sources, etc, or specifying the tasks). Section C. Textual Genres: From Definition to Play, presents three co-authorship articles on text types and genres not published before. Along with the investigative aspects, the articles can be noted for the factual material of analysis: lectures, the genres of jocular definitions and riddles, the very choice of which is aimed to stress the awareness of transference of knowledge – whether in the context of academic communication, or as part of literary/ cultural tradition. D. Reflective-Creative Assignments are meant to activate the students’ meta-cognitive skills, and to enable a better awareness of text as a multi-modal phenomenon. Through text-production, and further reflection on their own verbalization, students are expected to test their knowledge of the field, exchange views and experiences. Reflecting on artistic compositions is seen here as a finer and more creative type of meta-awareness. Section E. Glossary of Terms (English-Armenian) includes the terminological lexis of the area, and their counterparts in Armenian (for part of the more recent terms having no equivalents in Armenian the author has proposed variants).

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## **A. TEXT – TEXTUALITY – INTERDISCURSIVITY – CONTEXT**

### **TEXT LINGUISTICS: Introduction**

The sphere of linguistic concerns whose object of investigation is the text as a complex multi-level system displaying semantic, structural and functional unity is referred to as text linguistics, and alternatively (with subsequent differences) as discourse analysis. To develop a better awareness of this domain of scholarly study, we need to know the differences between the central categories and their extensive elaboration in different traditions.

Thus, at first sight, i.e. if we proceed from the everyday popular use, the term ‘text’ (as expressing the central notion in text linguistics) is applicable to written language and its realization in the form of articles, adverts, fiction, essays, etc; and ‘discourse’ (the major focus in discourse analysis) – to spoken language realized, for example, as conversations, lectures, etc.

However, all the complexities of definition arise because ‘text’ is understood as every type of utterance (much wider) and as a communicative event. Moreover, we will later see that the modern notion of text implies dynamic features as well. As for ‘discourse’, it involves whatever is beyond text – context

including (note that the definitions of discourse vary too). Considering the utmost extent of the concepts of ‘text’ and ‘discourse’, and their theoretical evaluation, there is a considerable overlap between text linguistics and discourse analysis. One such shared problem extensively discussed in both traditions is the phenomenon of coherence.

To test our impressionistic observations about the similarities and differences that occur in the field(s), we will consult a dictionary of linguistics. What we see is that the entry of one (text linguistics) refers to the other (discourse analysis), specifying that “text linguistics is the linguistic analysis of description of extended texts, either written or spoken. Originally in German (‘Textlinguistik’) and involving in particular, the concept of a ‘text grammar’ or generative grammar for texts, analogous to a grammar generating sentences” (OLD). As for discourse analysis, it is presented as a closely related and earlier development in linguistics, “an attempt by various linguists to extend the methods of analysis for the description of words and sentences to the study of larger structures in, or involved in the production of connected discourse” (OLD).

It should be mentioned that the term ‘discourse analysis’ was first used by Harris in the 1950-s, and that the other term – ‘text linguistics’ is a more recent one.

Clearly, the fields of investigation are new and their fuzzy regions, overlaps and meta-linguistic complications and competing terms are a natural consequence, and even a necessity in a sense. Thus, relative to today’s situation, linguists make a number of observations.

The first one is that purely text linguistic approaches give more importance to text-internal features (such parameters as, for example, cohesion and coherence), while discourse analysis is rather concerned with external factors, viewing them in terms of communication (Alba Juez 2009: 7). This implies that the text-internal elements constitute the text – the linguistic material proper, while the text-external ones constitute the context (*ibid*), the latter being understood as the environment in which the linguistic productions occur.

The second observation is that it would be an oversimplification to put it bluntly and say that text linguistics studies text, and discourse analysis – both: text and context, and hence is more comprehensive, especially that text linguists focus on the study of real language in use too, just as well as discourse analysts stress the functional aspect.

Thirdly, especially discourse studies are considered to be multi-disciplinary due to the factor of knowledge taken into account in such analysis, and involve such fields as linguistics (note that linguistics is mentioned on a par with other disciplines, and not as the main one), poetics, semiotics, psychology, sociology, anthropology, history, communication research.

Finally, theorists do not share the same notions of text and discourse – both terms are used ambiguously and are defined in a variety of ways. Moreover, linguists notice that the two disciplines have merged to a great extent.

Our choice of the term stresses the linguistic constituent, text as a starting point, text as both a result of speech production and an entity in which so-to-call certain possibilities of interpretation are encoded too. As such it is a unity in terms of

content, and as Chernyavskaya observes, a structured entity potentially open to interpretation, consisting of various elements, itself existing within some continuity as a fragment, having relative boundaries, beginning and ending (Chernyavskaya 2009: 15).

Needless to say, that we cannot imagine our lives or any way of knowing about the world without texts; in a sense we are surrounded by texts. In the modern scientific paradigm it is regarded as one of the key notions of our time and a means of expressing and storing human knowledge – the basis of culture and civilization. In particular, as the Russian theorist Bakhtin held, text is a primary prerequisite of all philosophical thinking, and especially in the perspective of humanities (as cited in Turaeva 2012: 4), where it has become a central category (rather than the word and the sentence/ utterance).

This shift has been a turning point in linguistics too, thus opening up new horizons for research, in particular in terms of viewing language as a global phenomenon with its functions of communication, expression, understanding, etc. And because language exists in text and through text, Halliday and Hasan point to the function of text creation as a main one (Halliday and Hasan 1985).

Furthermore, the ontological properties of the text cannot but be viewed from the angle of communication; in other words, the study of language as a global phenomenon is possible with the inclusion of its use/ realization, i.e. language as a system + speech/ discourse/ text. The best illustrations of this awareness are the linguistic disciplines that emerged in the XX c.: cognitive linguistics, sociolinguistics, pragmatics and text

linguistics – all of which are interrelated and share common tenets.

In the introductory edition “Discourse Analysis” presented within the series ‘Oxford Introductions to Language Study’, H.G. Widdowson briefly defines a text as “an actual use of language” which “has been produced for a communicative purpose” (2011: 4). As for the finer distinctions between the concepts of ‘text’ and ‘discourse’, and the use of the terms, the linguist highlights three important points. The first is that discourse is a complex of communicative purposes that “underlies the text and motivates its production”. The second is that readers or listeners “interpret the text as a discourse”. Finally, keeping in mind the communicative purpose, and also that communication is typically bi-lateral, ‘discourse’ refers “both to what a text producer meant by a text and what a text means to the receiver”. Thus texts are seen as serving for mediation between discourses (of the text producer and the text receiver). Moreover, what is ‘textualized’, i.e., has been shaped as a text, is open to interpretation (2011: 6-7).

Following the same logic, and considering the text in the communicative framework, Yevgeniy Sidorov summarizes the functional characteristics of a text by means of three functions which form a system of levels: social, constructive (system-forming) and regulatory. The upper level of the hierarchy - the social function - is conditioned by the factor of interaction between people, and the social functioning of a text as such is aimed at the organization of the social interaction between people – whether at the individual or group level. This function is seen as the most general and primary one, in relation to which all the others are secondary. The next level, derived from the

social function – constructive function – serves for the organization of the act of verbal communication as a socially structured system, where one side of the communication imparts a message to the other, with the intention to impact on the latter's behavior. And finally at the third functional level – regulatory – the text in a certain way determines the receiver's communicative activity through the latter's perception. It is in actualizing the regulatory function that a text presents itself as a whole/ totality. In the opposite direction, starting from the lowest level of the system – the lower function preconditions the upper one.

The three-level system of functions is closely connected with the communicative function of language. As for the other functions of language represented in a text: cognitive, expressive, emotive, and referential, Sidorov refers to their textual counterparts as functional features (2009: 139-143).

Two more fundamental conceptions are central to the sphere:

- ✓ Texts are organized at more global descriptive levels than that of the sentence (cf. the six segmental levels of language: phonemic, morphemic, lexemic, phrasemic, proposemic, supra-proposmic).
- ✓ The notion of strategic understanding comes to the fore when the role of language users is evaluated, with the factors of socio-cultural knowledge and mental models (Johnson-Laird 1983/1988).

The last point is connected with the awareness of the communicative and verbal character of human existence, the cognitive extent being an indispensable part of any discussion due to the factors of knowledge and information. Therefore, as

well as in the case of other linguistic disciplines, there has been a shift in focus from intra-linguistic phenomena (e.g. concerning the structural features of linguistic units) onto the dynamic processes of understanding, mental representation and processing of knowledge.

An illustrative approach to the problem of text processing on the receiver's part was presented by Roger G. van de Velde: "When discourse reception is directed towards the problem of how the properties of the verbal text can be dealt with, then it may be seen as a **descriptive** practice. When text processing is oriented towards the problem of what the producer meant by the verbal text and towards the complex problem of why (s)he selected/ imparted a specific message and why (s)he chose a specific formulation, it may be considered as an **explicative** enterprise. When text understanding pertains to the problem of how the receiver connects the text-oriented and producer-oriented information with her/his own value systems, criteria of judgement, etc, it may be conceived of as an **evaluative** practice". The theorist also observes that "the distinction between descriptive, explicative and evaluative interpretation does not reflect clearly delimited and autonomous stages of the total hermeneutic process" and that one and the same statement can be interpreted from more than one, or even all three perspectives. He gives the example, when one friend tells the other *your cake has a beautiful brown crust*, and specifies that the statement can be interpreted "as referring to a state of affairs (descriptive interpretation), as conveying the producer's communicative intention(s) (explicative interpretation) and as expressing/ evoking a positive appraisal (evaluative

interpretation)”, the differentiation serving mainly for methodological purposes (1992: 7-8) .

Certainly, text linguistics keeps in its focus problems that have traditionally been semantic, stylistic and grammatical. Thus, such lexicological/ semantic items as polysemy, figurative transference and asymmetry are in a sense text-linguistic too as empirical data necessary for their description are derived from actual texts/ contexts. So are stylistically marked units whose functioning is observable in terms of context, coherence and cohesion. As for Grammar, such theoretical tools as theme and rheme developed within the discipline prove useful at the supra-propositional level too.

Nevertheless, due to rapid growth the sphere which is interdisciplinary and multidisciplinary has exceeded such investigative perspectives as text vs. sentence; text vs. utterance; text: written vs. oral; text vs. non-text (these being indicative of stages in its development). Today’s focus is the opposition text vs. discourse – a situation which is not accidental. It is also conditioned by the fact that in human interaction are involved other media (semiotic systems) apart from language proper (e.g. gesture, dance, song, photograph, clothing, etc.). This means that non-verbal elements (e.g. in multi-modal texts) cannot be excluded from linguistic analysis as they are part of the overall system of the discourse and are regarded as para-texts accompanying verbal ones. Obviously, in our age of information and extensive communication defined as multimodal and inter-medial (with growing tendencies towards visualization) no linguistic discipline can remain isolated within formal limits. Neither can text linguistics.



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## **TEXT LINGUISTICS:**

### **General Tendencies and Main Areas of Investigation**

Text linguistics has been around for about half a century (since the late 1960s), and in all that time theorists have attempted to approach text from the grammatical, semantic, pragmatic, communicative, and in the recent years – cognitive angles. Characteristically, with every shift in focus its central category – text – has been handled in a new way with a result of a variety of definitions which is practically impossible to embrace. Apparently, the complexities: whether conceptual or meta-linguistic, are brought about by the nature of text itself.

The first stage of development of the discipline is characterized by research into the relations between the chains of sentences/ utterances, which enter larger units – supra-phrasal unities (or complex syntactic wholes), paragraphs, etc. Within the early approach, text linguistics displayed itself as ‘text grammar’ or ‘text syntax’, and we could say that in terms of the opposition surface structure vs. deep structure, the first period was devoted to the former.

Outlining the early period of the development of the discipline, Hannes Rieser notices that at the time “supra-sentential regularities could not be reconstructed by traditional morphological and syntactical tools”, and there was active discussion of methodological and fundamental questions, including “whether an interdisciplinary valid interpretation of texts was possible” on the basis of the description of text structure. “Since none of the philologies provided any descriptonal tools, support was expected to come from linguistics, which, however, at that time was not able to

reconstruct the syntax and semantics of texts either. Semantics, especially, was in a poor state then. These were vital aspects, the problem of supra-sentential relations and of text-interpretation in literature had great influence on the further development of text linguistics and on the direction of research". From this Rieser concludes that in its early days text linguistics "was descriptively oriented and did not have an integrating formal basis" (1978: 7).

Rieser also points out the use of the theoretical framework provided by generative grammar, its distinction sentence vs. non-sentence, notion of semantic acceptability in the attempt to find corresponding text terms by extending the existing ones. And so, the first text grammars were "strongly influenced by Chomsky's theory and Katz and Fodor's semantics" (1978: 8).

The next subsequent step towards a better understanding of a text was the construction of communicative text theories. Siegfried J. Schmidt outlines the following tendencies in the process (in brief paraphrase).

(a) The structuralist and generative linguistic methods in use in the fifties and sixties failed to explain transphrastic problems (e.g. anaphoric connections between sentences) in terms of linguistic communication (e.g. presuppositions) due to operating with too restricted models.

(b) The works of philosophers of language like Wittgenstein, Austin and Searle and works by Marxist psychologists like Sève, Wygotski and Leont'ev opened up a new approach to language as "verbal communication", which was interpreted as a form of social interaction.

(c) The questions how to define the relation of linguistics to social reality and how to justify its aims of research on the basis

of social and scientific assumptions came to the fore.

(d) The new understanding of language as a form of social interaction resulted in research into spoken everyday language.

(e) First (descriptive) analyses of verbal communication “supported the hypothesis that a natural language is not at all a homogeneous system but a framework that integrates very different kinds of “languages”, i.e. ways of communicating by means of verbal signs. Consequently the analysis of speech variation became an important object of linguistic research” (1978: 48).

There also grew the awareness that apart from the linguistic framework proper, with its focus of analysis on syntactic, semantic, textual structures, including topics and comments, structures common to all semiotic codes should be considered. In other words, the so-called outer framework of texts is relevant for text-linguistics too. The semiotic framework is thus understood to comprise two dimensions: semantic and pragmatic. The questions which concern the communicational situation of text production and text reception are seen within the semiotic framework of textlinguistics (Noth 1978: 24).

Explaining the semiotic framework, Wierzbicka finds it possible to compare a cookery recipe and a poem: “Within this semiotic framework we can observe that the poeticalness of this text depends on the *focus* (cp. Koch 1971), the mode of attention of the author or the reader of the poem. It is not the text, but the situational framework that changes when the author/reader takes a different attitude towards the text” (1978: 30).

In the 1980 – 90s there emerged a more or less unanimous view of a text as the highest independent unit of the communicative hierarchy with the tendency being from the

lower to the upper level: from the sentence and up to the text as a multitude of sentences. Differently, today a text *is considered* an important element of the communicative system, but not the only one as it itself exists in the system of discourse including the extra-linguistic background around and above the text.

The central investigative strategy of the second stage was the functional description of texts in the light of communicative and pragmatic perspectives, and the key notions of coherence and integrity were defined as basic parameters. In the communicative framework both text production and text reception were viewed, i.e. with the evaluation of the respective roles of both sender and addressee.

In the cognitive perspective of today's linguistic situation the emphasis is on the addressee, and the very same parameter of integrity of a text as an inherent quality is questioned against the possibility of viewing it as just being reconstructed (or rather constructed) by the addressee in the process of understanding. Similar sort of questions are asked about the elements, structures, processes and their location: whether they are intra-textual or are in the addressee's/ reader's/ hearer's mind (Chernyavskaya 2009: 12-13). To state it otherwise, the mental procedures involved in the reception, processing, representation and storage of knowledge are taken into account.

The opening up of the interpretive and cognitive perspectives in different disciplines (linguistics including) is connected with the philosophical (typically post-modern) evaluation of the role of the reader (hence interpretation) rather than the author (hence production) of a text (Cf. Roland Barthes' popular thesis about the death of the author). The next philosophical re-evaluation of science, culture, and

correspondingly in relation with text and text theory, is the acknowledgement of the human factor and the study of text from the standpoint of anthropocentrism (cf. the emphasis of the role of language user). The general philosophical bases of such so-to-call human-centred approaches are outlined by means of the following points:

- ✓ Text in the open system of art – society
- ✓ Dialogism, polyphony, intertextuality
- ✓ The image of author, authorial intent
- ✓ The personality of interpreter with the possibilities of subjective reading of a text
- ✓ Interpretation and its limits (the rights of the reader vs. the rights of the author vs. the rights of the text)
- ✓ The meaning of a text in the social-historical context
- ✓ The cognitive activity of the reader capable of constructing textual meaning with the least reliance on the author
- ✓ The main so-called anthropological centres of a text as ‘linguistic personalities’
- ✓ Anthropocentrism and emotiveness as text categories (Shchirova and Turaeva 2005 as cited in Chernyavkaya 2009: 17).

Thus, text-linguistic investigations can range from the descriptions of formal relationships among sentences and propositions to the social/ pragmatic character of particular instances of language use (e.g. in telephone conversation, dialogue in chat rooms, political speeches, scripts of various TV programmes, documents, etc.) and finally, discussion of the addressee’s/ reader’s/ hearer’s interpretive response. Clearly, the empirical data for such analyses are derived from naturally

occurring communication, or from registered (recorded, transcribed, etc.) textual material: whether fictional, or non-fictional.

In the context of the above-mentioned, we might ask a question about the size of a text, and whether it is relevant for identifying a text as such. Discussing very short textual entities, Widdowson accepts that “in certain circumstances single, isolated sentences can serve as texts”, and specifies that “it is these circumstances and not the size of the linguistic unit which determines textuality”.

Moreover, even one letter can function as a minimal text, like **P** signaling the place of parking. What accounts for such facts is “that they are a sort of shorthand: they stand for larger texts, rather like acronyms. Just as **PTO** at the bottom of a letter stands for the sentence *Please turn over*, so **P** stands for *Parking is permitted here* or *Here is a place for parking your car*, or something along these lines: shorthand” (2004: 6-7).

Another aspect of language in general, and text in particular, is linearity, due to which “sequencing is so important for communication, or the timing of backchannel cues in conversation, the switching between codes, the entire turn-taking system, repairs, etc”. As Jef Verschueren observes, “at the level of sentence structure, linearity determines the constraints on word order, in conjunction with the limitations on memory and planning. At the sentential and supra-sentential levels, aspects of information structure (such as the ordering of given and new information) and the progressive interplay between implicit and explicit meaning” provide communicative dynamics (1999: 151).

However, this property of language, as well as text should not be taken in the absolute sense. Widdowson compares an originally written text with a partial transcription of speech, and points at some illustrative differences. The first is that the transcribed record of unscripted conversation is non-linear as it is fragmentary and discontinuous. The second, paradoxical feature is that “the greater the precision the transcription strives for by the use of elaborate notation”, the more fragmentary and discontinuous the discourse, and “the further removed the transcribed text becomes from that which served to realize the discourse”.

The linguist explains this kind of so-to-call breach of linearity by the difference in perspectives: of the insiders/ participants and that of the outsider/ third person transcribing the communication: “We have here an observer’s paradox, but not that which Labov points out, and resolves, whereby a non-participant third-person presence impinges on the participation process itself (Labov 1972). This is the more intractable paradox that the very observation of an interaction necessarily misrepresents it, and the more precise the observed record, the greater the misrepresentation. The text of spoken interaction can only have an immediate discourse effect and is of its nature fugitive and partial. When transcribed, these features necessarily disappear. This we might call the paradox of irreducible subjectivity” (2004: 9-10).

Even this brief mentioning of differences shows that there is more about the text worthwhile scrutinizing than its syntactic or other arrangement. Widdowson proposes that text is a “different phenomenon altogether: the overt linguistic trace of a process of negotiating the passage of intended meaning, the pragmatic



process of discourse realization, whereby the resources of the language code are used to engage with the context of beliefs, values, assumptions that constitute the user's social and individual reality. In this sense, text is an epiphenomenon. It exists as a symptom of pragmatic intent. Of course, you can ignore this symptomatic function, disregard any discourse significance a text might have, and treat it simply as the manifestation of linguistic data. But since text always carries the implication of discourse, to do this is to analyze the textual product in dissociation from the pragmatic process which realizes it, and without which it would have no point" (2004: 14).

However, text-specific problems still remain in focus, and some extensively discussed, typical ones are:

- ✓ Text as a system characterized by coherence and integrity
- ✓ Typology of texts on the basis of communicative parameters and corresponding linguistic features
- ✓ Segmental units of texts (Cf. the principle of compositionality)
- ✓ Specific text categories
- ✓ The functioning of the segmental units of different levels in the light of the integrative aspects of texts
- ✓ Inter-phrasal links and relations (Turaeva 2012: 7-8).

Other classificational approaches are important for the sphere too. For example, the German linguist Hartmann holds that text linguistics can have three main scopes according to the degree of generalization: 1) General Text Linguistics, 2) Linguistics of a particular text, 3) Text-typological Linguistics (ibid).

In linguistic literature the theoretical problems of the sphere are also grouped according to their character and aspect of language use:

- ✓ Ontological – the way a text exists, its status
- ✓ Epistemological – the way objective reality is reflected in a text: with works of verbal art it is the correlation between the two worlds – real and fictional/ aesthetic
- ✓ Linguistic – the way a text is shaped in linguistic form
- ✓ Psychological – pertaining to the perception of a text
- ✓ Pragmatic – the author's position/ attitude towards the world of reality and the world of discourse.

What has been said so far illustrates the complex character of a text, that it possesses a global structure which is acquired due to the interaction between its deep and surface structures. The complexity of a text is also due to its formation/ compositionality as distinct from sentences/ utterances and supra-phrasal unities. Still another cause of complexity, another aspect, is the wide range of textual types and their high degree of variability (cf. fairy tales, lyrics, detective stories, newspaper articles, scientific publications, etc. with their communicative, structural and semantic peculiarities, not to mention the possibilities of hybridization and contamination).

In connection with the last aspect – typological variety – it should be mentioned that functional stylistics provides classifications of texts belonging to particular functional styles, genres, etc. However, in the typological perspective other methods can prove useful too: 1) according to the parameter of cohesion, and links established between the constituent elements, or 2) according to the communicative goal, and correspondingly according to the structural and semantic

peculiarities. In the second case the model of speech act proposed by R. Jakobson (1960) serves as a starting point. For example, when the factor of the sender of the message is stressed, the typological opposition reveals two types - individual and collective texts, the former typically represented by fictional texts, and the latter – pieces of scientific writing, legal documents, etc. On the other hand, when the focus is on the message itself, the opposition results in fictional vs. non-fictional texts.

Other types of structural analysis point to the existence of complete vs. incomplete, clichéd vs. non-clichéd texts, etc.

One of the best-known approaches to the system text – discourse is that proposed by Van Dijk and Kintsch, with the corresponding meta-linguistic development, a pair of terms: ‘macro-structure’ and ‘micro-structure’ for the comprehensive description of discourse. Thus, the notion of *macro-structure* is explicated as “representing the global organization of the semantic structure of a discourse”, and involving such notions as theme, plot, idea, or schema. “Macrostructures organize both the production, and the comprehension, storage and recall of complex verbal structures such as discourses”. The linguists also showed that “discourse comprehension is semantic, propositionally based, and that surface structure complexity only influences understanding under specific reading time restrictions”, and that “all processes involved in discourse understanding, question answering, problem solving, recall and recognition, etc. are not only based on those propositions which are explicitly expressed in the discourse, but also on those which are deductively or inductively implied by expressed

propositions. That is, discourse comprehension has an important inference-making component” (1978: 64).

Thus, identifying two levels of meaning in discourse – of “actual sentences and sequences of sentences” on the one hand, and of “parts of discourse or of the discourse as a whole”, they certainly stress the unity of the two. And so, macro-structure referring to the global content, at the micro-level “the semantics assigns sequences of *propositions* to the sequence of sentences of the discourse”, with the possibility that several propositions may be expressed by one sentence.

On the basis of the above, it goes without saying that the consideration of separate textual elements and units on their own (e.g. pronominal substitution, cohesive means, repetitions, key words, etc.), as well as in relation with the integral text (as part and whole relations), and further – with the discourse, is a common practice. We should also keep in mind that the study of the surface structure, however significant in terms of interphrasal relations and the hyper-syntactic dimension of text, is not sufficient if we are concerned with a more or less profound and comprehensive view of text (either a particular instance or in general terms) and textuality.

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## DISCOURSE AND TEXT

We are already aware of the notion that ‘text’ is an element in the communicative system, a result of communicative and verbal activity, a structure that emerges in the process, one that possesses its inner (intra-textual) regular features (lexical, logical and grammatical) due to which sequences of utterances are brought together to form an integral textual system in compliance with textual parameters. Textual integrity (understood as structural, semantic, functional unity) in its turn is conditioned by extra-linguistic and text-production factors and can be evaluated taking into account various communicative, social-cultural and cognitive factors.

As for ‘discourse’, the definitions vary from researcher to researcher, from one school or tradition to another. Three groups of definitions of discourse can be found:

1. Anything beyond the sentence
2. Language use
3. A broader range of social practice that includes non-linguistic and non-specific instances of language.

Z. Harris (1952), who was the first to use the term ‘discourse analysis’, viewed discourse from the formalist angle and considered it as the next level in a hierarchy of morphemes, clauses and sentences. This much criticized position is representative of the first group of definitions and obviously, the term ‘discourse’ includes the notion of ‘text’ as well.

The second notion of discourse is typically functionalist and keeps in view the purposes and functions of language and communication. As distinct from the first group of conceptions, here ‘discourse’ is an all-embracing category including not only

a propositional type of content, but also social, cultural and contextual<sup>1</sup>. Of relevance here are also other semiotic systems (e.g. kinesics, proxemics, bodily hexis) and paralanguage inasmuch as discourse is defined as multi-modal.

Interesting developments of the notion can be traced in different national investigative schools. Thus, in British and American tradition ‘discourse’ is understood to be connected speech, identical to conversation. Correspondingly, discourse analysis handles the interactive relationship between speaker and hearer – oral communication. An approach illustrative of that tendency is shown by Schegloff, who writes: “Discourse can, then, be a *contingent* product of participants in *ordinary* conversation; or it can be the *designed* product of a form of talk-in-interaction”. Thus, conversation is taken as a representative case (2001: 230). (Interestingly, in German linguistics the equivalent category is ‘Konversationsanalyse’, not – ‘Diskurs’)(Chernyavskaya 2009: 136-137).

Recalling Widdowson’s definition presented earlier, and referring to him again, we read: “When discourse takes the form of spoken interaction, the text is simultaneous and transitory and leaves no trace unless recorded” – a fine observation about the

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<sup>1</sup> Defining discourse as representing complex communicative events, Van Dijk points to such effects as access and control applicable to both the *context* and the *structures of text and talk*. Meanwhile, context is viewed as “the mentally represented structure of those properties of the social situation that are relevant for the production or comprehension of discourse”, consisting of such categories as “the overall definition of the situation, setting (time, place), ongoing actions (including discourses and discourse genres), participants in various communicative, social, or institutional roles, as well as their mental representations: goals, knowledge, opinions, attitudes, and ideologies”. Therefore controlling context means control over one or more of the categories (2001: 356).

instantaneous and elusive character of spoken text, which may mislead us to think that they are the same thing<sup>2</sup>. However, the linguist suggests looking at the transcribed version of such communication to see “how little of the discourse is actually made textually manifest”. With this awareness, and also taking into account the obvious differences between the oral and written registers, he writes: “Written text is different. Here we have a record made by one of the discourse participants, the writer, who enacts the discourse on behalf of both first- and second-person parties, but who, usually, only records the contribution of the first. The textual record is always necessarily one-sided.

The actual second-person reader, as distinct from the projected one, then has to interpret this text, that is to say, to realize a discourse from it. The discourse which the writer intends the text to record as output is, in these circumstances, always likely to be different from the discourse which the reader derives from it. In other words, what a writer means *by* a text is not the same as what a text means *to* a reader.” (2004: 12) This

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<sup>2</sup> Another observation about textual manifestations, spontaneous conversations, and pieces of “oral literature” by Wallace Chafe is of interest: “A person may remember a ritual or story or joke and repeat it later in another setting, though with language and content seldom if ever identical. But people do not repeat casual conversations in the same way. Someone might say, “That was a good conversation,” but no one would be likely to exclaim, “Let’s say the whole thing again tomorrow.”[...] “It is worth reflecting on the fact that the collection and study of texts has in the past been slanted toward narratives and rituals whose value lies in something closer to (though seldom identical with) verbatim repetition. Discourse of that kind is more persistent in memory, and in that respect is a little more like written language”. (2001:685)



long citation is meant to show another, more specific scope of the term – ‘the writer’s discourse’, or ‘the reader’s discourse’.

A much wider notion of discourse and its analysis is known in the French tradition, which having emerged in the 1960s and been influential in the 1970s, uses the term to refer to systems of human knowledge formed during social-historical development (cf. the third variety in the grouping above). According to M. Foucault (1972), discourse is part of discursive practice, a social historical type of information which correlates events to the world of discourse. In this version the linguistic element is of secondary significance, utterance being understood as a segment of human knowledge, part of discursive, as well as ideological and spiritual practice.

Ron Scollon and Suzanne Wong Scollon mention two interpretations of ‘discourse’ (and ‘discourse analysis’). On the one hand, it is about “close linguistic study, from different perspectives, of texts in use” (“Hallidayan functional linguistics, linguistic philosophy, pragmatics, and variation analysis (McCarthy 1991; Schiffrin 1994)”); on the other hand, “socially shared habits of thought, perception, and behavior reflected in numerous texts belonging to different genres”. They explain that the second sense, “discourse analysis grows out of critical, socio-cultural, sociological, or historical analysis”, and it is in this sense that the terms ‘Discourses’, ‘orders of discourse’, or ‘discursive formations’ (according to Foucault, Fairclough) are used (2001: 538-539).

A further development of the French tradition can be found in the works of the German theorists U. Maas, J. Link and J. Habermas. In this tradition the term discourse is typically applicable to literary criticism, and text is understood as part of

social practice, the latter conditioning a multitude of other possible texts. For the representatives of this school text analysis is transformed into discourse analysis on ideological bases, and discourse is viewed as existing in texts (Chernyavskaya 2009: 141-142).

Summing up the approaches to discourse, linguists observe that the latter is a special type of linguistic formation which is correlated with a field of social practice, human cognition and communication. And looking at the area, we see that the extension of the investigative scope from text-internal matters to the analysis of the social, cognitive and communicative environment as well – discourse, has resulted in the common use of such terms as ‘political/ medical/ legal discourse’, ‘discourse of fascism’, etc.

Apparently, especially if we look in terms of distinguishing text from discourse, two main conceptions are operative among linguists (actually summarizing what has been presented above). Moreover, the two conceptions are not opposed to each other, and according to the Russian linguist Chernyavskaya, they can be complementary to one another.

Thus, Discourse 1 is a particular communicative event represented in a written text or speech, taking place in particular cognitive and typological space, in other words, it is the text and the background around it. It is also defined as a communicative and mental process which results in a formal construction, i.e. text.

Discourse 2 is a totality of thematically correlated texts – ones that share a common theme, which can be disclosed inter-textually, i.e. through the complex interaction among numbers of individual texts. It is within this conception that discursive

formations (socially and historically established spheres of human cognition and communication thus termed by Foucault) are considered to be special discourses/ types of discourse (economic/ legal/ political discourse, etc.) (2009: 143-144).

A few remarks seem appropriate in connection with what has been said. Firstly, as distinct from discourse, a text is a relatively finite, formally limited entity having inner organization. Secondly, when discourse is referred to as a multitude of texts, the multitude is understood as open-ended, with the specification that discourse cannot be identified with a single text, neither is it formed from a separate text. As for text, it is a fragment of discourse and is meaningful in relation with it. Furthermore, any variety of discourse analysis starts with the textual level – text, which can, by the way, represent the intersection of a number of discourses (Discourse 2) realized in it. Finally, the inter-relatedness of text and discourse can be seen as continuity in which discourse also includes potential texts, and text includes the potentiality of so-to-call discursive realization in the reader's/ addressee's understanding/ interpretation.

Aimed at describing the nature and organization of conditions of human communication, text linguistics has to deal with text as a product of written or oral speech production. However, some linguists, and among them the prominent Russian linguist I. Galperin, adopt a narrower notion of text, excluding oral speech. Accordingly, he singles out the following parameters as decisive: completeness objectified in the form of a written document; formation in accordance with the type of the document; structure represented by a title/ heading and a number of supra-phrasal unities brought together by different types of

lexical, grammatical, logical and stylistic links, and serving for certain pragmatic purpose (Galperin 2009: 18).

Such an understanding of texts separates a written composition with its graphemic fixation from free-flowing speech with its linearity and sequential arrangement of utterances. Moreover, it is stressed that a physically materialized text (even a tape-recorded version) possesses a unique quality – it allows further reflections, multiple returns, which renders the text multidimensional.

In this connection we could employ the analogy with other forms (e.g. of art). Thus, like a piece of music which is being played, speech with its ‘fluidity’ so-to-call ‘dies away’ with no possibility to play it back at full and without considerable losses, whereas a recorded text (written, typed, tape-recorded), like any other visual text (painting, drawing, etc.) is ‘present’ in its totality with every part being open to observation. Moreover, a recorded text is beyond the time of its production as well.

Still, in more comprehensive terms, in either case (oral or written) we can and do deal with texts, and hence – the duality in the nature of a text: the fluid, dynamic spoken variety (like music, dance, etc. as they are performed) on the one hand, and still (like a still-life), ‘static’ manifestation on the other.

Stressing the central feature of the materialized variety once again – as distinct from spontaneous speech (discourse in the narrower sense) which is confined to a particular setting of space and time, its existence is in a sense beyond such dimensions. Furthermore, the awareness of this property of texts – especially texts of verbal art with their aesthetic impact - allows another theoretical/ philosophical conclusion – a text is both an open and closed system at the same time. We can use

the term 'closed' having in mind the limited and finite nature of texts as objectively existent entities having their own parameters independent of the consciousness of either speaker/ writer/ producer or hearer/ reader/ receiver. This is when the text is still and static, when it is so-to-call on its own.

However, the notion of text should not be reduced to its static /'isolated' state. Coleen Cotter gives an overview of analytical works to prove that text has not been examined as only "a static artifact", and identifies two tendencies ('vantage points'): "that of discourse structure or linguistic function, or according to its impact as ideology-bearing discourse". In either case a dynamic mechanism is involved that "results in the unique display of media discourse over time, culture, and context". Representative of the first perspective, she thinks, are Bakhtin's notions of voicing, Goffman's concept of framing, Bell's work on narrative structure and style, and Tannen's view of the media; and of the second - the interdisciplinary framework of critical discourse analysis (CDA), with Fairclough's focus on social theory and intertextuality in the study of discourse, Fowler's research into social practice and language in the news, and van Dijk's study of social structures and discourse structures (2001: 417).

To illustrate the point, let's look at how Norman Fairclough sees the correlation between text analysis and discourse analysis: "So, text analysis is an essential part of discourse analysis, but discourse analysis is not merely the linguistic analysis of texts. I see discourse analysis as oscillating between a focus on specific texts and a focus on what I call the order of discourse, the relatively durable social structuring of language which is itself one element of the relatively durable structuring

and networking of social practices. Critical discourse analysis is concerned with continuity and change at this more abstract, more structural, level, as well as with what happens in particular texts. The link between these two concerns is made through the way in which texts are analysed in critical discourse analysis. Text analysis is seen as not only linguistic analysis; it also includes what I have called interdiscursive analysis, that is, seeing texts in terms of the different discourses, genres and styles they draw upon and articulate together". (2004: 3)

Besides, as soon as we think of the 'actualization' of a text in the consciousness of the reader/ hearer/ addressee of the message, as well as its being exposed to the latter's understanding/ interpretation, with certain elements of creativity (in the case of fiction) and requirements of knowledge on their part, then we can insist the text is in a sense an open space with a multitude (though not limitless) of senses and a bulk of information which is changeable/ dynamic. Thus we speak of openness in regard to a text from the point of view of interpretation. Needless to say that together with the core of information shared generally by everybody, the openness also allows highly individual associations and even misinterpretation.

As Jacob Mey puts it, "the discourse aspect of a text is not just a passive one, a reader being (more or less successfully) entertained by an author; on the contrary, the success of the text depends on the reader's active collaboration in creating the textual universe", the reader's role being just as important as the author's for the story to be "successfully delivered and see the light of day" (2001: 793).

It is also considered that a text combines the systematic and individual. The factor of systematicity underlies the

communicative requirements – texts are modeled by patterns in accordance with the linguistic code. As for the individual features of a text, they are due to the infinite variability of the material forms that it can subsume (Turaeva 2012: 12).

As we can see, the text as an object of linguistic investigation is complex and multi-aspect. Suffice it to say that it has spoken and written realizations; can be fictional or non-fictional due to the feature of informativity or aesthetic impact; the factor of length can be decisive in its functioning as well, etc. Therefore, the approaches to the phenomenon of text vary too. Correspondingly, the following groups of approaches are traced:

1. Conceptions focusing on the static aspect – text as a static entity, result of speech production; its informative content is perceived as somewhat alienated/ detached from the sender, as the very form in which language is exposed to immediate observation.
2. Conceptions based on the notion of text as a process. Characteristically, ‘process’ is understood as involving both the realization of speech-producing ability, as well as the factor of language in action. In other words, the language – speech interface is stressed.
3. Conceptions emphasizing the causative power of a text – verbal activity as a source of text. Naturally, in this case text is viewed in its communicative dimension including both the sender of the message and the receiver.
4. Stratification conceptions which have evolved from the notion that a text is a level in the language system/hierarchy. Within this position, text is

understood as i) an abstraction (in terms of the algorithm/ model/ scheme of its production) and ii) in specific terms – as a particular text. In the first case we deal with the emic level (that of constructs), in the second case – the etic level (that of actual realization) (ibid).

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## TEXT AS A PRODUCT OF VERBAL ART

The discussion so far has shown that the concept of ‘text’ is used to refer to different objects and phenomena (cf. the varieties of textual realization). We also noticed the clear division between fictional and non-fictional texts. This straightforward distinction (even if there are cases of stylistic variation and uncertainty in terms of functional style, genre, or register in occasional instances – e.g. hybrid genres) is not accidental. Also, keeping in mind the analysis of approaches to the distinction between text and discourse (in the previous chapter), the meta-linguistic varieties, as well as the dynamic notion of text, we will derive useful hints from the following description by Elizabeth Black:

“There is no evidence that literary discourse differs from non-literary texts as text: as discourse it is clearly different. Literary discourse uses any devices available in the language. The text is self-contained: the context is created by discourse. All elements necessary for its interpretation must be built in. It is addressed to an absent audience; the message is conveyed indirectly through the words of the characters, which may be transmitted through the voice of a narrator. The result is an embedded discourse, where the meaning of a token can change according to the level it is placed on [...] Referentially, fictional discourse does not refer to the real world, but to an imaginary construct. While ordinary language may be described as ‘doing things with words’, literary discourse does not usually have, or expect to have, a direct impact upon the word. This clearly affects the reader’s attitude to narrative”. (2006: 15-16)

However, it is common to apply the term ‘text’ to a product of natural human language (primary modeling system), as well as to a product of verbal art (secondary modeling system).

Why natural human language is called a primary modeling system is due to the situation that with the help of language we conceptualize, categorize, and know the world around us by naming, describing and referring to the phenomena and objects of the real world, their features and relationships. In other words, we produce mental objects on the basis of the relevant features of real objects and phenomena. What happens in verbal art (and generally in art, also in semiotic terms) is that in it the so-called reflection of the world and authorial intention are unified, and thence a piece of verbal art represents another level – that of secondary modeling system. Moreover, in a sense, natural human language serves as a building material for fictional texts. As a result, the language of fiction is a special semiotic system common for, and unifying texts in different natural languages (See Turaeva 2012: 13-14). In this connection, it is worth mentioning that, as Yuriy Prokhorov explicates, ‘living’ reality is disconnected and devoid of the notion of purpose. Differently, fictional reality is structured and teleological, with the details, logic of characterization, etc. being intended by the author (See Prokhorov 2009: 68).

Along with the features referred to above, in textlinguistic studies such literary compositions are characterized by artfulness referred to as ‘poeticalness’. According to Wienold, Russian formalism was the first to study the literariness or poeticalness of texts considered ‘works of art’, and to point out that there is a change (or evolution) of evaluation of works of art

in time<sup>3</sup>. Wienold also mentions the factor of ‘aesthetic’ focus in evaluation, and finally – ‘fictionality’ (the way it is understood by Schmidt): “Schmidt 1972 considers ‘fictionality’ as a basic property that distinguishes literary texts from other texts; but, ‘fictionality’ in his analysis, is not a semantic property of such texts, but a property of their place in a communication system”. (1978: 135-136)

Typically, the language of fiction is said to be characterized by ambivalence of semantics, hence the freedom and multiplicity of interpretations. That feature of fictional language is explained by the fact that it makes use of verbal signs in their secondary code senses/ meanings. Moreover, the suggestive nature of poetic language conditioned also by putting together of incompatible notions, emergence of new associations and connotations, implicitness and covertness make the language of fiction (poetry including) complex and attractive.

Writing about the structure of narrative, in particular, Barbara Johnstone brings to the fore two main approaches, the understanding of which facilitates a better awareness of the notions content, structure, meaning as they refer to fictional text/ discourse. Thus, the first is that of Vladimir Propp (*Morphology of the Folktale*), who showed “what all folktales have in common and how they can differ is essentially that of linguistic analysis”. According to Johnstone, Propp's work might be called the *syntax* of the folktale, since it highlights the same syntagmatic deep structure in all of them, the same sequence of

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<sup>3</sup> Wienold refers to Jakobson’s system of the six functions of language, one of which is the poetic function, which as such is “characterizable by the linguistic indicators of poeticalness. Poeticalness, then, is assumed to explicate what is the artfulness of written works of art” (1978: 138-139).

“functions” or meaningful actions by characters. In other words, universal features are referred to as formal syntax.

The next approach, Claude Levi-Strauss's, is seen as formal semantics. Levi-Strauss described the abstract elements of meaning in myth, semantic contrasts such as male/female and raw/cooked. He too observed traditional and shared elements despite differences on the surface. Namely, the shared part is the limited number of basic themes. [Other theorists whose works are based on similar analyses are Roland Barthes, A. J. Greimas, Tzvetan Todorov, and Gerard Genette] (Johnstone 2001: 635-636).

In a text of fiction the three worlds – of reality, concepts/ notions and of meanings, come into interaction in most unusual ways. And while in case of common speech events the universal formula is ‘reality – meaning – text’, in the case of fiction, according to the Russian theorist Stepanov, we deal with the modified version – ‘reality – image – text’, in which the factor of human imagination is crucial (Turaeva 2012: 14).

As a result, fictional texts as artistic compositions are multi-layer. To handle the situation, in linguistic literature they distinguish between the ‘plane of content’ and ‘meaning’ of a text. The plane of content is the result of interaction between the meanings of linguistic units included in the text. As for the meaning of a text, it is considered to form at a higher level – in it the plane of content is correlated with contextual, situational and encyclopedic information. The latter is essential in the case of fiction and is connected with the background knowledge of the reader, as well as their social, cultural and educational background, which indirectly ‘enrich’ the text, and to be more exact – its interpretation, with associations.

Naturally, the reader's associations also reflect their time, and it is not surprising that different generations 'read' different additional information, different, e.g., from those of any earlier periods. Moreover, the reader's role is exceptional: but for him/her, the story wouldn't have the chance to be at all:

"The reader, as an active collaborator, is a major player in the literary game. His or her contribution consists in entering the universe that the author has created, and by doing so, becoming an actor, rather than a mere spectator. As a result, we do not only have cooperation, but also *innovation*. By acting the reader changes the play: what the reader reads is, in the final analysis, his or her own coproduction along with the author [...] the author depends on the reader as a presupposition for his or her activity, and the reader is dependent on the author for guidance in the world of fiction, for the "script" that he or she has to internalize in order to successfully take part in the play, have his or her "ways with words," to borrow a felicitous expression due to Shirley Brice Heath (1988)". (Mey 2001: 788)

Coming back to the peculiarities of fiction and its language – as any segmental linguistic unit of semantic, structural and functional organization, a text is observable in syntagmatic and paradigmatic relations. In the case of texts of fiction these are viewed in the semiotic perspective. Thus, the syntagmatic relations of/in a fictional text (such as those between the descriptions and episodes in the narrative space) are explicitly and finally set inasmuch as a text is objectively limited.

As for the paradigmatic correlations (i.e. the associative links around the text), they are weakly set and are practically limitless and implicit due to the complex nature of the structure of fictional language.

The understanding of the above type of relations in fiction as semiotic, and correspondingly their study as of semiotic systems allow us to view fictional texts as objects of text-linguistic investigation (and not merely of literary critical studies). One way of theoretical elaboration is to look for similarities between natural human language and the language of fictional literature.

As mentioned earlier, multiplicity of meanings and ambivalence are characteristic of the language of fiction, and two main factors play their role in it:

1. The first is that ambiguity is set by the author. Illustrative cases are small-size verbal pieces such as aphorisms, paradoxes and fables whose multiple interpretations are a matter of genre.

Let's consider some paradoxes by O.Wilde:

(from "Lady Windermere's Fan")

Lady Plyday: Women of that kind are most useful. They form the basis of other people's marriages.

Dumby: Experience is the name everyone gives to their mistakes.

Lord Darlington: Do you know I am afraid that good people do a great deal of harm in this world. Certainly the greatest harm they do is that they make badness of such extraordinary importance. It is absurd to divide people into good and bad. People are either charming or tedious.

(from "An Ideal Husband")

Mrs. Chevely: Women are never disarmed by compliments. Men always are. That is the difference between the two sexes.

Lord Goring: Everything is dangerous, my dear fellow. If it wasn't so, life wouldn't be worth living.

- Religions die when they are proved to be true. Science is the record of dead religions.
  - If one tells the truth, one is sure, sooner or later, to be found out.
  - The old believe everything; the middle-aged suspect everything; the young know everything.
  - To love oneself is the beginning of a life-long romance.
- (pp. 733-738)

2. The second cause of ambiguities can be the model of the world in the consciousness of the reader, the perception of a text being regarded both as a historical and individual category especially that a text exists not only in syntagmatic relations but also in paradigmatic ones as a manifestation of intra-textual, as well as inter-textual relations. {In the latter type of relations the notion of “mega-context” can be useful – when a text is correlated with other verbal and non-verbal ones}.

Needless to say, that the associative links between texts (paradigmatic dimension) may be brought about/ triggered by syntagmatic elements (i.e. elements of the same level). Such can be stressed or unstressed syllables, rhyming words, allusive expressions, episodes in the space of the plot, as well as characters. It is interesting to note that even seemingly accidental allusive elements can be central to the understanding of the meaning of the allusive/alluding text. Moreover, the phenomena of allusiveness and inter-textuality are not confined to the relations between verbal texts only, but can occur between different mediums as well.

E.g. the episode of the dance of Salomé before the Tetrarch Herod, when she demands as her reward “the head of John the Baptist on a charger” in O.Wilde’s play directs the reader not



only to the corresponding passage in Flaubert's novel ('Herodias'), the Bible, but also to the paintings devoted to the theme (e.g. of Rubens and Gustave Moreau), thus activating all the historical and cultural associative links that the reader has built up by the time of their 'encounter' with Wilde's play.

Studying narratives, which have appeared (or appear) in several media (e.g. book form, comic version, film, radio play, on stage), certainly opens new perspectives. On the basis of such analysis, Clark and Van der Wege claim that at least four phenomena should be paid due attention to:

1. *Experience*: People experience selective features of the narrative world as if they were actual, current experiences. These include visual appearances, spatial relations, points of view, movement and processes, voices, and emotions.
2. *Mimetic props*: People's imaginings appear to be aided by well-engineered mimetic props - direct quotation, gestures, stage sets, sound effects, background music.
3. *Participation*: Speakers and writers design what they say to encourage certain forms of imagination, but listeners and readers must willingly cooperate with them to succeed.
4. *Compartmentalization*: In participating in narratives, people distinguish their experiences in the story world from their experiences in the real world. (2001: 780)

The presence of the same theme, episodes, characters, even certain linguistic descriptions on the syntagmatic level (within the surface structure) throughout the different works allows paradigmatic extensions due to the mega-context and the reader's background knowledge. Obviously, the mega-context

and the background of knowledge place the text (in this case the other artistic compositions referred to too) in other dimensions.

In particular, we are all well-aware of the fact that the ontology of a text is closely connected with its existence in time and space, considering both its material realization and the character of human cognition. In other words, any text – whether fictional or non-fictional – exists in real-world time and space as a material object (book, manuscript, document, etc.) with its individual finite time.

Besides, a text as a phenomenon of culture with its spiritual value discloses itself in another type of space and time – conceptual, as a reflection of the features of real time at the level of concepts and notions.

Nevertheless, as an artistic composition with its peculiar ideal and creative aspects a text of verbal art has a world of images which belongs to a special conceptual space – fictional/artistic. The fictional variety of time and space is where the ideal world of aesthetic reality exists. And it is in this perspective that texts representing works of verbal art are beyond time and space; they are characterized by the category of semantic present (and perhaps presence too) being realized in the reader's (viewer's, audience's) time, as part of their world.

It should be stressed that artistic models of reality inspired by imagination are special forms of cognition in which real, perceptual and individual forms of time are interwoven, with the indirect reflection of time outweighing the direct reflection (the latter being the basis of documents, letters, newspaper articles, etc.).

The psychological and cognitive bases of the situation are that the temporal relations reflected in human consciousness do

not fully coincide with real time but are perceptual in character. Thus, perceptual or emotive time as distinct from real time is responsible e.g. for our experience of acceleration and slowdown – sensations that are connected with the phenomena of imagination, dreaming, recollection, etc. Naturally, the perceptual form of time is necessary for the spiritual realization of any text, and especially, pieces of verbal art, whose temporal distance from the reader is ‘overcome’ in the latter’s consciousness.

The aesthetic, cognitive and semiotic (and hence - text-linguistic due to the factor of intertextuality) value of verbal creativity is of special interest in the case of secondary texts, whose ontology supposes the existence of a prior text. Such are parody, pastiche, any variety of stylization, etc.

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## TEXTUALITY: Standards

To disclose the essence of a text especially in terms of its inherent features, linguists oppose a text to a non-text, i.e. a text vs. other linguistic units. The very quality that helps to identify a text is traditionally referred to as textuality, texture or textness – a complex of certain standards or parameters. Methodologically, the latter can be of **general** character – essential features/parameters which are definitive for a text as an object of analysis, any text; **typological** features of classes/ types of texts; **individual** features of particular texts providing their unique nature. Clearly, the general features go side by side with individual ones in a specific case.

In Russian linguistic tradition (Goncharova & Shishkina) the acknowledged invariant (general) features are the following:

- A text is a complete entity from the position of its producer, but open to multiple interpretations;
- It is a linear sequence of materially expressed linguistic signs (written or oral) whose semantic interaction results in certain compositional unity supported by lexical and grammatical relations between the elements of structures thus created<sup>4</sup>;

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<sup>4</sup> With the understanding that a text itself is a functional, semantic and structural unity existing as such due to certain rules of composition, as well as regular formal and semantic links, in the Russian tradition of text analysis the *supraphrasal unit* (complex syntactic whole) is viewed as the main structural unit of text. The supraphrasal unit (as a span of utterance) comprises a number of sentences linked to one another by connective means formally expressed through grammatical, lexical, or other categories. It is said that the supraphrasal unit lies on the border where the grammatical categories of separate sentences stop being connected. In other words, and looking the other way, the boundaries of supraphrasal units are defined by

- As an autonomous instance of speech production a text has specific propositional and thematic structure;
- A text is a realization of a certain communicative act on the part of the author(s), hence it rests on certain communicative and pragmatic strategies or text functions displayed through a system of verbal or contextual signals to be responded by the addressee (cited in Chernyavskaya 2009: 19)<sup>5</sup>.

Along with these general features invariably characteristic of any text, another frequently cited definition of textuality on the basis of 7 standards is found in Beaugrande and Dressler's "Text Linguistics". Well-aware of the wide variety of forms that texts take, the linguists specify that "a science of texts should be able to describe or explain both the shared features and the distinctions" that texts or text types display, paying attention to what standards texts must fulfil, how they might be produced or received, the purpose for which people use them, etc. In accordance with the questions put forward, they define a text as a 'communicative occurrence', which meets such standards as cohesion, coherence, intentionality, acceptability, informativity, situationality, intertextuality (Beaugrande and Dressler 1981).

Before looking at each standard individually, we have to note two things. Firstly, as the authors of this theory hold, if any

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relative semantic independence, often associated with the theme. Characteristically, when separated from its immediate context, a supraphrasal unity preserves its syntactic, and semantic independence (Novikov 1983: 9-14).

<sup>5</sup> Focusing on the written form of text, the Russian linguist I. Galperin includes such text categories in his system as informativity, divisibility, prospection, retrospection, cohesion, continuum, modality, auto-semantics of segments, integrity, completeness (See Galperin 2009).

of the standards is not met, the object under question is non-communicative, therefore it is a non-text. Secondly, the seven standards retain their constitutive validity both in terms of text-production and text-reception.

The first of the seven standards is **cohesion** and characterizes the surface structure of the text, namely the ways in which its components – the actual words – are mutually connected within a sequence, with the interdependence being grammatical. Naturally, the signals on the surface of the text are not independent of the deeper structure – meaning; moreover, one standard of textuality is closely connected with any of the others.

The second standard, **coherence**, concerns the ways in which the components of the textual world (the configuration of concepts and relations underlying the surface text) are mutually accessible and relevant. Stressing the logical and cognitive content of a text in terms of consistency (cf.: concept as a configuration of knowledge), as well as the character of relations between concepts, Beaugrande and Dressler explain coherence as being achieved due to such relations as causality (including enablement, reason), purpose, temporal proximity, etc.

For example, in the sentence provided by them, ‘falling down’ is the cause of the event of ‘breaking’:

Jack fell down and broke his crown.

Cf. also: Jack shall have but a penny a day

Because he can’t work any faster (reason).

Old Mother Hubbard went to a cupboard to get her poor dog a bone (purpose).

When she got there, the cupboard was bare (temporal proximity) (ibid).

An important observation by the authors is that coherence is not a mere feature of text, but ‘rather the outcome of cognitive processes among text users’, moreover, on the text receiver’s part ‘the adding of one’s knowledge’ is important ‘to bring a textual world together’ – the latter ability is called inferencing. Inferencing is possible as far as ‘text-presented knowledge’ meets with ‘people’s stored knowledge of the world’.

Despite being actualized in the communicative framework (for both producer and receiver), and therefore, observable in pragmatic and cognitive perspectives, coherence, and with it cohesion too, is a ‘text-centred’ notion, ‘designating operations directed at the text material’, in other words, characterizing the text on its own, the two standards (cohesion and coherence) are aspects of the unity of deep and surface structures<sup>6</sup>.

As for the remaining five standards, they are labeled ‘user-centred’, bearing on the activity of textual communication. Among them **intentionality** is mentioned first. It concerns the text producer’s attitude ‘that the set of occurrences should constitute a cohesive and coherent text instrumental in fulfilling the producer’s intentions’. Interestingly, in a sense, coherence

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<sup>6</sup> Stressing that the notion of coherence is applicable to a number of different realms of multidisciplinary research (e.g. physics, biology, psychology, logic), Roger G. van de Velde specifies that in text linguistics, ‘coherence’ refers to the “content properties and the communicative functioning of verbal texts”. As for the pragmatic scope of the term, he holds that it “may be considered as a function, not of the content properties of the cotext, but of the producer’s plans/ goals/ intentions/ motives”, being “contingent on the producer’s estimate of the receiver’s inferencing capacity and on the producer’s abilities/ skills/ willingness to act appropriately on that estimate” (1992: 26-27).



and cohesion act as operational goals, the awareness of which allows the realization of other discourse goals.

Again stressing the bi-lateral nature of communication in and through text, the next standard is **acceptability** – ‘the text receiver’s attitude that the set of occurrences should constitute a cohesive and coherent text having some relevance for the receiver’ in accordance with the producer’s intentions (cf.: the readiness on the receiver’s part to co-operate with the producer). The attitude of acceptability is closely connected with such factors as text type, social and cultural setting, etc., as well as the operation of inferencing.

The fifth standard of textuality is **informativity** understood as the extent to which ‘the occurrences of the presented text’ are expected or unexpected; known or unknown. Obviously, texts of a high degree of informativity (conveying new information, or from a new angle, involving a great many facts) are commonly appreciated by receivers despite being more demanding in terms of processing than less informative ones. However, one practical requirement in text-production is that neither extreme (overloaded informatively, or of little informative value) should be chosen.

The sixth standard is indicative of the factors which make a text relevant to a situation, and is termed **situationality**. In other words, the meaning of a text is defined taking into account the context of situation. The illustrative case that Beaugrande and Dressler provide is the road sign

**SLOW  
CHILDREN  
AT PLAY.**

The text taken on its own can be interpreted in different ways, however the situation that it is a sign for motorists makes it sound as a warning against speeding up, and not that the children playing are slow.

The last standard discussed in this theory of textuality is **intertextuality** and is connected with the fact that the utilization of one text depends on knowledge of one or more previously encountered texts. Here intertextuality is understood in text-typological terms, when a producer of a particular type of text should be aware of the typical patterns, characteristics, etc. of the group. Correspondingly, the receiver should be familiar with them too (at least to know what to expect).

Two observations are important with reference to these standards. The first is that variability is relevant in some cases, e.g. 'reliance on intertextuality may be more or less prominent'.

The second is that the seven standards are interconnected. As already mentioned, coherence is interpreted in close connection with the grammatical (syntactic) interconnection of the elements of the textual whole (cohesion); or coherence and informativity (also referred to as thematicity) can be viewed together in semantic terms, etc.

R.-A. de Beaugrande and W. Dressler's model of textuality has been influential for more than two decades, and many researchers refer to their conception relying on the opposition text – non-text<sup>7</sup>, among them are M.Halliday, R.Hasan, W.

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<sup>7</sup> The category of textuality is handled differently in two theoretical traditions: Western and Russian. In case of the first, definitions proceed from the necessity to identify a text against non-text; in the second – the focus is on textual categories vs. lower-level linguistic units (Galperin, Kozhina, Sorokin, Turaevaa, Chernyavskaya, etc.).

Heinemann, etc. The quotations from Halliday and Hassan stress the communicative and functional aspects too:

“[A] language that is functional. [...] Language that is doing some job in some context, as opposed to isolated words or sentences [...] any instance of living language that is playing some part in a context of situation, we call it a text. It may be either spoken or written, or indeed, in any other medium of expression that we like to think of”. (Halliday& Hassan 1985: 10)

The tendencies in the development of the discipline mentioned earlier, as well as the large number of approaches to the phenomenon can also be explained by the fact that the ontological status of text is somehow changing. Namely, today we can come across texts which are either incomplete or continuous, i.e. are not formally shaped as finite entities.

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Another linguist, Eikmeyer (1988) notes that a purely formal or syntactic approach is not sufficient for the study of texts, which on the formal level already “can be regarded as sequences of sentences”. He also mentions a number of factors “contributing to *textuality*, i.e. the quality which distinguishes texts from other sequences of sentences”. Such are:

- (1) lexical recurrences
- (2) word order
- (3) coreference and proforms
- (4) names and descriptions
- (5) time and aspect
- (6) actant roles
- (7) topic-comment structure
- (8) connectives
- (9) lexical relations between sentences
- (10) contiguity relations between sentences
- (11) causal relations between sentences
- (12) time and place relations between sentences
- (13) presuppositions (Eikmeyer 1988: 216).

Such are Internet chats, or Internet novels continuously written by many authors – the latter as an example of net literature existing in an interactive creative medium, in which the roles of author and reader are redefined, and the community of co-authors uses new technologies allowing the change and transformation of the product of their co-authorship irrespective of the distances between the internet users.

Another dramatic change is connected with the recent notion of ‘hypertext’, in which the traditional linear structure of text is reorganized into a non-linear branching text which contains links allowing users to move from one piece of text to another. As a method and mechanism of non-linear structuring, hypertext becomes the form of fiction as well – hyper-novel, hyper-story, hyper-drama, hyper-poetry, etc.

Obviously, with the changes of the traditional form of text its features/ standards become highly variable and consequently demand reconsidering. For example, coherence rests on the notion of integrity, whereas whether it is an inherent feature of text itself or a matter of perception remains open, considering the existence of net literature. Besides, linguists provide data (on experimental bases) that even when given unrelated sequences of words and sentences, participants of experiments perceive them as texts, seeking for meaning and communicative goals (See Novikov 1983). An exemplary discussion can be found in S. Fish’s article ‘How to Recognize a Poem When You See One’ (2007).

Such data allow researchers to insist that coherence is not ‘in the text’, but one can understand a text as coherent, therefore ‘integrity of text’ is defined as a psycho-linguistic phenomenon, i.e. from the standpoint of the receiver.

On the other hand, it is obvious that a total separation of the text from its author and the neglect of authorial intention would mean undermining any consistent understanding of what the text's meaning is.

To 'harmonize' the two positions, linguists suggest that coherence (which could also be viewed as textual integrity) should be understood as an in-built mechanism of a text allowing/ triggering cognitive processes in the receiver, the latter taking an active part. In communicative terms, the receiver's role is not merely that of the addressee but also of an independent individual capable of interpretation. Naturally, the communicative strategy of the sender is present in the text in the form of various communicative signals which influence the addressee and their response. On the other hand, the receiver has communicative-pragmatic goals too – to decode the intended meaning by using their background knowledge. In other words, integral textual meaning is not independent of the perceiving/ receiving/ interpreting consciousness.

A dynamic model of textuality is the following one proposed by Feilke, comprising the features of **generativity, universality, contextuality, processuality, intentionality** and **dialogism**.

Generativity concerns the ability to produce a virtually limitless number of verbal messages with a communicative-pragmatic effect.

Universality implies the existence of universal cognitive and semantic strategies of text-production, which are beyond the restrictions brought about by the system of a particular language.

Contextuality stresses the aspect that a text functions as a social as well as verbal structure, and that the integrity of a text can be explained only if its contextual links, social-cultural, psychological, historical and other factors are taken into account.

Processuality is a text-producing competence oriented towards the process of creating a text as a complex linguistic sign.

Intentionality is connected with the fact that a text always involves a situation-based action/ series of actions.

The dialogic aspect is conditioned by the character of communication independent of the mode – oral or written, and includes the addressee's factor (cited in Chernyavskaya 2009: 35).

The discussion of the main features of a text would be incomplete if we overlooked the notion of textuality as a prototypical phenomenon. In this perspective a basic methodological principle is that text categories are not immanent or unchangeable, and the object of investigation is characteristically the text as a concrete phenomenon rather than an abstraction.

In very general terms, the prototype theory can be summarized as a semantic theory (e.g. of words) according to which meanings are identified (in part at least) by characteristic instances of whatever class of objects, etc., a word denotes. A classical example is of song birds (such as a robin) as having more of the central characteristics of a bird than others (ducks, ostriches, penguins, etc.). Thus, a robin (or the like) is a prototypical instance, or prototype of a bird, and it is argued that the meaning of 'bird' should in turn be identified by its

prototype: ‘robins and the like in the first instance, plus other species that, to varying degrees, share some of their character’ (OLD, see also G. Lakoff, E. Rosch, R. Langacker).

The question arises how the theory of prototypes applies to a text theory. In particular, if prototypicality is interpreted as an exemplary variant of a class of objects against the abstract invariant as a generalization from concrete instances, it is argued that a prototype being a particular object includes both invariant and general, as well as variable and specific features. Thus, prototype and invariant are clearly distinguished – an invariant is not a typical example having specific features (a prototype is), but one that involves minimum systematic features of the most general nature.

So, just as the semantic structure of a word is defined as having central and peripheral parts, so is a text characterized by means of features which are invariant/ central, and ones that are variable/ peripheral, with the balance between them varying in accordance with the type of the text.

The main advantage of the prototypical approach is considered to be the fact that it is effective in disclosing the nature of typologically heterogeneous texts (novel, scientific article, cookery book recipe, telephone conversation, e-mail message, word-texts, etc.) as examples of a textual prototype with variable validity of its separate features: whether cohesion, coherence, thematicity, or cultural markedness, intertextuality, etc. It is important to note that the variability is not opposed to the qualitative definiteness of the text, but highlights the interpretive activity of the receiver with their textual competence (Chernyavskaya 2009: 40).

For example, even if the usual features of textuality (in terms of prototypical organization) are not manifest in a text: such are the cases of very brief or one-word texts ('Underground'; 'No smoking'), or non-verbal texts/ signs of the conceptual type of 'empty multitude' (an empty envelope instead of a letter as an expression of a standpoint; Malevič's 'Black Square' and 'Red Square'; John Cage's musical composition consisting of 4min. and 33 sec. of total silence), we deal with texts which have communicative goals, intentionality, and are open to interpretation.

One last remark about textuality is our awareness that all human knowledge is textual being represented in texts, registered as well as created in them, hence - the cultural, social and historical dimensions of texts due to systems of concepts, associations, presuppositions, etc. employed in connection with them.

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## TYPOLOGY OF TEXTS:

### Functional Styles, Genres; Text-Typological Competence

As a linguistic category, a text is characterized in typological terms since any text is representative of a particular class of texts, i.e. it is a realization of a text type. It is even considered that we can hardly think of text as an abstract phenomenon, rather it is a concrete instance. Certainly, as such texts can be viewed from linguistic (rather – intra-textual: grammatical and semantic, for example) and extra-linguistic standpoints. It is natural to assume in this connection that the identification of the central category in typological investigations can be complex, considering the variety of perspectives; moreover, it is in fact so in terms of the meta-linguistic handling as well. Thus, to refer to the central phenomenon – class of texts - such terms as *text type*, *genre*, *field-related genre*, *style* may be used.

The more inclusive term in the text-typological perspective is text type: “Text types are understood as basic cognitive operations which are manifest in text segments and speech acts – for example, description, narration, exposition, argumentation, and instruction (cf. Werlich 1976). These text types constitute traditional text forms, known as genres and subgenres, and stretch from fiction to non-fiction. Thus, genres cover both literary discourse and technical or scientific discourse” (Gläser 2005: 130).

As mentioned earlier, there exists a certain overlap between typological and functional stylistic problems and their elaboration. The first point of intersection is related to the

understanding of the major categories of *functional style*, *text type* and *genre*, and further – their classification bases.

Typically, when defining functional styles, such extra-linguistic factors as the form and sphere of public communication, type of activity, communicative goals, typical content, etc., are taken into account, matters that occur in the focus of text linguistics as well.

Another point brought to the fore, considering the awareness of the variety of manifestations of language in use is that a functional style is not a solid and homogeneous formation; rather it can be modeled by the so-called ‘field’ principle – with the core of the style and its peripheral variations (cf.: the prototypical approach to text) (Chernyavskaya 2009: 53).

The discussion of the terms *functional style*, *genre* and *text type* is a matter of tradition too. Thus, in the Russian theoretical elaboration the notion of functional styles was developed using the method of deductive reasoning – following the methodological procedure general/abstract > specific/concrete. According to Chernyavskaya, illustrative of the tendency is the category of *substyle* with its specific cases of, e.g., *scientific-informative*, *scientific-critical*, *scientific-popular*, *scientific-educational*, etc. being identified.

Within the same tradition they also differentiate between *speech genre* and *style*, specifying that the distinction is a matter of theorizing and degree of abstraction and not that we deal with two separate phenomena. In particular, *genre* is understood as ‘a concrete variety of textual compositions unified by common purpose, compositional form and theme’ (ibid).

We could compare the definition with the one found in the Western tradition: ‘A use of language which conforms to certain

schematic and textual conventions, as agreed by particular discourse community' (See Widdowson 2011; 2004). In the second case, the typological unit of textual analysis is *genre*.

A very similar description of 'genre' is produced by Elizabeth Black:

"Genre is comparable to schema: it draws on our previous knowledge and experience, and offers a framework for interpretation. Genre is part of our knowledge structure, and functions in a way similar to schemata. Both underlie our initial approaches to a text. Genre is a pre-setting device, which predisposes the reader to approach a text in a particular way; it tells us whether what follows is likely to be a joke, business discussion, chat, novel or poem.

The expectations we bring to a text are also affected by its appearance including what Genette (1982) calls paratextual features. This encompasses the physical appearance of the text including the binding, the cover, the identity of author and publisher, the date of publication and other factors. We are aware, for instance, that informative text is often set out in columns: as in newspapers, dictionaries and encyclopaedias. We would be surprised to find a novel set out in this way, just as the convention has developed that poetry is set out in such a way that the line breaks indicate the rhythm. All of these things guide our initial approach to a text. In that sense, they are physical clues to the genre to which it belongs (or is aping). It is essential to a full understanding of a text to know what generic conventions the author is invoking, and the system of expectations that a competent reader brings to its interpretation". (2006: 37)

As referred to above, the methodological basis here is diametrically different, i.e. it is inductive and empirical. In other words, the accumulation of empirical data and observations of concrete instances of speech/ discourse serve as a starting point for further systematization, classification and typology. And it is for this reason that the discourse analytical definitions of genres are comparable with our common/ everyday notion of them – advertisement, interview, newspaper article, etc (because they proceed from immediate observations). There are estimates that the types of text known to a common user of a language range from 1600 to 2000.

The possibility of the two tendencies is raised also by Siegfried Schmidt, who contemplating about the general problems of text typology, writes: “There are two basic possibilities: Either one starts with pre-theoretically characterized types of texts (as objects under observation) and tries to produce a formal reconstruction of the heuristically assumed types by means of a consistent text theory; or one constructs an efficient text theory which allows the production of text types as theoretical constructs, which may then be empirically tested”. Besides, considering that communicative text theories are aimed at analyzing “verbal texts in contexts of communication”, it is stated that so-called external markers (e.g. characteristics of the communication situation, medium, expectations of recipients, the social norms and conventions for the combination of external and internal markers) should be derived from an explicit model of communication; and internal markers (e.g. stylistic devices, choice of tenses, choice of meta-communicative signals, of illocutionary indicators, of stereotypes for opening and finishing a text, etc.) can only be

specified in the framework of an explicit text theory (1978: 55).

Schmidt also puts forward a number of questions concerning the social and individual conditions of text production and reception: “Is it for example possible to reconstruct the complex (network of) factors as “worlds” (in the sense that logic uses the term), consisting of systems of presuppositions? How much information about specific situations can be incorporated into the lexicon of a text grammar? How is it possible to gain empirical data constituting complex situations? What kinds of methods are required (and how can they be developed) if we are to be enabled to infer from texts the various elements making up a complex situation or to predict how known influencing factors will regulate text production/reception?”

The answer, she thinks, is to construct “a standard model of text production (or text reception) which would contain as many influencing elements as can be found or imagined at the moment. Such a model ought to contain not only lists of items but also a representation of relations between the items and some sort of hierarchical order according to the degree of recurrence of the items in communication processes and/or the degree of influence on text production/reception. This model might function as a heuristic device which would take into account all social, psychological, logical and encyclopedic aspects relevant to the theoretical reconstruction or the formal representation of individual communication acts or the meaning of an individual text” (1978: 53).

Discussing matters of style and text typology too, Nils Erik Enkvist suggests another empirical method; namely, that a text be compared “with a network of other texts or text types which

are regarded as significantly related to the original text, and therefore worth the comparison. Out of this process, the impression of 'style' arises as a result of the sum total of those features that make a text similar to, as well as different from, the features in the network used for comparison. Style is thus a relation, a differential. Which particular texts or text types should furnish the background and yardstick for the comparison is determined by what we are after. To pin down characteristics of an individual style we must obviously compare a text produced by the relevant individual with a network of comparable texts - a 'norm' for short, if the term can be shorn of its evaluative connotations - produced by others. To arrive at genre styles texts from one genre must be compared with texts from other genres. To describe period styles texts from one period will be related to texts from another period. And to describe styles used in a particular speech situation it must be seen how texts emanating from this situation differ from texts emanating from other situations. The total impression of the style of a text may often arise from a complex network of such comparisons, which are performed by matching a text against a whole set of experiences of other texts, similar and different, that emanate from a spectrum of contexts, situations and backgrounds". (1978: 174-175)

According to de Beaugrande and Dressler (1981: 10): "Text types are classes of the text with typical patterns of characteristics"; "A text type is a set of heuristics for producing, predicting and processing textual occurrences, and hence acts as a prominent determiner of efficiency, effectiveness and appropriation".

Another insightful observation about grouping texts into

classes is Hasan's: "The generic membership of the text is determined by reference to the structural formula to which the actual structure can be shown to belong. A text will be perceived as incomplete if only a part of some recognizable actual structure is realized in it; and the generic provenance of the text will remain undetermined, if the part so realized is not even recognizable as belonging to some distinct actual structure". Hasan employs the term *structural formula* to explain his position as "any well-defined configuration of the elements of the structure of a text", each such element being realized by "some combination of lexico-grammatical units; the relationship between these and the text is that of realization". However, importantly, the elements of text structure cannot be defined by reference to the rank status or sequential ordering of the lexico-grammatical units only - the definition should be functional, the functions themselves being determined by the semiotics of the text genre. Hasan's argument is that "A text is a social event whose primary mode of unfolding is linguistic. If text can be seen as a bridge between the verbal symbolic system and the culture, this is because of the relationship between text and social context: text is 'in language' as well as 'in culture'. It follows from this relationship between text and context, that the specification of structural formulae for distinct genres requires a model of language in which context is a well-defined category" (1978: 229).

Thus, a text type is a model of constructing and perceiving similar texts, or structural prototypes on the basis of which other texts of varying content could be produced. In a certain sense, such a text type /genre could be understood as an invariant model, a structurally organized form, but which is at the same



time characterized by certain productivity, and hence – involves variable features in each individual instance.

The use of the descriptive phrases ‘model of construction/ production’ and ‘individual instance’ is not accidental, but points to a standard of textuality known as prototypical/ typological intertextuality – the systematic/ typological openness of texts of one functional style/ type/ class to one another (Chernyavskaya 2009: 63). Typological intertextuality is based on the phenomenon of stereotypical character of components in the structural and compositional organization of particular texts. This in its turn implies that an individual text is intertextually correlated both with a definite typological model of producing and processing similar texts (on the basis of systematic/ invariant features), and with other individual texts of the same type (on the basis of individual features).

One remark seems appropriate taking into account the British and American use of the term *genre* understood as ‘text type organization’ (‘field-related genre’). It is that the term is not confined to non-fictional texts but is also applicable to structurally organized forms of literary pieces (fiction).

It might also be useful to remember the term *register* explained by means of the term *functional style* but defined through a more detailed notion and used to refer to more particular uses and varieties of language. *Register* is considered to involve three dimensions: field (the subject-matter, specialized or predominant themes of discourse, e.g. language of law, political speeches, etc.), mode (manner of transmission of linguistic message: written, spoken, telegraphed, etc.) and style (language characteristics that mark different relations between the participants in a linguistic communication).

When viewing texts in typological terms it is important not to overlook the balance between the tendency towards standardization and the functioning of the stereotypical in text production and reception on the one hand, and the factors of creativity and variability, on the other. Furthermore, since various structures of textual organization underlie a textual prototype, in establishing the standard and recurrent features of a particular type of text the correlation between the functional (illocutive) and propositional (thematic), as well as formal aspects should be taken into account.

An interesting investigative method known within text-linguistic tradition is the German linguist K. Brinkner's approach developed for the description of the models of text formation (1992):

1. Description of text function;
2. Description of the form of communication;
3. Description of thematic restrictions imposed on the temporal and local orientation of the utterances;
4. Description of the development of the theme;
5. Description of verbal (lexical and syntactic) and non-verbal means of realization of the specific thematic model in the concrete text (cited in Chernyavsaya 2009: 66).

Especially stressing the plane of content in their analytical handling of the functional characteristics of text types, text linguists exploit the notion of **subtexts** – fragments within a textual whole, characterized as invariant components in terms of communicative goals and thematic value.

Thus, on the example of advertisements (written messages of public character designed for different community groups),

such subtexts as ‘image of the author’, ‘image of the addressee’, ‘image of the future/ image of the result’, ‘specific conditions for the achievement of the aim’, etc. are singled out. Subtexts being invariant components, the balance between them in each specific variety of advertisement may change in compliance with the concrete communicative–pragmatic goals, etc.

For example, in adverts calling for friendship and/ or marriage the semantic focus is on the subtext ‘author’s image’ and is linguistically expressed to cover such information as gender, positive characterization, professional, social skills, financial status, etc. Naturally, the other subtexts may be somehow reduced.

In other cases other subtexts may come to the fore – e.g. in wedding, baptismal announcements the subtext of ‘event’ (including such details as personal information, names, time and place of the event, etc.) is of more importance.

The above allows to conclude that the type of text (genre) is a form of formalizing human communication, recalling the definitions ‘schematic and textual conventions’, ‘typical patterns of characteristics’, ‘structural prototype’, ‘invariant model’, etc. Besides, illustrative of the point is the mutual awareness on the sender’s/ author’s/ speaker’s and addressee’s/reader’s/ hearer’s part of the balance between text-production and text-reception and the choices connected with them (e.g. in the light of ‘adapting forms of expression to interpreter roles’ – recipient design, as well as the factor of assumptions and expectations of the virtual interpreter, on the other hand).

Needless to say, that not only the addressee/ reader should be competent (whichever term being used for the occasion – ‘super-addressee’, ‘super-reader’, ‘full-knowing reader’, etc.),

but the text should provide thematic, functional and illocutive unity to meet the expectations.

Being one of the central fields of text-linguistic studies, typology reflects the modern tendencies in investigative developments and has acquired a cognitive dimension too, stressing the role of the interpretive mechanisms (on the basis of knowledge and cognitive procedures) and relying also on cognitive psychological data. Accordingly, such seemingly paradoxical phenomena as possible deviations from textual standards or changeability of textual organization can be easily handled as manifestations of dynamism and creativity – keeping in mind the methodological requirement that any norm implies variants (and variability).

We could hardly imagine any truly human communication which is absolutely formalized and has no (even the least) unexpected turns or twists – whether as a result of some errors or playful interaction. Despite and maybe even due to such variability, communication becomes richer, and we would never stop admiring a masterfully contrived metaphor even though its use may be thought to flout the maxims of conversation.

Obviously, what helps any conversation going and serves as a basis for understanding is shared knowledge. In cognitive psycholinguistics they discuss the category of cognitive modules – communicative-cognitive competence, without which no communication/ dialogue/ understanding would be possible. A cognitive module comprises: 1) linguistic competence (structurally organized systemic knowledge), 2) sociolinguistic competence (the ability to use systematic knowledge of language in accordance with the communicative pragmatic situation), 3) functional competence (ability to interact on

regulative bases), 4) socio-cultural competence (readiness and ability to conduct a dialogue between cultures on the basis of one's own and other cultures), 5) strategic discourse competence (ability to identify various utterances/ texts and produce linguistically and communicatively adequate ones) (Almazova 2003, in Chernyavskaya 2009: 73). Needless to say, the cognitive module will not exclude the knowledge of the standards of text production.

In more specific terms, and as part of communicative competence, theorists also identify the category of text-typological competence – the way our awareness of a text model/ text type is represented in our consciousness. (And we still keep in mind that ‘text type’ is a theoretical construct, i.e. one developed by theoretical methods and for theoretical purposes though certainly on empirical grounds).

Text typological competence as knowledge about the global textual variants is also referred to as ‘superstructure’: “Superstructures must be not only in the text, but also in the reader's or listener's mind. One must know about conventional schemata before one can use them” (Van Dijk, Kintsch 1983: 25). Naturally, such competence is a matter of extent, considering the fact that it is connected with knowledge (cf. ‘conventional schemata’), which can be general encyclopaedic or specialized. For example, a lecture as a model of text will be recognized (identified) by everyone, but a university lecturer (or a student) is sure to have more precise and detailed information and hence better awareness of it than a lay person. Besides, text typological competence can be differentiated from two angles: production (e.g. lecturer's position) and reception (that of students); in the first case we deal with the ability to create

(such) texts in accordance with the model, and in the second – to identify the textual features.

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## TEXT, COMMUNICATION, MULTIMODALITY

The notion of text and its understanding would be incomplete without another perspective – multimodality of communication, as far as text as a communicative unit (whether spoken or written) is hardly possible to view as a merely verbal phenomenon. In other words, in today's context of variety of realizations and forms of expression, we impart what we intend as message, using all the relevant channels, modes, semiotic means. Thus, for example, if a text is in its typewritten form, the style, design and other elements of formatting, including the shape and size of font(s) used will be meaningful, not to mention such para-textual visual elements as illustrations, even short video clips. As for the textual entities in the internet space, their hyper-textual branching links and references make the situation even more complex.

On the other hand, oral communication is naturally richer because we use not only natural human language but also other semiotic systems, i.e. other 'languages': body language (gestures), facial expression, paralinguistic means, etc. actually employing all the possible channels and modes. Furthermore, not only do we help our expression with non-verbal means, for example emphasizing separate words or concepts in our message, but also the very process of thinking as a type of self-communication. Many of us would remember having experienced states preceding verbalization which involve images, complex entities consisting of kinaesthetic, acoustic or visual elements. The emerging of a thought may be signaled or accompanied by some elevated state of spirit, involuntary/

spontaneous gesture, etc. Due to the factor of memory, we might recall some familiar rhythm, or even smell as part of the process.

Besides, there is another aspect of multimodality which concerns language itself. As the most common means of communication, natural human language is not isolated from other semiotic systems. For example, a usual term that we would choose to describe a vivid expression is ‘graphic’, or we ‘visualize’ as we read or hear a textual piece. Still another argument would be iconicity in language (e.g. onomatopoeia), where the complex signs add dimensions to the strictly verbal message.

Thus, it is clear that the multisensory way we perceive and experience the world is certain to condition multimodal expression and communication. This in its turn means that text as an object of investigation calls for interdisciplinary study with a major focus on multimodality. The term ‘multimodality’ needs further clarification, but prior to that let’s look at the notions ‘somatic experience’, ‘senses’, ‘sensations’, etc.

It is generally acknowledged that human senses, sensations, and sense-making are of social, hence cultural significance. Vannini, Waskul and Gottschalk observe that such American pragmatist philosophers as Mead, Dewey and James show that “sensing is an active and interpretive process, rather than a passive reaction to external stimuli endowed with pre-formed meaning” (2012: 11). The researchers also point at anthropologists’ interest in ‘sensations as texts’, and attempts to develop theoretical, conceptual, methodological, and disciplinary fusions “less based on linguistic cognition and more on embodied, multi-sensual, multimodal, pre-objective, and carnal ways of knowing” (2012: 14-15). Importantly, sensing



and sense-making are held as codetermined and “mutually emergent in active and reflexive practices in which we are both the subject and object of the sensations we perceive” (ibid).

And so, “the senses emerge through a process of objectification of one’s sensations”. This means that reflexivity is involved in the process – “somatic experience is mediated by reflexivity” (2012: 19).

It is considered that human sensory experience is mediated by somatic work in the so-termed cultural world and the existential world. The cultural world is structured by negotiated/conventional ‘somatic rules’, which “vary by personal, interpersonal, contextual, social, cultural, material, geographic, and historical circumstances”. The latter can be “as symbolic as corporeal, as cultural as physical; as ritualized as creatively improvised” (ibid). Thus, sensing (as well as reflection) is considered a social practice (not just a physiological effect).

Here are a few illustrative cases of the social character of senses and somatic work.

In the context of sporting or dancing activity, body movements involve different sensorial dimensions: the angle of the head and torso, for example, and choices are made on the basis of touch, aural and visual dimensions of movement. Vannini and his co-authors also give the example of cricket players choosing their bats: picking up, holding out at arm’s length, swinging, twisting, and swishing through the air (2012: 27). The same will be true of the awareness of embodiment on a tennis player’s part. Still another example is learning to breathe according to yoga standards with a special emphasis on rhythm, balance, and movement, and again with reflexive efforts. Actually, the socialization of any other bodily activity will

qualify for such a discussion, considering the learned/ taught, communicated, shared, and hence – social aspects of human senses.

Further distinction is made by Huxley between sensing and perceiving: “Sensing is not the same as perceiving. The eyes and nervous system do the sensing, the mind does the perceiving. The faculty of perceiving is related to the individual’s accumulated experiences, in other words, to memory” (quoted in Vannini et al 2012: 18).

Obviously, the way we sense and perceive is often a matter of learning and tradition, “a useful habit formed by our brains” (as phrased by Bill Nichols and quoted in Vannini et al 2012: 152).

A good example of a habitual way of seeing the world is provided by Daniel Chandler (2004: 152). Explaining that it takes deliberate effort to become more aware of everyday visual perception as a code, he proposes ‘bracketing’ visual perception as an experiment.

Sitting facing the same direction for a few minutes, without moving the body, and taking the visual impression without separating the objects and spaces will result in a two-dimensional space – a surface covered with spots. Artists usually know this experience very well, also because they “convert three dimensions into two”.

Chandler explains our ability to perform relative shifts in the apparent shapes and sizes of people and objects in the world due to changes in viewpoints by two mechanisms – categorization and perceptual constancy. The latter, according to Nichols, ensures that “the variability of the everyday world becomes translated by reference to less variable codes. The

environment becomes a text to be read like any other text” (quoted by Chandler 2004: 152).

As for ‘multimodality’, Vannini, Waskul and Gottschalk view it as part of the existential world along with sensory/sensori-motor transformation of signals, and emergence<sup>8</sup>.

However, multimodality is a much more complex phenomenon, and it is not only about the simultaneous engagement of different senses such as seeing, hearing, touching, smelling, etc. in the subject (person). More importantly, as a theoretical approach, perspective, or method developed within media and communication studies, it refers to textual forms. In particular, the term ‘multimodality’ has been used for the past decade to explain such textual forms in which, according to Heidi Peeters (2010), “the borders between traditional media or between different sensorial channels are transcended (2010: 119). She further specifies that at the level of the text “it designates a tendency towards the integration of a variety of semiotic systems (verbal, visual, kinaesthetic)” (ibid); and “emerges from the interaction between the semiotic and the sensorial realm” (2010: 122).

The last description stresses the duality in the use of the term: the semiotic, textual realization on the one hand, and the cognitive, perceptual realm on the subject’s part on the other. Peeters’ awareness of the complex character of multimodality – with multiplicity of socially shaped and culturally shared modes involved in meaning-making, as well as their selection and/ or configuration for the realization of meaning – allows her to

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<sup>8</sup> ‘Emergence’ is used in describing collective behavior, and refers to how collective properties arise from the properties of parts, how behavior at a larger scale arises from the detailed structure.

differentiate between the *cognitive* and *transpositive* varieties, and *intermodality*.

The first type – cognitive – actually points at the multimodal nature of the text in the perceiver's mind solely due to the latter's tendency to visualize or sensorialize the verbal message (2010: 123). This extended scope of understanding the phenomenon is interesting in the sense that practically every piece of verbal art may be viewed as multimodal at the cognitive level inasmuch as it triggers an active response in the reader, having an aesthetic impact and employing imagery, figurative language, etc.

The second, transpositive type, stresses the transformation of one mode into another, still cognitively evoking the earlier system together with the current one (2010: 124). As an example Peeters mentions Cubist art, representing motion in its still variety.

Finally, intermodality is understood as a phenomenon to a certain extent resembling intertextuality, and a text is viewed in connection with a cluster of different other interwoven texts which it may evoke (ibid). A well-known classical or biblical story might qualify for this category if considered in its realizations through different media (visual, spoken, gestural, written, 3D, etc.), and whether as an art form, dramatic piece, or even a souvenir, cake, toy, etc.

No discussion of multimodality as a theoretical approach (nor specifically, mediated discourse theory) can avoid the central category - **mode**. One of the scholars working productively in the field of multimodal studies, Sigrid Norris, defines the term 'mode' as "a system of mediated action with regularities" (Norris 2013: 156). In the brief definition a key

concept is ‘mediated action’, which Sigrid Norris explains and exemplifies in an earlier article: “A mediated action is a unit which encompasses the social actor and the meditational means. Neither a social actor (such as an artist), nor a meditational means (such as a brush, paint or a canvas), nor an action (such as moving a brush across a canvas), can thus be analyzed by itself. When utilizing the mediated action as our unit of analysis, we continuously keep the tension between social actor and (the always multiple) meditational means as part of the action that is being performed” (2012: 34)<sup>9</sup>.

As for the conceptual content of the term ‘mode’, Norris specifies that, for example, smell as a sense is a biological ability that most humans have (cf.: the opposition sensation vs. sense in Vannini et al, referred to earlier), while “the mode of smell is an acquired system of mediated action that comes about through the use of the sense of smell” (2013: 159). Also, as a ‘system of mediated action’, a mode is a “theoretical concept that binds physical social actors to (more or less) symbolic and/or concrete systems in fundamental ways” and “binds social actors to other social actors, embedding a strong socio-cultural aspect” (ibid).

Recalling what Vannini and his co-authors write about senses, and somatic work, we see obvious similarities in

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<sup>9</sup> Mediated actions are further divided into 3 categories: 1. Lower level actions; 2. Higher level actions; 3. Frozen actions. An example of a lower level action could be one word, one line, one stroke of brush; an example of a higher level action is the multitude of lower level actions. An example of a frozen action is one that can be viewed through the traces that it has left – just as a “painting tells us that someone has painted it”. Consequently, investigating poems and paintings as frozen actions (rather than texts), as Norris holds, “emphasizes the ever present connection between art-work and artist” (Norris 2013: 34).

including the social and cultural constituents in the notion. However, the use of ‘mode’ as a theoretical concept enables the discussion of not only the engagement of senses in the subject/ perceiver, but also the communicative and representational aspects of texts and text forms. Moreover, as Norris observes, modes (which do not exist in the world) develop depending on how we describe or discuss them (2013: 160). In other words, the socio-cultural aspect is coupled with the linguistic one. For example, we could compare what and how people speak/ write about smells, sounds, colours, etc, paying attention to the conventional (already established in language, or in some well familiar texts) as well as innovative use of analogies, and figurative language. Obviously, there will be speakers/ writers who find it simpler to pick out the right wording and/ or description; and as a rule this type of ‘translation’ into verbal language requires certain experience and skills – the more we practice, the richer our expression becomes.

The next focal point to mention as relevant for the study of textual forms in the multimodal perspective is the extension of the scope of discourse analysis into **multimodal discourse analysis**. In particular, multimodal discourse analysis not only proceeds from the starting point that “face-to-face communication as a multi-layered ensemble of actions” is not restricted to “articulatory movements for speech and intonation”, but also considers “other body movements triggered by the communicative intentions of the individual” (Ferré 2014: 25-26).

With this wider scope of analysis, the analytical category of ‘speech act’, used specifically in connection with linguistic communication, is replaced by ‘communicative act’, which

“encompasses both linguistic and non-linguistic communication” (ibid). In the same source we read that “the mental processes are organized in five modules: the pragmatic, lexical, grammatical, prosodic and phonological modules, which interact with one another in a circular way”. Along with the cognitive/ mental scope of communicative acts, the external/physical side is taken into account too, including the impact on the physical external world, “which is itself modulated by the individuals’ representation of the world” (ibid).

The last phrase – ‘the individuals’ representation of the world’- as well all the discussion above - of senses, modes, mediated actions, multimodal discourse - opens a perspective on communication and text forms, which would be incomplete without at least the awareness of human emotions in the process, because emotional consciousness is an indispensable part of individuals, their intelligence and activity, and the basic human emotions (happiness, anger, sadness, fear, disgust) are characterized by a double communicative function: external – for communication with other individuals, and internal – for inner thinking processes (Shakhovskiy 2008: 39). Moreover, in the theory of emotions the role of the latter is established as motivating, and hence text-forming (Shakhovskiy 2008: 7), considering that emotions tend to be conceptualized and semanticized (also lexicalized at the verbal level) in proxemics, body language, etc, and therefore the semiotic systems of emotions are present not only in verbal language, but also in body language (Shakhovskiy 2008: 18). As one last argument for keeping emotions in focus when discussing matters of text, textuality, communication, and multimodality is that natural

human language is characterized by an emotive function and emotive signs which make up “the cognitive-emotive<sup>10</sup> structure of the linguo-cultural code” (Shakhovskiy 2008: 28).

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<sup>10</sup> The distinction between ‘emotional’ and ‘emotive’ is that of referring to psychological phenomena, and transformed linguistic phenomena respectively.



## KNOWLEDGE AND THE COGNITIVE DIMENSION OF TEXT

What has been said so far: text linguistics as an interdisciplinary and multidisciplinary field of studies, text as a communicative phenomenon, the very distinction text vs. discourse, the unity text – context, text as artistic composition, the multitude of the problems on the semantics-pragmatics interface, and the like testify to the cognitive scope of either activity connected with the ontology of a text: production or reception. In either direction two interrelated factors prove essential. They are knowledge and memory.

A well-known theory in which the two were formulated in close connection was F.C. Bartlett's<sup>11</sup>, cited extensively by scholars and referred to by Van Dijk and Kintsch as a 'theory of recall', with the key notion *schema* "characterized as an active principle in our memory, (re-)organizing elements of recall into structured wholes. In perception and language understanding we interpret and recall all new information with respect to our established schemata, which are both cognitively and socially determined" (1978: 62).

The term 'schema' is used today in four scopes: as "a set of cultural preconceptions about causal or other types of relationships" in the sense Bartlett (1932) used it; schemas as representing "the structure of stories themselves"; schemas as scripts – "representations for events (Schank and Abelson

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<sup>11</sup> The psychologist's notion of the connection between memory and knowledge was based on a series of experiments in which participants were asked to reproduce from their memory the story that they heard as accurately as possible. The result was that what the participants derived from the narrative they heard was conditioned by their schematic expectations.

1977)”; schemas as concepts (Clark and Van der Wege 2001: 781).

Another term referring to structures of knowledge about the world (typical situations, events, activities) – *frame* (Minsky 1984/1988) appeared in connection with information processing in general. The term ‘frame’ and its correlates among cognitive linguistic terms will be presented in this chapter further, but it is interesting to note an attempt to retain both ‘schema’ and ‘frame’, ‘schema’ being the more general one, and ‘frame’ referring to speech activities. Thus, Nancy Ainsworth-Vaughn writes: “Frames are related to schemas, which are mental constructs, organized chunks of information [...] We have schemas about all aspects of our lives, including our and others' social identities, the normal conduct of types of talk, and relationships between the two. I suggest that speakers make attempts to instantiate their schemas for the conduct of speech activities. In my terminology, such an attempt is a framing act, and an instantiated schema for a speech activity is a frame. Frames are constituted by participants' interactive behavior and by the way this behavior indexes the socio-cognitive schemas associated with speech activities”. (2001: 459)

As for memory, it is structured too, and in Van Dijk’s model three varieties are present: semantic memory, episodic memory, and control system. As outlined by Wodak and Reisigl, “*semantic memory* is social memory: it is here that the collectively shared beliefs of a society are stored” and “organized as attitudes”[...] “*Episodic memory* retains personal or narrated experiences and events as well as patterns abstracted from these experiences”[...] In brief terms, the third structure of long-term memory is “the *control system*, as a personal model of the social

situation. The control system's task is to link communicative aims and interests (e.g. persuasion) with the situational and individual social conditions (e.g. level of education, gender, and relationship to the person one is addressing)". (2001: 379-380)

It is obvious that the theoretical developments and analytical tools serve for the definition and/ or establishment of the meaning either created in a particular discourse specifically, or as mechanisms involved in the process on the general level as well. And whether as referential (ideational, propositional), interpersonal (emotional, non-propositional), or textual, meaning involves aspects of knowledge the awareness of which is central to the field<sup>12</sup>.

### **Frames, Domains**

The awareness of certain relatedness among concepts, not overlooking their experiential relatedness, has been present in cognitive semantic tradition for decades. Among the variety of models, Fillmore's (1985/1988) frame semantics stands out, in which the central category is the frame, which is not merely a means for organizing concepts, but a "fundamental rethinking of the goals of linguistic semantics" (Croft and Cruse 2009: 7).

Fillmore contrasts his frame-semantic model to truth conditional semantics, describing it as a model of the semantics

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<sup>12</sup> Ronald W. Langacker highlights the connection between text/ discourse and cognitive studies by the following argument: "Most fundamentally, Cognitive Grammar makes contact with discourse through the basic claim that all linguistic units are abstracted from usage events, i.e., actual instances of language use. Each such event consists of a comprehensive conceptualization, comprising an expression's full contextual understanding, paired with an elaborate vocalization, in all its phonetic details". (2001: 144)

of understanding, implying both the speaker's and hearer's parts. For him the primary goal of the analysis of linguistic meaning is understanding. It is stressed that a speaker produces words and constructions in a text to evoke a particular understanding. The hearer's task is to invoke that understanding. In other words, "words and constructions evoke an understanding, or more specifically a frame; a hearer invokes a frame upon hearing an utterance in order to understand it" (Croft and Cruse 2009: 8).

Thus, proceeding from word meaning, Fillmore intends to disclose the frame-semantic aspects of text as well, where the meanings of elements assemble "into the total meaning of the text" (1982: 111). Moreover, the interpreter's role is stressed too: "On the one hand, we have cases in which the lexical and grammatical material observable in the text 'evokes' the relevant frames in the mind of the interpreter by virtue of the fact that these lexical forms or these grammatical structures or categories exist as indices of these frames; on the other hand, we have cases in which the interpreter assigns coherence to a text by 'invoking' a particular interpretive frame" (1982: 124).

Before discussing the examples, it is important to explicate Fillmore's use of the term 'frame'. For him 'frame' is a "general cover term for the set of concepts variously known in the literature on natural language understanding as 'schema', 'script', 'scenario', 'ideational scaffolding', 'cognitive model', or 'folk theory'" (1982: 111). Besides, the term is used by him to refer to cognitive phenomena, and interactional phenomena, and hence – 'cognitive frames' and 'interactional frames' respectively. In other words, the use of the terms illustrates the existence of schematized abstract 'scenes' as encoded in

language on the one hand, and more specific instances of conceptualization, on the other. Thus, “When we understand a piece of language, we bring to the task both our ability to assign schematizations of the phrases or components of the ‘world’ that the text somehow characterizes, and our ability to schematize the situation in which this piece of language is being produced. We have both ‘cognitive frames’ and ‘interactional frames’, the latter having to do with how we conceptualize what is going on between the speaker and the hearer, or between the author and the reader” (1982: 117).

In Fillmore’s model more factors are taken into account than the mere analysis of concepts into semantic features. Thus, he shows in his frame semantic analysis that e.g. *man*, *boy*, *woman* and *girl* evoke frames that include not just the biological distinction, but also differences in attitudes and behavior towards the sexes. For example, the relations *man/ boy* and *woman/ girl* are not the same. *Girl* is used for female humans at a higher age than *boy* is for males. Moreover, the term *woman* can sometimes be applied to an eight-year-old girl (Fillmore 1982:127-128).

Fillmore also points to lexical splits in such cases as *brother/ brothers* and *brother/ brethren* as a result of a split in frames, noticing that the frame contrast is somehow lost in the unitary definition of *brother*.

It is considered that Fillmore’s semantic model shares certain characteristics with the lexical (semantic) field theory. In the latter case, words are grouped together by association in experience, and are defined relative to other words in the same lexical field. Differently, however, in frame semantics words are defined directly with reference to the frame, i.e. the word

concept is linked directly to the frame. This implies that when defining the meaning of a word, one may fail to think of a semantic field, but the frame to which the concept is connected should be available (1985/1988: 62).

Moreover, Fillmore demonstrates that there are words whose corresponding concepts inherently refer to other concepts which are extrinsic to the concept denoted by the word. To support this point of view, Fillmore gives the example of the word *scar*, which does not just denote a feature of the skin, but the healing state of the wound.

Another example is *widow* – a woman who was once married but whose husband has died. In still other instances, in particular when referring to properties and actions, we need to understand something about the participant in the action (or the possessor of the properties). For example, we understand *gallop*, knowing about the body of a horse; *lap* is interpretable in reference to a person's posture and its function in supporting another object.

As examples requiring reference to extrinsic entities are mentioned deictic expressions that evoke the speech act situations. E.g. the past tense situates an event in a point or interval or time relative to the speech act situation. In its turn the speech act situation (including its time of occurrence) functions as the frame against which past time reference is profiled. It is the speech act situation that serves as a frame for other deictic words too (e.g. person deixis – *I, you*; spatial deixis – *this, that, here, there*).

Besides, many word concepts are understood, taking into account the intentions of the participants, as well as the social and cultural context (in which the thing, state or action is

placed). For example, VEGETARIAN makes sense in the frame of a culture in which meat-eating is common; *apple core* evokes a frame describing a particular way of eating apples. Describing the relation of a word to its frame, Fillmore notices that “no one word gives the full structure of the frame” (1982: 120).

A typical example is the RISK frame. It includes the following elements:

- Chance (uncertainty about the future)
- Harm
- Victim (of the harm)
- Valued Object (potentially endangered by the risk)
- Situation (which gives rise to the risk)
- Deed (that brings about the situation)
- Actor (of the deed)
- (Intended) Gain (by the Actor in taking a risk)
- Purpose (of the Actor in the Deed)
- Beneficiary
- Motivation (for the actor) (Croft & Cruse: 11).

Now, the verb *risk* can be used in a number of utterances, but never will all the elements of the RISK frame be evoked at the same time. Some examples are:

- a. You’ve (Actor/ Victim) risked your health (Valued Object) for a few cheap thrills (Gain).
- b. Others (Actor/ Victim) had risked all (Valued Object) in the war (Situation).
- c. She (Actor/ Victim) had risked so much (Valued Object) for the sake of vanity (Motivation).

On the other hand, any of the uses of *risk* evokes the entire RISK frame even if only part of the frame is focused on by the construction in which the word is used.

Another interesting observation concerns the anomaly of frames that are appropriate at one time of utterance (but not at another) due to certain cultural, historical and other changes. Below is a contrived Fillmorian example:

‘During World War I, Ronald Reagan’s birth mother dropped his analog watch into the sound hole of the acoustic guitar’ (1985/1988: 73).

The following comments are needed for the example. According to Fillmore, such a sentence could be uttered in 1984, but not say 1919. Why? – Because World War II had occurred to allow the 1914-18 war to be renamed World War I; medical technology had allowed the dissociation of the birth mother from the genetic mother (who donates the egg); electric guitars and digital watches had been invented. None of the framings of the objects, persons or events was available in 1919, therefore the utterance would be impossible at that time even if true retrospectively.

Thus the frame is defined as **a coherent region of knowledge, or as a coherent region of conceptual space**. The practical question that we may face is how we identify such a region as distinct from others. The simplest way is to proceed from actual words and constructions, i.e. by assuming that concepts correspond to meanings of linguistic units (words, complex expressions or constructions).

An illustrative example is the word *radius* (‘a line segment that joins the centre of a circle with any point on its circumference’). Now, the concept RADIUS is a line segment, but not a random segment; it is one defined relative to the structure of the circle. This means that we understand the concept RADIUS only against a background understanding of



the concept CIRCLE, and that the two concepts are closely connected – a relationship which can be represented in conceptual structure. In Langacker’s meta-linguistic development, the relationship between the concepts RADIUS and CIRCLE is one between a concept profile and a base. The profile refers to the concept symbolized by the word (in question); whereas the base is that knowledge or conceptual structure that is presupposed by the profiled concept. Langacker also uses the term domain for the base (1986)<sup>13</sup>, which is identical to Fillmore’s frame.

Langacker also presents the examples HYPOTENUSE against the base (or domain) of a right triangle, TIP against an elongated object, UNCLE as viewed in the domain of individuals linked by kinship relations, and stresses that the semantic value of an expression is not limited to either base or profile individually, but is rooted in the relationship between the two (1986: 6).

A meta-linguistic fact worthy of attention is that the term ‘profile’ is also used as a verb to describe the relationship between word form and word meaning (cf. ‘*Radius* profiles a particular line segment in the CIRCLE base/ domain/ frame’). It should be stressed that neither a concept profile nor a base alone

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<sup>13</sup> Emphasizing that semantic structures (or ‘predications’) are characterized in terms of cognitive domains, Langacker notes that “a domain can be any sort of conceptualization: a perceptual experience, a concept, a conceptual complex, an elaborate knowledge system, and so forth” (1986: 4).

“The base of a predication is simply its domain (or each domain in a complex matrix). Its profile is a substructure elevated to a special level of prominence within the base, namely the substructure with the expression ‘designates’” (Langacker 1986: 6).

is sufficient to define a linguistic concept. The meaning of a linguistic unit must specify both the profile and its base.

The meta-linguistic variety in terming the phenomenon: base/ domain/ frame is justified to a certain extent if we take into account the situation that a base usually supports multiple concept profiles, then it truly serves as a domain (in the true sense of the word) since several separate concept profiles have it as a base. And so Croft and Cruse's definition of a domain runs as follows: "a semantic structure that functions as the base for at least one concept profile" (profiles typically being numerous) (2009: 15).

A regular example of profile – base relation is the part – whole one. E.g. the concept ARM can be defined against the concept BODY; DAUGHTER presupposes PARENT; NIECE presupposes other more complex kinship relationships, and its base could be, e.g. KINSHIP SYSTEM. This proves that the base against which a profile is defined can be more complex than the 'whole' counterpart of the 'part – whole' system. Moreover, as we have already seen, in semantic terms, the profile–base relation, as well as the differentiation between bases and domains (the latter as a more inclusive notion), prove important.

### **On some Theoretical and Meta-linguistic Problems Concerning the Profile – Frame/ Domain Distinction**

The Fillmorean frame semantics should be understood in the context of other theoretical approaches and meta-linguistic developments. As mentioned earlier, the term 'frame' used by Fillmore has two counterparts – 'base' (Langacker's term) and

‘domain’ (appearing in Fillmore’s, Lakoff’s and Langacker’s works). At heart, these terms refer to essentially the same theoretical framework.

Along with frame semantics, as types of semantic analysis are current such theories as those of ‘scripts’ (in artificial intelligence), ‘communities’ (sociology) and the ‘theory theory’ (cognitive psychology) (Croft and Cruse 2009: 17).

In particular, ‘scripts’ are often understood as frames/ domains involving a sequence of events (see Schank and Abelson 1977). They are in fact frames including dynamic concepts extending through time (cf. PURIFIED vs. PURE; RUN, BUY presuppose a sequence of events, as well as prior and posterior states).

The ‘theory theory’ of categorization is a theoretical construct similar to a frame/ domain, and according to the ‘theory theory’, we understand categories (e.g. HORSE, HAMMER) on the basis of ‘theories’ of biological kinds and artifacts respectively. This means that we have at least a folk theory (if not a scientifically grounded one) of biological kinds, for example, indicating the individual members of the same category and biological patterns. Thus, in frame semantic terms, the base HORSE includes the ‘theory’ of biological kinds.

In connection with a ‘community’ (a social domain of a use of a word) Fillmore provides the example of the legal domain/ community using the concepts of MURDER and INNOCENT differently than the words may be used outside that community/ domain. Thus, in the legal one MURDER is profiled in a frame/ domain where it contrasts with MANSLAUGHTER, whereas outside that domain the contrast is absent. Again in the legal domain, INNOCENCE is profiled against a frame in which

innocence and guilt are established by judgement in a trial. In the non-legal domains INNOCENT is profiled against a frame in which innocence and guilt are defined proceeding from the fact whether or not the person in question has committed the crime (Fillmore 1982: 127-128). Obviously, the differences are conditioned by social relations (due to social activities) rather than on conceptual grounds.

When discussing the relations between profile and frame/ domain in terms of distinctions as realized in word meaning, interestingly, cognitive linguists notice that the distinctions may rather apply to the frame/ domain. Such examples discussed by Fillmore are the concepts LAND and GROUND which denote (profile) the same thing, but against different frames: LAND – ‘dry surface of the earth’ is understood in contrast with SEA, while GROUND describes the dry surface of the earth in contrast with AIR (Fillmore 1982: 121). An even finer observation made by Fillmore is that a bird that spends its life on land does not go in the water, but a bird that spends its life on the ground does not fly.

Another pair of concepts opposed on a similar basis is FLESH profiled against the frame/ domain of the body’s anatomy vs. MEAT against the frame/ domain of food (cf. ‘flesh and bones’ – emaciated body; ‘meat and potatoes’ – meal).

Apart from the regular and systematic instances of framing in language, there are certainly cases conditioned by the speaker’s choice: when they choose one concept/ word rather than another. This means that in certain contexts the choice of framing is a matter of construal, i.e. how the speaker conceptualizes the experience to be communicated and therefore to be understood by the hearer. Naturally, in such cases an

evaluative effect will be present in the framing. E.g. the concept FETUS is viewed against UNBORN BABY especially in contexts reflecting situations of abortion when arguing for or against it. The evaluative element is conditioned by the frames MAMMAL (for FETUS), HUMAN, BIRTH and LIFE.

### **A Few Further Specifications**

The human mind and hence knowledge has complex organization, and as the last example already shows there occur certain links between domains. In this connection it is mentioned that the profile – domain/ frame relations can form whole chains, where a concept that functions as the frame/ domain for other concepts can itself be a profile for another conceptual frame/ domain. E.g. the concept RADIUS is understood in terms of CIRCLE. Further, CIRCLE itself is meaningful against two-dimensional SPACE, i.e. we can say that the word *circle* profiles the concept CIRCLE against the SPACE frame. We could generalize that as well as the concepts we make use of in categorizing the world are often directly connected to human experience, so are domains experientially-based.

Langacker terms those domains which are rooted in embodied human experience basic domains and defines them as “cognitively irreducible representational spaces or fields of conceptual potential” (1986: 5). Thus, some basic domains are: SPACE, MATERIAL, TIME, FORCE, COLOUR, HARDNESS, LOUDNESS, HUNGER, PAIN, etc. The list could be continued by emotions, mental states, etc. Among these, according to Croft and Cruse, the differentiation which

are basic and which are abstract depends “on one’s theory of mind and social interaction” (Croft and Cruse 2009: 24).

According to Langacker, the relation between an abstract domain and a basic domain (that it presupposes) is schematic. It is a relationship of concept to background assumption or presupposition. E.g. a *shape* can be considered as a general or schematic concept subsuming [CIRCLE], [SQUARE], [TRIANGLE], etc. Langacker also mentions that some domains involve more than one dimension (Langacker 1987: 150-151). SPACE usually involves three dimensions, CIRCLE needs two, LINE – one; TEMPERATURE and PITCH are one-dimensional; COLOUR is three-dimensional: it involves HUE, BRIGHTNESS and SATURATION.

An interesting feature of domains is that a concept may be profiled in (it may presuppose) several different domains forming a complex matrix, where using Langacker’s wording, semantic structures/ predication “require more than one domain for their full description”. On the example of KNIFE he shows that one dimension for it is shape specification, another its use for cutting, still another – its place among other pieces of silverware, with further specifications of size, weight, material, information about knife-throwing acts in circuses, etc. (1986: 5).

A human being would be defined relative to a large number of domains – a domain matrix: of physical objects, living things, volitional agents, etc. The combination of domains is presupposed by the concept HUMAN BEING. We can thus infer that the domain structure presupposed by a concept can be extremely complex.

To characterize conceptual domains and complex cases of framing, George Lakoff has proposed another cognitive tool -

**Idealized Cognitive Models**, for which Lakoff mentions four sources: Fillmore's frame semantics, Lakoff and Johnson's theory of metaphor and metonymy, Langacker's cognitive grammar, and Fauconnier's theory of mental spaces (1990: 68). Accordingly, each ICM "is a complex structural whole, a gestalt, which uses four kinds of structuring principles: propositional structure, as in Fillmore's frames; image-schematic structure as in Langacker's cognitive grammar; metaphoric mappings, as described by Lakoff and Johnson; metonymic mappings, as described by Lakoff and Johnson. Each ICM, as used, structures a mental space, as described by Fauconnier". (ibid)

In ICMs the factors of real-world phenomena, human experience and context are not overlooked. Moreover, in cognitive semantic terms and on the basis of what has been discussed so far, the factor of encyclopedic knowledge intimately connected with the interrelationship between the world and what we know about it proves central to how we understand a concept and which part of it is represented as the linguistic meaning of a linguistic expression. This is so because the meaning of a linguistic expression is not confined to the conceptual structure of the frame that supports the concept profile for it, but encompasses the total (encyclopedic) knowledge that speakers have about the concept symbolized by the word or construction.

Langacker, for example, chooses the metaphoric term 'access node' to define word meaning, having in mind a mechanism of access which opens up a perspective on our knowledge of the world (Langacker 1987: 161-64). The idea which is maintained is that by choosing a certain word we

construe (conceptualize) the relationship between the experience that we are communicating and the knowledge that we have/ share with our interlocutors.

However, there is the awareness that real-life situations are more complex and display more variety than any frame/ domain or domain matrix may include. On the other hand, in every specific situation only part of the totality of information enclosed in a domain matrix applies.

And so with the understanding of this and proceeding from the postulate that “the knowledge represented in the frame is itself a conceptualization of experience that often does not match the reality”, Lakoff offers the notion of **idealized cognitive models (ICM)**. On the example of BACHELOR discussed by Fillmore, he shows that a concept can be profiled against a frame which does not accommodate the variety of actual social statuses found in the real world. Thus, it is claimed that in the case of the concept BACHELOR, which according to conceptual analysis is an ADULT UNMARRIED MALE, the definition being typically adequate and suiting many normal cases, is still an idealized version of the world, an idealized cognitive model which is simpler than the reality. Hence, Lakoff gives the following descriptions which can be defined as ‘adult unmarried males’, but can they be called ‘bachelors’? The question remains open:

- a. The Pope
- b. Tarzan
- c. An adult male living with his girlfriend
- d. A male homosexual
- e. A male homosexual living with his boyfriend



- f. A 17-year-old living on his own, running his own Internet firm, and dating 7 women (cf. a 17-year-old living with his parents and going to school, who virtually all agree is not a bachelor).

In such cases, Lakoff holds, “unmarried adult males are certainly not representative members of the category of bachelors”, and the prototype effects are explained by the fact that there is gradation in how well an idealized cognitive model fits in one’s understanding of the world (perfectly, very well, pretty well, somewhat well, pretty badly, badly, or not at all). Therefore, the extreme results are: “unequivocally an unmarried adult male”, or “the person referred to deviates from being an unmarried adult male”.

In other cases the idealized cognitive model may involve a cluster of several different ICMs – “psychologically more basic than the models taken individually”. Thus, the idealized cognitive model for *mother*, which is a cluster ICM or a domain matrix, includes the following:

BIRTH: the person giving birth is the mother

GENETIC: the female who contributed the genetic material is the mother

NURTURANCE: the female adult who nurtures and raises a child is the mother of that child

MARITAL: the wife of the father is the mother

GENEALOGICAL: the closest female ancestor is the mother.

Having the complex of definitions in mind, we could think of cases when only part of the cluster model information applies to expressions containing the component ‘mother’:

- a. Stepmother: fits the NURTURANCE and MARITAL models only
- b. Foster mother: fits the NURTURANCE model only
- c. Birth mother: fits BIRTH only
- d. Genetic mother: GENETIC

Unwed mother: fits (probably) all but the MARITAL model.

Lakoff sums up: “They are all mothers by virtue of their relation to the ideal case, where the models converge. That ideal case is one of the many kinds of cases that give rise to prototype effects”. (Lakoff 1990: 68-76)

The examples demonstrate the close connection between linguistic knowledge and background knowledge, and also, that the former should not be separated from general thinking and cognition. This implies that linguistic behaviour (on a larger scale) is part of the general cognitive abilities which allow learning, reasoning, etc. As R. Langacker states: “Insofar as possible, linguistic structure is seen as drawing on other, more basic systems, and abilities (e.g. perception, memory, categorization) from which it cannot be segregated. Rather than constituting a distinct, self-contained entity (a separate ‘module’ or ‘mental faculty’), language is viewed as an integral facet of cognition”. (2008: 8)

In cognitive linguistic terms, (considering its main principles) the next focal point is the awareness of the functional approach to language. And since linguistic knowledge (or the knowledge of linguistic structures) is not an autonomous faculty, and how we use language is related to general cognitive principles, there should therefore be awareness of shared features across different cognitive domains. This in its turn

implies that when explaining or defining meaning, the different levels of analysis (whether phonological, syntactic or semantic) should be taken into account, rather than separated on more formal grounds. In that case, obviously, the factors of the speaker's/ writer's intended meaning and the particular context will not be ignored. With the focus on the two factors (intended meaning and context), cognitive linguists stress the importance of the consciousness and human categorization of reality, and that the reflection of reality in language is due to the human mind (thinking, consciousness).

The complexities connected with establishing the truth value (linguistic truth and falsity) of utterances are overcome by considering how participants construe a situation on the basis of their conceptual frameworks, and in interaction. The following passage from Langacker illustrates the point and enables further contemplation:

“... an individual mind is not the right place to look for meanings. Instead, meanings are seen as emerging dynamically in discourse and social interaction. Rather than being fixed and predetermined, they are actively negotiated by interlocutors on the basis of the physical, linguistic, social, and cultural context. Meaning is not localized but distributed, aspects of it inhering in the speech community, in the pragmatic circumstances of the speech event, and in the surrounding world. In particular, it is not inside a single speaker's head. The static, insular view ascribed to cognitive semantics is deemed incapable of handling the dynamic, inter-subjective, context-dependent nature of meaning construction in actual discourse” (2008: 28).

A central topic in which the cognitive mechanisms, conceptual structures and processes, as well as the interpretation

of the real world are intersected is the metaphor. In the cognitive linguistic tradition it is due to the efforts of George Lakoff and Mark Johnson that the significance of metaphor as an essential element in our categorization of the world and thinking processes was brought to the fore. In particular, it has since been discussed in connection with such cognitive findings as image schemas (providing conceptual frameworks on the basis of our perceptions and bodily experience) and Fauconnier's notion of mental spaces, as well as such cognitive processes as viewpoint shifting, figure-ground shifting and profiling.

## **Metaphor**

We know from our own experience, as well as from linguistic literature that metaphor is the most important form of figurative language use, ranging from the linguistic metaphor as part of any vocabulary to the most complex and poetic forms in pieces of verbal art. Whichever of the types of manifestation, the mechanism underlying metaphoric processes is that of resemblance/ analogy and its identification, which brings about transference – properties are transferred from one concept to another.

In order to disclose the correlation between the concepts involved in figurative transference, terminological pairs have been proposed in accordance with different meta-linguistic developments. Thus, the starting point, or described concept is often called target domain, and the comparison concept (or analogy) is called source domain. In another terminology, the former is the tenor and the latter – the vehicle (I.A. Richard's terms).

In the example: ‘The birth of new ideas was seemingly instantaneous’, *new ideas* is the target domain, and {*living creatures/humans*} is the source domain. Correspondingly, the emergence of new ideas is referred to as a birth.

Obviously, the traditional view of metaphor is sufficient in evaluating the phenomenon as a rhetorical device (an ornamental tool). However, in cognitive terms and in the light of more recent investigations, metaphor is significant in ordinary language too being an important mode of thinking. In other words, we understand or think of one domain/ sphere of experience by means of another, paraphrasing Lakoff’s statement. Language (though not all of it) is metaphorical, and so metaphor permeates our thinking as well as our linguistic expression.

Among the variety of metaphors (orientational, spatialization, ontological, container, entity and substance, etc.) that Lakoff and Johnson discuss of interest are spatial metaphors in the case of which image schemas with corresponding experiential bases are readily identified. Thus, the linguists point to spatial metaphors with an up – down orientation (to mention but a few):

HAPPY IS UP; SAD IS DOWN

My spirits rose. That boosted my spirits. I’m feeling down. I’m depressed.

(Physical basis: Drooping posture typically goes along with sadness and depression, erect posture with a positive emotional state).

CONSCIOUS IS UP; UNCONSCIOUS IS DOWN

Get up. Wake up. I'm up already. He rises early in the morning. He fell asleep. He dropped off to sleep. He's under hypnosis. He sank into a coma.

(Physical basis: Humans and most other mammals sleep lying down and stand up when they awaken).

HEALTH AND LIFE ARE UP; SICKNESS AND DEATH ARE DOWN;

MORE IS UP; LESS IS DOWN

GOOD IS UP; BAD IS DOWN

RATIONAL IS UP; EMOTIONAL IS DOWN (Lakoff & Johnson 2003: 15-17).

Being characteristic of language and thinking, and co-existing with non-metaphorical concepts, metaphorical ones display certain systematic and regular features. Even a brief survey of Lakoff and Johnson's examples, considering the way they are grouped testifies to this.

An interesting section in the book is devoted to coherence within a single metaphor, which highlights the coming together of cognitive domains to form a matrix. Below are some of the examples provided by Lakoff and Johnson:

AN ARGUMENT IS A JOURNEY

We have *set out* to prove that bats are birds.

*When we get to the next point*, we shall see that philosophy is dead.

We will *proceed* in *step-by-step* fashion.

**The next step is defined:**

A JOURNEY DEFINES A PATH

He *strayed from* the path.

He's *gone off in the wrong direction*.

They're *following us*.

**The combination of the two results in:**

AN ARGUMENT DEFINES A PATH

He *strayed from the line* of argument.

Do you *follow* my argument?

**Another dimension – of surface – emerges:**

THE PATH OF A JOURNEY IS A SURFACE

We *covered* a lot of ground.

He strayed *off* the trail.

AN ARGUMENT DEFINES A PATH and THE PATH OF A JOURNEY IS A SURFACE **converge:**

THE PATH OF AN ARGUMENT IS A SURFACE

We have already *covered* those points.

You're getting *off* the subject.

We're well *on* our way to solving this problem. (2003: 90-91)

Another feature of metaphors is their conventionality, in connection with which the notion of novelty is usually discussed, as well as the phenomenon of dead metaphors (so-to-call fossilized ones). Interestingly, even in the latter case the innovative potential is said to be there, considering the possibility of reviving them by triggering our awareness of the metaphoric transference (cf. the possible expression 'the pushchair of civilization' against the conventional – 'the cradle of Western civilization').

Still another feature is asymmetry. By this it is understood that metaphors do not set up a symmetrical comparison between two concepts, rather – they provoke the transference of features from the source to the target (and not the other way round). So *life* is described in terms of a *journey*, and not \*'journey is a life', or say \* 'our trip was born'.

Related to this asymmetry and also due to their potential to correlate reality (the experiential basis) with thinking/ logic/ conceptual framework, metaphors as directional mechanisms display a tendency towards abstraction – concrete source > abstract target (Saeed 1997: 306). In other words, we describe the new/ unknown/ less tangible/ less definable in terms of the older/ better known/ more tangible/ better definable/ more easily experienced entities. Typically, this could be a shift from the physical to the mental domain:

Seeing, grasping, catching > understanding;

Hearing, listening > paying attention to, obeying (cf. MIND-AS-BODY).

Metaphor being the central object of cognitive investigation, a more basic cognitive structure is an image schema, rooted in our physical experience of being in the world – of perceiving the environment, moving our bodies, etc. And it is on such existential and experiential bases that we shape conceptual structures necessary for thinking about abstract phenomena, across more abstract domains (Saeed 1997: 308). Such cognitive structures, in fact, underlie metaphors. Some examples of image schemas are: of CONTAINMENT, PATH, FORCE, etc.

The initial idea of containment comes from the physical experience of the human body as a container, as well as from our existence/ being within ‘bounded locations’ such are rooms, buildings, etc., or placing different objects in containers. Thus the abstract schema is of an entity enclosed in/ within a location. Therefore, elements are understood as entities inside or outside the container. Moreover, containment can be a transitive quality - if the container is placed in another container, the entity is



within both: 'If I am in bed, and my bed is in my room, then I am in my room'.

Some more examples of the containment type ontological concepts based on a metaphoric shift are:

He's out of sight now.

The ship is coming into view.


He is out of the race.

I put a lot of energy into washing the windows.

She is deep in thought.


He is in love.

We stood in silence.



Other schemas include: PATH, LINKS, FORCE, BALANCE, UP-DOWN, FRONT-BACK, PART-WHOLE, CENTRE-PERIPHERY. The mere mentioning of schemas allows us to notice that they are not only static but can also be dynamic.

To take another example, the PATH schema reflects our everyday experience of moving around the world and experiencing the movements of other entities. Correspondingly, the PATH schema has a starting point, an end point and a sequence of contiguous locations connecting them:



Additionally, paths are associated with directional movement along them, as well as with temporal sequence, implying that the further along the path an entity is, the more time has elapsed. For example, we perceive the achievement of purposes as paths. E.g.:

He's writing a PhD thesis and he is nearly there.

I meant to finish painting it yesterday, but I got sidetracked.

The inventory of image schemas proposed by Lakoff and Johnson were completed by Clausner and Croft, by adding SPACE, UNITY/ MULTIPLICITY, IDENTITY and EXISTENCE (Cruse & Croft 2009: 45).

## **Mental Spaces**

Mental spaces are considered to be another major organizing principle for conceptual structure – whether in such cases when a situation is asserted (profiled), evoking, for example, the frame/ domain of commercial transactions ('Gina bought a sports car'), or the assertion is represented as a belief ('Gina believes that Gina bought a sports car'), or something that is still in the person's (speaker's) mind ('Gina wants to buy a sports car'), or the event may be hypothetical ('If Gina buys a sports car, then she will drive to Paris').

In truth-conditional (formal) semantics the status of the situations needs to be established whether as being true in the real world, or only true in someone's beliefs or desires, etc. Correspondingly, "the standard way of representing the status of situations is as possible worlds: there is the real world, and there

are worlds with situations that are possible but not (necessarily) actual” (Croft and Cruse 2009: 33). In other words, possible worlds are identified with a person’s beliefs or wishes or some other mental attitude.

What we get in the theory of mental spaces is an alternative model of representing the status of knowledge; the notion of a possible world is replaced by that of a **mental space**. And because the allocation of a situation to ‘X’s belief’ or ‘the hypothetical situation’ is done in the mind of the speaker (hearer), not in an unclear metaphysical location, the so-to-call space is mental (ibid).


Utterances are construed (in conceptualization processes) as situating events/ states in a base space (the mutually known world of the interlocutors, which Fauconnier calls the reality space). Usually, utterances conveying information in the form of statements which are not just basic assertions include elements described as space builders, which set up new spaces different from the base space and linked to it. As a rule, space builders can be temporal expressions, image or ‘picture noun’ contexts (‘in the picture...’), fictional situations (‘in the movie...’), games and other systems (‘in the game...’), negation and disjunction (‘either... or’), etc. (2003: 14-18).

When a mental space is built, the situation is perceived as being true in that space only. Just as words and constructions evoke semantic frames/ domains so they construct spaces – in the simplest cases they at least evoke/ trigger the base space. Characteristically, between the base space and the built space(s) there must be a mapping of the elements found in each space, i.e. certain conceptual structures occur in the built space(s).

Recalling the sentence: ‘Gina wants to buy a sports car’, the person named *Gina* in the desire space built by *Gina wants* is mapped onto *Gina* in the base space. As for the object described as a *sports car*, it may or may not correspond to anything in the base space. Why may or may not?

The interpretation of the utterance depends on whether Gina thinks of a specific (particular) car, or this is just a wish to have any such car. The statement actually has two readings (conditioned by the indefinite article *a*: specific and non-specific. There will correspondingly be two types of mappings.

Specific reading




SC: sports car (role)

R: reality space

G: Gina's want space

Non-specific reading



For the explanation of the diagram we also need to understand two more categories introduced by Fauconnier for the discussion of the mappings between the spaces. They are roles and values (2003: 40-41). A role is a linguistic description of a category; a value is an individual that can be described by that category. This means that roles can be a category or type with various instances or tokens. In our example, sports car is such a role since there are many instances (values) of sports cars. It should be mentioned, however, a role can also be a category filled by a single individual at one time but by individuals over time. Such a role is *the President of the USA*.

Roles and values being specific to a single mental space, all counterpart relations between roles and values in different spaces are established cognitively and by the interlocutors. As we look at the diagrams of specific and non-specific readings (Gina wants to buy a sports car), the value  $X^1$  of a sports car in the want/ desire space has a counterpart value  $X$  in reality (a specific car she saw), whereas in the non-specific reading there is no counterpart value in reality: she just imagines a car not having identified it with any existing car.

Thus the ambiguity occurs because a value in one space can be described by the role its counterpart in another space has, even if that role is not valid for the value in the first space. This is the ID Principle that Fauconnier observes (ibid: 3-5).

It is generally recognized that Fauconnier's mental spaces are conceptual spaces serving for the description of the assignment and manipulation of reference (including the use of names, definite descriptions and pronouns). These structures are representative of a particular view of meaning, namely, that studying linguistic meaning we study the way that language

provides a mechanism of complex cognitive procedures (Saeed 1997: 319).

According to this theory, meaning is not in language, rather language serves for the construction of meaning, which involves cognitive activity. In other words, Fauconnier stresses the importance of the cognitive processes activated by linguistic structures. The central idea is that when speaking/ writing we continually construct domains or mental spaces.

For example, when speaking about Shakespeare's play 'Henry IV', we might construct several relevant mental spaces – the world of the play, and the real world where Henry IV is a historical figure. Hence, we can use the same name to talk about the historical person and the character in the play. However distinct the domains that we refer to, there are usually links between them. After having seen the play, we might comment on the performance and the actor: 'Henry IV was too inert'. We might also think of a portrait of the protagonist: 'Give me Henry IV!' Another possible reference could be to the historical person: 'Henry IV was a cruel man'.

The idea is that we refer to different situations freely and flexibly, including possible figurative shifts – metaphor, metonymy, etc., because we can 'partition off' separate domains of reference. As for the links between mental spaces, Fauconnier mentions two more tools along with the identification principle. They are trigger and target (2003: 5).

To illustrate the point, let's consider the following situation.


Looking at the photograph of a friend (whose name is Jonathan) we say: 'Jonathan looks a little bit depressed', referring to the person's image. Here the name of the real Jonathan is the trigger, and the target is the image that we

describe. Similar examples are such metonymic uses as the author's name for the book ('Aristotle is on the shelf'), the name of the disease for the patient, etc.

As for the identification principle allowing us to use such referential shifts, Fauconnier defines it as follows:

"If two objects (in the most general sense)  $a$  and  $b$ , are linked by a pragmatic function  $F$  ( $b=F(a)$ ), a description of  $a$ ,  $d_a$  may be used to identify its counterpart  $b$ " (Fauconnier 2003: 3).

Applying this principle to the example with Jonathan, the real Jonathan ( $a$ ) and the photo Jonathan ( $b$ ) are linked by the pragmatic function IMAGE, a description of real Jonathan (his name,  $d_a$ ) can be used to identify his photographic image ( $b$ ) (2003: 11-13).



Mental spaces, as mentioned, can also be built by talking of a person's beliefs, wishes, etc. E.g. 'Len believes that the girl with blue eyes has green eyes'. In the example *believes* is a space-builder – a linguistic element which serves as a trigger for setting up a mental space. Other typical space-builders are: adverbials of location and time – '*in John's novel*', '*in Pete's painting*', '*when she was a girl*', '*after the event*'; adverbs – *possibly, really*; connectives – '*if ... then*'; certain verbs – *believe, hope, imagine, etc* (2003: 17).

### ***Strong aspects of the theory of mental spaces***

Disclosing the mechanism of reference and the problems connected with the complexities that arise when we become

aware of the interactions between reference and knowledge, as well as reference and context, the idea of mental spaces helps to handle them elegantly and readily. In particular, in the case of referential opacity as a result of which contradictory beliefs/interpretations may arise if we rely on denotation only, the method of the identification principle enables the separate discussion of the mental spaces and allows for the factor of knowledge.

An illustrative instance provided by Fauconnier is the following. There is a policeman Jones – ‘Jones believes that the leader of the Black Gulch Gang is a sociopath’. At the same time, Jones does not know that his wife is the leader of the gang, and so the sentence: ‘Jones doesn’t believe his wife is a sociopath’ can be true.

In the mental space theory, because of what Jones knows, considering the effect of belief contexts referred to earlier, no contradictions arise even though the nominals *the leader of the Black Gulch Gang* and *his wife* denote the same individual. Moreover, sentences like ‘Jones believes that the leader of the Black Gulch Gang is a sociopath’ are described as opaque contexts, the opacity being associated with embedded (subordinate) clauses introduced by verbs of propositional attitudes (like *believe*, *want*, *suspect*, *hope*, etc) (Saeed 1997: 323).

Another such case is this.

‘Detective Baxter suspects that a prisoner in the same cell has helped John’. The sentence can have two readings:

1. Detective Baxter suspects a particular prisoner. This type of reading is called specific or transparent.



2. Detective Baxter suspects that one of the prisoners is responsible for the deed but he doesn't know who exactly. This type of reading is called non-specific, or opaque.

According to the mental space approach, the two readings are due to not just ambiguity in the sentence but because of two separate space-connecting strategies.

As for the spaces established by linguistic expressions, the elements within them, and the relations holding between the elements, Fauconnier also notices that: "The space-builder  $SB_M$  establishing space M will always establish M as included in some other space  $M'$  (its parent space). This inclusion may either be indicated explicitly by syntactic embedding" or "be inferred pragmatically from previous discourse". Of the case of explicit indication is illustrative the statement: 'Max believes ( $SB_M$ ) that in Len's picture ( $SB_M$ ), the flowers are yellow' – space  $M'$  includes space M. In the second case discourse D starts relative to space R (origin (= 'speaker's reality')) – a. Susan likes Harry (establishes relation between Susan and Harry in R); b. Max believes (space builder for M) that Susan hates Harry (establishes relation between Susan' and Harry' in M) – no parent space is explicitly specified for M. R is inferred as the parent space (Fauconnier 2003: 17).

These and other examples show that complex cases of reference as well as the different cases of ambiguity can be analyzed by using the notions of mental spaces (parent – daughter), reality, space-builders, connectors, triggers, targets, etc.

Another regularly cited example from Fauconnier, worth mentioning is the sentence: 'In this painting, the girl with the

brown eyes has green eyes', where *in this painting* is a space-builder setting up the mental space of the painting P, as distinct from the mental space of the real world R. Correspondingly, the girl who has brown eyes in R has a counterpart in P who has green eyes.

As Lakoff and Sweester notice in the Foreword to 'Mental Spaces', "Fauconnier's Identification Principle permits the description of the girl in R to be used to name the girl's counterpart in P. Thus the description 'the girl with the brown eyes', which holds in R, can be applied to the girl in the painting. Therefore, the clause 'the girl with the brown eyes has green eyes' is not contradictory because the two descriptions hold in different mental spaces" (in Fauconnier 2003: XIII).

According to Lakoff and Sweester, one of the most impressive things about this theory is that it unifies the treatment of reference and the treatment of presupposition. Specifically, in the theory, one of the central questions is - what is the relationship of presuppositions in a built space to those in the base.

Moreover, another advantage of the mental space theory is that it permits an interesting analysis of presupposition. Namely, one of the complex features of presupposition is its cancellability. Thus, the sentence: a. 'John hasn't stopped smoking' presupposes that b. 'John used to smoke'. However, the presupposition in (b) can be cancelled by various kinds of contextual information.

Below is an example of presupposition cancellation: 'John's children are blond' presupposes that 'John has children'. Still, by introducing a conditional clause, we cancel it: 'If John has children, John's children are blond'.

In accordance with mental space theory, *if* sets up a conditional mental space C, separate from the reality space R. ‘John has children’ holds in C, but not necessarily in R. ‘John’s children are blond’ (the second clause) holds in an extension of C, but again not necessarily in R. Thus the presupposition that John has children holds in C but not in R. On the other hand, where there is no conditional construction setting up a separate mental space, ‘John’s children are blond’ will be taken as holding in R and hence as presupposing that John has children in R.

In brief terms, the mental space approach explains the cancellation phenomenon by viewing presuppositions as moving (‘floating’ is Fauconnier’s term) from space to space unless blocked by contradiction with the entities and relations (essentially the facts) identified in a space.

Let’s take another example discussed within the theory. ‘Luke believes that it is probable that the king of France is bald, even though in fact there is no king of France’.

This example can be disclosed if we identify the following three mental spaces and the movement (floating) of the presuppositions. Thus, the first, parent space is the speaker’s reality R, the second is the space of Luke’s belief B set up by *believes*, and the third space P is set up by *probable*. The presupposition ‘There is a king of France’ originates in P from the sentence ‘The king of France is bald’ and is thus a presupposition of ‘It is probable that the king of France is bald’. Then it floats up to the encompassing parent space B and thus becomes a presupposition of ‘Luke believes that it is probable that the king of France is bald’. However, the presupposition is blocked from floating into the space R by the explicit clause ‘in

fact there is no king of France'. The presupposition is blocked in R and therefore for the sentence as a whole. Still the analysis shows how it remains associated with parts of the sentence which relate to other spaces.

Croft and Cruse notice that the traditional pragmatic analysis proceeds from the principle that the presupposition of the whole sentence is determined from the presuppositions of its parts. Instead, Fauconnier considers that a presupposition floats up from a built space to its base space until it meets itself or its opposite (Croft & Cruse: 37).

For example,

a. If Max has gone to the meeting, then Max's children are alone.

b. If Max has children, Max's children are American.

In (a) the built space presupposes that Max has children but does not assert it, therefore the presupposition can float to the base space. In (b) the built space asserts that Max has children, and hence the presupposition cannot float beyond it to the base space (ibid).

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## Speaking Assignments

### 1

1. Edit the following statement: “A text is a simple entity lacking any unity”.
2. Comment on the term ‘open’ used in relation to text.
3. The pragmatic aspect of a text concerns... (Continue the sentence).
4. How does the failure of any of the standards of textuality (according to Beaugrande and Dressler) affect the status of a text? Explain.

### 2

1. Choose the best option: ‘Coherence is discussed in connection with – *super-phrasal unity; text; background knowledge; morphemic sequence*. Comment on your choice.
2. Group the words around two central notions: *text-internal features; background knowledge; cohesion; context of situation; linguistic material; external factors; coherence*.
3. What is anthropocentrism in text linguistics? Name at least three main investigative scopes.
4. Syntagmatic and paradigmatic relations in texts of fiction: give one example of each.
5. What is intentionality?

### 3

1. Discourse studies are typically multi-disciplinary. Name at least two disciplines they involve.
2. Of what can a text be considered a fragment?

3. Comment on the term ‘open’ used in relation to text.
4. Explain the statement: “Discourse is multimodal”.
5. What is cohesion?

#### 4

1. Why is text considered the basis of human culture and civilization? Give at least one reason!
2. Choose the best option: “The study of language as a global phenomenon is possible provided we look at its: *cognition; analysis; intentionality; knowledge, use*”.
3. Name at least two oppositions in which text is viewed: *sentence, utterance, non-text, discourse*.
4. General textual features are those... (Continue)
5. A communicative and mental process which results in a formal construction – name the phenomena.

#### 5

1. Produce a definition by using the words: *language, social, cognitive, characteristics, phenomena, share(s), other, with*.
2. Give one example of a problem discussed both in text linguistics and semantics.
3. Texts can be individual or collective according to -----.
4. Typological textual features are those ----- (Continue).
5. Why is the language of fiction considered a special semiotic system?



6

1. Due to what does the opposition text vs. discourse have a semiotic dimension? Explain.
2. Group the words around two central notions: *text-internal features; background knowledge; cohesion; context of situation; linguistic material; external factors; coherence*.
3. Give one example of a problem discussed both in text linguistics and grammar.
4. *Ideological, spiritual and social practice; segment of human knowledge* – these notions are applicable to -----.
5. Can a text represent a number of discourses realized in it? Explain.
6. What is coherence?

7

1. Can we say that text grammar/ syntax as the first stage of development of text linguistics studied the deep structure? Explain.
2. ‘The main investigative positions of studying the intention of the author, the personality of interpreter, interpretation and its limits’. Explain.
3. *Ideological, spiritual and social practice; segment of human knowledge* – these notions are applicable to -----.
4. Textual integrity is ----- (Continue).
5. Use the words in a definition: *text; producer; entity; multiple; open; position; complete, interpretation*.

8

1. Comment on the status of a text as a unit in the communicative hierarchy.
2. Name the three main scopes of text linguistics according to the degree of generalization.
3. The functionalist notion of discourse keeps in view -----  
----- (Continue).
4. Name at least two intra-textual features.
5. Name the two text-centred standards of textuality. Explain.

9

1. Why do we say that a text exists as an element of the communicative system?
2. What is an epistemological text linguistic feature?
3. A totality of thematically correlated texts with inter-textual links is referred to as -----.
4. Whose attitude does the standard of acceptability relate to?
5. 'Plane of content' and 'meaning' of a text – explain the two notions.

10

1. Edit the sentence: "In the communicative framework the focus is on text-production".
2. The pragmatic aspect of a text concerns -----  
(Continue).
3. *Ideological, spiritual and social practice; segment of human knowledge* – these notions are applicable to -----.
4. What is primary modeling system?
5. In methodological terms, textual parameters can be -----  
-----, -----, -----.

11

1. Due to what does the opposition text vs. discourse have a semiotic dimension? Explain.
2. What is perceptual time? What is it related to?
3. Edit the following definition: “Beyond the limits of a communicative act, text lacks any communicative and pragmatic strategies independent of verbal/ contextual signals”.
4. Explain: “Paralanguage interacts with language and on occasion outweighs it”.

12

1. Individual textual features are those -----  
(Continue).
2. Name Beaugrande and Dressler’s standards of textuality.
3. Give an example of a logical relation of causality.
4. Comment on the factors of systematicity and individual variability in texts.
5. Give one reason for which fictional texts are objects of text-linguistic investigation.

13

1. Which of the two aspects – text-production and text-reception do Beaugrande and Dressler’s standards of textuality apply to?
2. Give an example of a logical relation of reason!
3. In what way is the high degree of informativity more demanding?
4. Why do we say that imagination has a central role in fiction?

5. Text as a static entity – explain!

14

1. Name the cognitive mechanism of providing textual coherence for the receiver.
2. Give an example of a logical relation of purpose.
3. Which standard of textuality is directly connected with the utilization of a text due to knowledge of one or more previously encountered texts? Explain.
4. What allows a text to be viewed beyond time? Explain!
5. Explain why artistic models of reality are special forms of cognition.

15

1. Beaugrande and Dressler's model of textuality proceeds from the opposition----- .
2. Which of the linguistic terms can be used in explaining the standard of situationality: *syntagmatic arrangement*, *context*, *morphemic sequence*, *derivation*, *secondary text*, *word-order*.
3. Is coherence an inherent feature of text only? Explain!
4. Can allusiveness and intertextuality occur between different mediums? Explain!
5. Explain the statement: "It seems fair to suggest that discourse analysis of spoken language is particularly prone to over-analysis".

16

1. In what way is the communicative strategy of the sender present in a text?

2. Think of one argument why no text can lack informativity.
3. Name two factors due to which the language of fiction is characterized by multiplicity of meanings.
4. What is direct reflection of time?

17

1. Why are cohesion and coherence handled as operational goals?
2. Edit the definition: "In the prototype theory meanings are identified on the basis of abstract invariants".
3. Name a syntagmatic element in a text of verbal art that can bring about paradigmatic associations.
4. What is a secondary modeling system?
5. What do stratification conceptions of text emphasize?

18

1. ----- concerns the ability to produce a virtually limitless number of verbal messages with a communicative pragmatic effect.
2. Give an example of a logical relation of reason!
3. Edit the statement by a method other than negation: "Universality is confined to data from a particular language".
4. Comment on the factor of time in reference to fiction!
5. Paraphrase the statement: "A text frequently has a much wider variety of interpretations imposed upon it by analysts studying it at their leisure, than would ever have been possible for the participants in the communicative interaction which gives rise to the text".

1. Name one advantage of the prototypical approach to textuality.
2. Why is the standard of acceptability closely connected with the factor of the text type?
3. Explain the use of the terms 'open' and 'closed' with reference to text.
4. Does an invariant have specific features?
5. Of what can a text be considered a fragment?

1. Choose the best option: 'Coherence is discussed in connection with – *super-phrasal unity; text; background knowledge; morphemic sequence*. Comment on your choice.
2. Group the words around two central notions: *text-internal features; background knowledge; cohesion; context of situation; linguistic material; external factors; coherence*.
3. What is anthropocentrism in text linguistics? Name at least three main investigative scopes.
4. Name a syntagmatic element in a text of verbal art that can bring about paradigmatic associations.
5. What is a secondary modeling system?

## **B. FURTHER READING ASSIGNMENTS**

### **Text, Discourse, Context**

ELIZABETH BLACK: *Pragmatic Stylistics*. Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh 2006

pp. 3-4

Context is usually understood to mean the immediately preceding discourse and the situation of the participants (see Brown and Yule 1983: 35-67). In a written text the beginning provides the necessary orientation into the discourse, since nothing precedes it. But it should be noted that the title, appearance, author, even publisher of a book or magazine provide the reader with many hints as to the kind of text they can expect, and so contextualize it to some extent. Werth (1999) develops an elaborate and very precise view of context. The context in which discourse takes place is identified as the discourse world, while the topic is the text world. It is the text that drives the evocation of knowledge and establishes common ground which is arrived at by negotiation between the participants. To this is added the background knowledge of the participants, enriching and giving meaning to the ongoing discourse. In short, he argues that context is dynamic, the mutual creation of the discourse participants. (This applies equally to written or spoken discourse.) In this view, the search for coherence is text driven. While the prototypical situation of

discourse is face-to-face interaction, there is no reason to suppose that written texts operate any differently. This view stresses the incremental nature of discourse: added information clarifies what has gone before, and/or may alter our perception of it.

Another view of context [...] is developed by Sperber and Wilson (1986/1995). They argue that context is the responsibility of the hearer, who accesses whatever information is necessary in order to process an utterance, on the assumption that it has been made as relevant as possible by the speaker. Without discounting the importance of the points discussed above, they stress that encyclopaedic knowledge plays an important role. Thus different people may interpret the same utterance differently according to the information they possess, what they deem relevant, and their knowledge of social conventions.

*How would you explain the term ‘contextualize’ used in the passage?*

*Comment on the dynamic nature of context as viewed in the communicative framework. Does background knowledge affect the dynamism?*

ROGER G. VAN DE VELDE: *Text and Thinking (On Some Roles of Thinking in Text Interpretation)*. Walter de Gruyter, Berlin – New York, 1992

p.13

The basic question ‘How is written discourse itself understood?’ cannot be answered in isolation. It is intimately connected with the following ‘What?’ and ‘Where?’ question. ‘What information is needed to understand a specific written



context?’ ‘Where is that information to be found?’ For instance, when a sequence of utterances gives us only partial information [...], what information must then be sought and added? Is this information to be retrieved from semantic memory? Or is it to be derived from the (non-)verbal environment in which the sequence of utterances occurs? Or is it to be found in other texts and/or in the intertextual relations [...]

In order to provide an answer to the ‘How?’, ‘What?’ and ‘Where?’ questions, one must take into consideration the social context of discourse reception. One should attend to the situation in which a text has its specific function(s). One should focus on actions which co-occur with discourse or which are denoted by discourse. One should consider communicative hints which can be derived from the pragmatic context of discourse. One should attempt to identify which intentions, reasons, motives or other inner-life constellations cause or underlie a particular text or go together with it(s production). One should direct one’s attention towards the syntactic and semantic (-logical) nature of discourse-internal links. One should be concerned with the rhetorical/ stylistic characteristics of texts. One should also deal with the graphemic form in which discourse is manifested.

*What factors are relevant to written text interpretation?*

*In what way are the What? Why? How? questions related to the pragmatic context of discourse?*

ROGER G. VAN DE VELDE: *Text and Thinking (On Some Roles of Thinking in Text Interpretation)*. Walter de Gruyter, Berlin – New York, 1992

p.18

(A) Verbal texts are phenomenal wholes which encompass manifold information parts, such as the phonic/ graphemic, morphological, syntactic, semantic (-logical), rhetorical, stylistic, logical and other information parts. These information parts are called **cotext**.

(B) There are data which co-occur with the production/ reception of verbal texts, such as the actions performed by the interlocutors, their mental background activities (motives, intentions, expectations, etc.), their states of (expert) knowledge, their goal and plan perspectives, and the like. These co-occurring data are called **context**.

(C) There are information parts which are to be called up or hypothetically (re)constructed by the receiver to serve the aims of interpretation. They are also called **context**. As will be immediately apparent, the way the receiver deals with these information parts depends on her/his pertinent prior knowledge (about logic, literary aesthetics, and the like).

*What is 'cotext'?*

*What is included in the notion of context? In what way can the notions of context and knowledge overlap?*

H.G. WIDDOWSON: *Text, Context, Pretext (Critical Issues in Discourse Analysis)*, Blackwell Publishing, USA, 2004 pp. 42-43

So let us suppose then that context is abstract and in the mind rather than concrete and in the world. This clearly distinguishes it from situation understood as the material circumstances of utterance. But on the face of it, it still remains an undefined mass of factors: the fact that they are abstract entities in the mind rather than actual entities in the world does

not make them any more manageable. On the contrary, it makes them more difficult to discern. In reference to Firth's scheme, what the Sperber and Wilson proposal amounts to is an incorporation of 'the relevant objects' into 'the relevant features of participants': it is how such objects are cognitively abstracted that counts as context. But we are still left with the problem of how to recognize which features are relevant and which are not.

We should note, however, that Hymes defines 'scene' not only as a psychological construct, but as a *socio-psychological* one: it is something that is *identified* by the parties concerned as a culturally familiar type of occasion, that is to say, an abstraction from the situation of what is deemed to be schematically relevant.

*In what sense is context abstract, and in the mind, rather than concrete and in the world?*

*What helps us distinguish relevant features from irrelevant ones in a given situation?*

ROBERT LONGACRE, STEPHEN LEVINSON: *Field Analysis of Discourse*, pp. 103-122

In: *Current Trends in Textlinguistics*, Ed. by U. Dressler, Walter de Gruyter, Berlin – New York, 1978

pp. 104-105

Beginning and End of a Discourse. It is not unusual to find formulaic beginnings and endings for discourses in many languages. A formulaic beginning may be termed *aperture*. A formulaic ending may be termed *finis*. If such a formulaic beginning is present, the discourse itself most likely gets going in a section found in the following slot, which can be termed *stage* for narrative discourse, and *introduction* for other types.

*Closure*, which precedes *finis*, is a wrap-up of a discourse in a manner which is specific to the content of that discourse.

In the body of a discourse, we find *episodes* as slots in narrative, and *points* as slots in expository and behavioral discourses. For procedural discourse, we may assume that the main slots of procedural discourse are called *procedures*. In drama we have *acts*.

Characteristically, there is more to a discourse than we have indicated, however. If a discourse is plus tension, there will most likely be some kind of climax of development, some marked surface structure *peak*. In a narrative discourse, there may be a peak to mark the deep structure confrontation (climax) and a *peak'* to mark the deep structure denouement (i.e., a decisive event which loosens up the story and makes resolution possible). There are many ways of marking surface structure peak and peak'. [...]. When a story has a peak, it is possible to organize the episodes of the story in reference to that peak. We can speak therefore, of pre-peak episodes, post-peak episodes, and even inter-peak episode (for stories which have both a peak and a peak'.)

For discourses that are not narrative but still have a climax of development, the peak may mark *target procedure* in a procedural discourse, *climactic exhortation* in a behavioral discourse of the hortatory variety, and a most satisfactory or *culminating explanation* in expository discourse (cf. Longacre 1976, 228-231).

*How is discourse organized, and does the inner structure of discourse depend on the discourse type?*

*What is the function of peak in various types of discourse?*

TEUN A. VAN DIJK: *Critical Discourse Analysis*, pp. 352-371

In: *The Handbook of Discourse Analysis*, Ed. by Deborah Schiffrin, Deborah Tannen, and Heidi E. Hamilton, Blackwell Publishers, Massachusetts USA, Oxford UK, 2001  
pp. 353-354

Since CDA is not a specific direction of research, it does not have a unitary theoretical framework. Within the aims mentioned above, there are many types of CDA, and these may be theoretically and analytically quite diverse. Critical analysis of conversation is very different from an analysis of news reports in the press or of lessons and teaching at school. Yet, given the common perspective and the general aims of CDA, we may also find overall conceptual and theoretical frameworks that are closely related. As suggested, most kinds of CDA will ask questions about the way specific discourse structures are deployed in the reproduction of social dominance, whether they are part of a conversation or a news report or other genres and contexts. Thus, the typical vocabulary of many scholars in CDA will feature such notions as “power,” “dominance,” “hegemony,” “ideology,” “class,” “gender,” “race,” “discrimination,” “interests,” “reproduction,” “institutions,” “social structure,” and “social order,” besides the more familiar discourse analytical notions.

In this section, I focus on a number of basic concepts themselves, and thus devise a theoretical framework that critically relates discourse, cognition, and society.

p. 354

Language use, discourse, verbal interaction, and communication belong to the microlevel of the social order.

Power, dominance, and inequality between social groups are typically terms that belong to a macrolevel of analysis. This means that CDA has to theoretically bridge the well-known “gap” between micro and macro approaches, which is of course a distinction that is a sociological construct in its own right (Alexander et al. 1987; Knorr-Cetina and Cicourel 1981). In everyday interaction and experience the macro- and microlevel (and intermediary “mesolevels”) form one unified whole. For instance, a racist speech in parliament is a discourse at the microlevel of social interaction in the specific situation of a debate, but at the same time may enact or be a constituent part of legislation or the reproduction of racism at the macrolevel.

There are several ways to analyze and bridge these levels, and thus to arrive at a unified critical analysis:

1. **Members-groups:** Language users engage in discourse *as* members of (several) social groups, organizations, or institutions; and conversely, groups thus may act “by” their members.

2. **Actions-process:** Social acts of individual actors are thus constituent parts of group actions and social processes, such as legislation, newsmaking, or the reproduction of racism.

3. **Context-social structure:** Situations of discursive interaction are similarly part or constitutive of social structure; for example, a press conference may be a typical practice of organizations and media institutions. That is, “local” and more “global” contexts are closely related, and both exercise constraints on discourse.

4. **Personal and social cognition:** Language users as social actors have both personal and social cognition: personal memories, knowledge and opinions, as well as those shared with

members of the group or culture as a whole. Both types of cognition influence interaction and discourse of individual members, whereas shared “social representations” govern the collective actions of a group.

*What does the abbreviation CDA stand for?*

*How is the notion of discourse different from that of text, judging from the ideas presented in the passage?*

*Comment on the ways of unifying the levels of CDA.*

*How do the social and cognitive aspects of discourse ‘intersect’?*

RUTH WODAK AND MARTIN REISIGL: *Discourse and Racism*, pp. 372-397

In: *The Handbook of Discourse Analysis*, Ed. by Deborah Schiffrin, Deborah Tannen, and Heidi E. Hamilton, Blackwell Publishers, Massachusetts USA, Oxford UK, 2001

p. 385

Our triangulatory approach is based on a concept of “context” which takes into account (1) the immediate, language, or text-internal co-text, i.e. the “synsemantic environment” (see Buhler 1934) of a single utterance (lexical solidarities, collocational particularities and connotations, implications, and presuppositions as well as thematic and syntactic coherence) and the local interactive processes of negotiation and conflict management (including turn-taking, the exchange of speech acts or speech functions, mitigation, hesitation, perspectivation, etc.); (2) the intertextual and inter-discursive relationship between utterances, texts, genres, and discourses (discourse representation, allusions/evocations, etc.); (3) the language-external social/sociological variables and institutional frames of

a specific “context of situation” (the formality of situation, the place, the time, the occasion of the communicative event, the group/s of recipients, the interactive/political roles of the participants, their political and ideological orientation, their sex, age, profession, and level of education as well as their ethnic, regional, national, and religious affiliation or membership, etc.); and (4) the broader sociopolitical and historical context that the discursive practices are embedded in and related to, that is to say, the fields of action and the history of the discursive event as well as the history to which the discursive topics are related.

*What constitutes the notion of context?*

*Comment on the scope of the terms **context**, **co-text**, **discourse**, **discourses**, **discursive practice**.*

JOHN WILSON: *Political Discourse*, pp. 398-415

In: *The Handbook of Discourse Analysis*, Ed. by Deborah Schiffrin, Deborah Tannen, and Heidi E. Hamilton, Blackwell Publishers, Massachusetts USA, Oxford UK, 2001

p. 401

Linked directly to this process is the concept of “representation.” Representation refers to the issue of how language is employed in different ways to represent what we can know, believe, and perhaps think. There are basically two views of representation: the universalist and the relativist (Montgomery 1992). The universalist view assumes that we understand our world in relation to a set of universal conceptual primes. Language, in this view, simply reflects these universal possibilities. Language is the vehicle for expressing our system of thought, with this system being independent of the language itself. The relativist position sees language and thought as



inextricably intertwined. Our understanding of the world within a relativist perspective is affected by available linguistic resources. The consequences here, within a political context, seem obvious enough. To have others believe you, do what you want them to do, and generally view the world in the way most favorable for your goals, you need to manipulate, or, at the very least, pay attention to the linguistic limits of forms of representation.

While many analysts accept the relativist nature of representation in language, i.e. that experience of the world is not given to us directly but mediated by language, there is a tendency to assume that politically driven presentation is in general negative. In Fairclough's (1989) view of critical linguistics/discourse, for example, political discourse is criticized as a "form of social practice with a malign social purpose" (Torode 1991: 122). The alternative goal is "a discourse which has no underlying instrumental goals for any participant, but is genuinely undertaken in a co-operative spirit in order to arrive at understanding and common ground."

Examples of this malign social purpose are highlighted in work on the political discourse of what has been referred to as "nukespeak." As is clear, the very title "nukespeak" is formed on analogy with Orwell's famous "newspeak," where the assumption was that if one could manipulate or limit what was possible in language then one could manipulate or limit what was possible in thought. Chilton (1985) and others argue, using a range of analytic techniques, that in the political discourse of nuclear weapons efforts are made to linguistically subvert negative associations. An example from Montgomery (1992: 179) highlights this general issue (see also Moss 1985):

*Strategic nuclear weapon* - large nuclear bomb of immense destructive power

*Tactical nuclear weapon* - small nuclear weapon of immense destructive power

*Enhanced radiation weapon* - neutron bomb (destroys people not property)

*Demographic targeting* - killing the civilian population.

In this example Montgomery is performing a type of translation in which he explicitly attempts to show how the language on the left of the dash is manipulating reality as represented by the translation on the right. For Montgomery, the language of nuclear weapons is clearly "obscurantist and euphemistic."

*What is **language** in the universalist and relativist views?*

*Comment on the phrase 'experience of the world mediated by language'.*

*Euphemistic replacement: comment on the consequences of its manipulative use in political discourse (cf. Van Dijk's notions of micro- and macro-levels of analysis above).*

COLEEN COTTER: *Discourse and Media*, pp. 416-436

In: *The Handbook of Discourse Analysis*, Ed. by Deborah Schiffrin, Deborah Tannen, and Heidi E. Hamilton, Blackwell Publishers, Massachusetts USA, Oxford UK, 2001

p. 423

The ubiquity of media language and its easy accessibility make it a natural data source for linguists interested in the components of language and discourse and for other researchers interested in assessing the effects of language on culture. Given that the media is such a widespread purveyor of talk about our

world and our position in it, it is a bit surprising that not more linguists attempt to work with it. However, those who have explored media discourse tend to select and utilize data that will allow answers to fundamental questions about language, about the nature of the news and the media, and about more abstract issues of language, action, thought, and society.

Newspapers are convenient repositories of large bodies of data, and this fact has allowed the development of research backed up by quantity of example. As illustration, Suter (1993), aiming to expand the development of the study of text-types, goes to the newspapers to find a “prototype text.” The “wedding report” is the case study with which he develops his working model of text analysis. He uses data on the wedding report - an account of a wedding which includes time-place-date details as well as other wedding-related information - from a variety of British newspapers to analyze text structure, incorporating the frameworks of Biber (1988), Bell (1991), Halliday (1985), and van Dijk (1988). Suter aims to determine the constitutive features of the four areas that delineate a text type: *situational context, function, content, and form*. His work is a good example of a multidisciplinary approach informed by a broad reading of media as situated social and textual practice.

*Why is media language considered to provide interesting data for researchers?*

*What is a “prototype text”? What four factors are mentioned as defining it?*

p. 426

Linguistic style becomes an operative concept in media discourse, as a means both of characterizing the register and the

unique features of news language, and also of considering the dynamic role of many speech communities in the production of discourse.

The many social tasks a journalistic text intentionally or unconsciously accomplishes are reflected in the different dimensions of register that many researchers have noted as constitutive of media discourse. For example, Chimombo and Roseberry (1998) see news register as a result of the informing role of news producers and its attendant linguistic correlates. Weizman (1994) notes preliminarily how quotation marks convey a reporter's stance toward the material he or she has included in the news story and in the process help constitute the news register. And Scollon and Scollon (1999) notes that the journalistic register is marked in part by the reporter's standardized practice of avoiding brand names and copyrighted material, an activity that integrates a "hidden dialogicality" with intellectual property priorities.

Style issues have also been addressed in the context of the media of bilingual societies, including Gonzalez's (1991) study of stylistic shifts in the English of the Philippine print media and Cotter's (1996a) research on English discourse-marker insertion in Irish-language radio interviews. Gonzalez notes that a stylistic formality and consistency in Philippine English print media can be attributed to an underlying insecurity toward the colonizing language as well as to the site of English acquisition, i.e. the school. Cotter discusses the presence of discourse markers as a strategy for discourse coherence in a domain in which fluency is expected but not necessarily available, and for the negotiation of identity in a bilingual frame. (See Schiffrin, this volume.) In both cases, the discourse requirements of a well-formed news

story or interview condition the use of language.

*Comment on the informing function of news texts, and 'a reporter's stance towards the material'.*

*Comment on the phenomenon of stylistic shifts in the media of bilingual societies.*

SUZANNE FLEISCHMAN: *Language and Medicine*, pp. 470-502

In: *The Handbook of Discourse Analysis*, Ed. by Deborah Schiffrin, Deborah Tannen, and Heidi E. Hamilton, Blackwell Publishers, Massachusetts USA, Oxford UK, 2001

p. 481-483

The terms “narrative” and “story” (here used synonymously) have different meanings in different disciplines. In the literature on the medical encounter and the documents it generates, notably the patient's chart and case history, the phrases “doctors' stories” and “patients' stories” come up frequently. The latter is fairly straightforward, inasmuch as patients typically “tell a story” that explains their presence in the physician's office, and that story is a constituent element of the medical interview “frame.” The phrase “doctors' stories,” however, seems to have a greater range of meanings. In some studies it seems to be synonymous simply with “explanation” or “prognosis” (Boyd 1996), whereas in others it refers to more prototypical narratives.

The phrase “doctors' stories” provides the title for Kathryn Hunter's book (1991), the main agenda of which is to call attention - particularly within the medical community - to the crucial importance of narrative to the institution and practice of medicine. Narrative, Hunter argues, is integral to the medical

encounter, to communications by and about the patient, and to the structure and transmission of medical knowledge (cf. also Hunter 1996; Epstein 1995). The patient's story is told to and interpreted by the physician, who then tells another story about the patient, in case format, to other physicians, and records that story in a formulaic chart entry. Hunter observes that most of the rituals and traditions of medicine and medical training are narrative in structure - the "medicine is a detective story" metaphor rests on the notion that "diagnostic reasoning [i]s a fundamentally narrative enterprise" (Epstein 1995: 43) - and explains why narratives such as cautionary tales, anecdotes, case reports, and clinical-pathological conferences must be seen as central, not peripheral, to medicine. This thesis is further developed as a "take-home message" to physicians: that if they will recognize the narrative structure of medicine, they will attend better to their patients, in part by acknowledging the details and importance of their patients' life stories[...]

Narratives about an experience of illness have proliferated in America over the past several decades, notably in the form of biographies and autobiographies often referred to as "pathographies." Hawkins (1984, 1993) surveys this burgeoning body of literature, tracing the metaphors and patterns of myth-making at work, and examining the ways in which writers of pathographies borrow from the metaphorical archetypes - the journey, war/battle, death and rebirth, the body/soul analogy - to describe and come to terms with the experience of serious illness. Whereas Hunter (1991) sees pathography as a genre of protest literature against the medical reification of patients (see n. 10 on the "metonymic imperialism" through which "patients" are transformed into "cases"), Hawkins views it as

complementary to the medical case report. Using a striking visual metaphor, she observes: “Case reports and pathography function as mirrors set at an oblique angle to experience: each one distorts, each one tells the truth” (1993: 13).

*In what ways is a patient’s story different from a doctor’s story?*

*What is the role of narrative in medical discourse?  
Comment on the factors of prototypicality and framing.*

BARBARA JOHNSTONE: *Discourse Analysis and Narrative*, pp. 635-649

In: *The Handbook of Discourse Analysis*, Ed. by Deborah Schiffrin, Deborah Tannen, and Heidi E. Hamilton, Blackwell Publishers, Massachusetts USA, Oxford UK, 2001

p. 639 [PEN – personal experience narrative]

Two aspects of Labov's work have, however, caused recurrent confusion. One of these has to do with the meaning of the term “narrative.” For Labov, a “narrative” was a sequence of clauses with at least one temporal juncture, but a “complete” or “fully formed” narrative included such things as orientation and evaluation as well. “Personal experience narrative” included both “minimal” and more elaborate types. Many subsequent researchers continued to use the same term - “narrative” - both for any talk representing a sequence of past events and for talk specifically meant to get and keep someone interested in listening to a recounting of events. This has resulted in confusion both in the design and in the reporting of narrative research, since the two uses of “narrative” refer to two levels of analysis, “narrative” in the first sense being a necessary part of “narrative” in the second sense. Some scholars have accordingly

found it helpful to substitute another term, such as “story,” for the second sense. Following Polanyi (1985), I adopt this distinction in what follows, using “narrative” to mean talk that represents events in the past and “story” to mean roughly what it does in everyday parlance: narrative with a point.

A second source of confusion has been the inadvertently normative sound of some of Labov's terminology, and, partly in consequence, the normative way in which his analysis has sometimes been read. Labov's claim to be describing “the normal structure of narrative” or characterizing “fully developed” or “complete” narratives have led some to suppose that he was making more universal and/or more judgmental claims than were probably intended. It has been observed over and over that not all stories have abstracts or codas and that PEN is often less monologic than were the stories Labov analyzed. It has been easy for researchers to forget that the PEN Labov characterized was mainly collected in research interviews with relative strangers, and that the fact that stories arising in different contexts turn out to be different actually does more to support Labov's claims about the connection between narrative form and contextual function than to debunk them.

*Comment on the terms ‘narrative form’ and ‘contextual function’.*

*Why do you think Johnstone stresses the factor of time (cf. ‘events of the past’) in defining narrative?*

*How is PEN described by Labov? Why is this understanding controversial?*

pp. 640-641

In addition to asking questions about the form of narrative



talk, discourse analysts have also asked questions about its function. Talking about the past is apparently something all humans do. Rosen (1988) suggests that the “autobiographical impulse,” the urge to make our lives coherent by telling about them, must be universal; personal narrative is how we make sense of ourselves as individuals and as members of groups. As Linde (1993: 3) puts it, “In order to exist in the social world with a comfortable sense of being a good, socially proper, and stable person, an individual needs to have a coherent, acceptable, and constantly revised life story.” Schifffrin (1996) shows how two storytellers create individual identities, situating themselves in their families and in society through choices they make as they narrate; Johnstone (1996) discusses self-expressive reasons for individuals' storytelling styles.

Shared stories, as well as shared ways of telling stories and shared uses for stories, also make groups coherent. Among the earliest work by ethnographers of communication were studies of the functions of narrative and speech events in which narrative was central (Kirschenblatt-Gimblett 1974; Darnell 1974), and ethnographers have continued to explore the uses of narrative in various parts of the world (see, for example, Scollon and Scollon 1981; Basso 1986; Patrick and Payne-Jackson 1996). Smaller-scale social groupings are also constituted and maintained partly through shared uses of narrative. Bauman (1986), for example, discusses stories and storytelling events as they serve to negotiate social relations in Texas; Johnstone (1990) talks about how storytelling creates community and a shared sense of place in the American Midwest; Shuman examines the uses of stories by urban adolescents; Coates (1996) shows how “telling our stories” defines the interrelationships of

a group of female friends.

*What is the function of personal narrative?*

*What is a shared use of narrative, and how does it help to socialize and achieve coherence in groups?*

### **Verbal Interacton, Utterance, Interactants, Speech Act Analysis**

JEF VERSCHUEREN: *Understanding Pragmatics*. Arnold, London – New York – Sydney – Auckland, 1999

p. 131

... we reserve the term **utterance** for any stretch of language, no matter how long or short and no matter how many voices it may contain, with a clear beginning and end, produced by the same person(s). Examples range from one-word sentences, over speech acts constituting a turn in a conversation, to multi-volume novels. **Utterance clusters** are organized conglomerates of utterances. A typical example would be a conversation, or written correspondence [...]

The most widely studied, pragmatically defined, utterance types are no doubt those commonly labeled **speech acts**, which are structurally situated at the sentence level, so that often they occur as utterance constituents rather than complete utterances. This level varies itself from one-word structures [...] to complex syntactic constructions with various layers of embedding.

*Comment on the metalinguistic variety: **sentence, utterance, speech act.***

*What can speech acts structurally consist of?*

*Considering that length is not a decisive parameter in defining an utterance, what makes a stretch of language an utterance?*

RUQAIYA HASAN: *Text in the Systemic Functional Model*, pp. 228-246

In: *Current Trends in Textlinguistics*, Ed. by U. Dressler, Walter de Gruyter, Berlin – New York, 1978

p. 232

In the discussion of the context of situation, it has been normal till recently to talk of role as a unitary concept and to refer by this term only to the social role of the interactants. On the other hand, there is good reason for suggesting that every interactant in a verbal interaction carries at least three distinct types of roles simultaneously. These are *i.* textual roles; *ii.* social roles and *iii.* participatory roles.

There are two recognized (general) textual roles: those of *speaker* and *hearer* (for a discussion of how the degree of specificity for labelling the roles can be varied see Halliday: 1972*a*). Generally, the textual roles are interchangeable, so that within the domain of the same interaction, the one who functions as speaker at one point in time will in all likelihood also function as hearer at another point in time, and vice versa. This unmarked state of affairs — notwithstanding lectures, speeches and the like - provides the justification for coining the term *speaker-hearer* and for referring to the interactants as *1st speaker*, *2nd speaker* ... as if all the interactants do is to speak. The notion of turn taking (Sacks et al: 1974) is again closely related to the textual roles of speaker and hearer and the possibility of ‘textual role-switch’.

By contrast, social roles — often thought of as *the* participant role — are not generally interchangeable within the domain of the same verbal interaction. Social roles are indicative of the rights and obligations of the bearers of the roles, often with particular reference to the transaction specified by the field; the two - the field and the roles - in these cases are mutually defining and together constitute the nexus of the transaction. It is possible to sub-classify the set of social roles into two classes: one, where the roles pair off hierarchically and secondly those where they form essentially non-hierarchic dyads. An example of the first category is teacher-pupil and of the second friend-friend or stranger- stranger.

Participatory role is determined solely by reference to the question: who set the interaction into motion? Whichever interactant does this, may be said to have the participatory role of *initiator*, while the one(s) whose move is a response to the initiator's move may be referred to as the *respondent*. It should be obvious that the roles of 1st speaker and initiator need not be carried by the same interactant; also cultures vary as to which social roles will coincide with the roles of initiator and respondent. Perhaps it is worth mentioning the generalization that when we have a clearly categorized social setting such as clinic, post-office or courthouse, the respondent role is normally carried by interactants who have the function of maintaining the social nature of the institution. [...]

Significantly, these three types of roles relate readily to the three-part description of the text as a *verbal social event*. The textual roles arise because text is a social event of the verbal kind; the social roles arise because text is a verbal event of the social kind (Halliday: 1975 a; 1976a); and the participatory roles

arise because text is a happening, a doing, a piece of human behaviour like a handshake, a smile or an embrace.

*What is textual role-switch, and how important is it for successful communication?*

*Define the roles of interactants in light of the three perspectives: text as an event, text as a verbal phenomenon, text as a social phenomenon.*

THOMAS BALLMER: *Context and Context Change*, pp. 317-376

In: *Text and Discourse Constitution (Empirical Aspects, Theoretical Approaches)* Ed. by J. S. Petőfi, Walter de Gruyter, Berlin – New York, 1988

pp. 328-329

It proves useful, at this stage of the discussion, to introduce the following *analysis* of a speech act in three levels:

1. physical level (including neuro-physiological, articulatory, acoustic, auditive phenomena)
2. morpho-syntactic level
3. socio-mental level (including beliefs, states of obligation, expectations).

Making use of these levels, we can say that by performing act *a*, a basic change occurred on the physical level. An electrical pattern, representing a thought of *S*, is transformed stepwise into an articulatory pattern, an acoustic pattern, an auditive pattern of *H* (and *S*) and finally into an electrical pattern again. The world has *physically changed*, a physical event originating from *S* has induced certain *lasting results in the brain* of *H* (and the brain of *S*).

Simultaneously a morpho-syntactical form is realized.

Whether this is taken to be a *consequence* of the physical event, an *act of itself*, or a *theoretical construct* independent of the act is a problematical question. It depends on the theoretical and ontological assumption one is willing to make. All three views are possible, and defended by different philosophers and linguists. In any case, the change occurring on the morpho-syntactical level is the addition of another realization of a morpho-syntactical form to the already existing such realizations.

What happens on the socio-mental level depends, again, very much on what the semantic and pragmatic objects are taken to be theoretically and ontologically. According to the view I would like to advocate here, these objects are essentially beliefs, including beliefs of what is to be attempted, i.e. states of obligations, beliefs about what will happen [...] Beliefs are mental objects. Because beliefs are about reality (and other beliefs), it seems promising to try a (possibly approximate) reduction to real objects, as much as seems useful. Therefore those objects are reconstructed relying on objects such as truth-values, individuals, times and (eventually higher order) sets and functions among such objects. The primordially independent entities worlds, propositions, beliefs, obligations, expectations, contexts, etc. are reconstructed set- and function-theoretically on top of these partly theoretical (truth-values, times) and partly ontological entities (individuals). The changes occurring on the socio-mental level are changes of beliefs and more generally contexts. As contexts may include worlds, beliefs, states of obligations and so forth, the changes are changes of these entities independently of any set-theoretical reconstruction. Once one accepts the program of modeling these entities set-

theoretically, the changes are to be modeled in the same way. Thus *changes*, though perhaps autonomous and independent entities in their own right, *are reconstructed* here as certain (set-theoretical) *functions*.

*Why do you think is the third level of speech act analysis referred to as both social and mental (rather than mental)?*

*How is context represented on the socio-mental level?*

p. 341

A further question which may interest us sometimes is how a *context forces the utterance of an expression*. This is the converse question to how an utterance affects a context, The three questions; (1) how do linguistic expressions force certain contexts, (2) how are linguistic expressions judged in contexts, and (3) how do contexts force (the occurrence of) certain linguistic expressions, can be nicely displayed by our interaction graphs. The only way to do this in a reasoned manner is to recognize values as independent full-fledged entities and to rephrase (1), (2) and (3) somewhat. There are three basic kinds of speech acts:

(1) (Operatives) The speaker can force a certain *context* to come about by attempting to make it *fit* to a certain *sentence* (proposition),

(2) (Judgments) The speaker can force a certain *value* to come about by attempting to match a *sentence* (proposition) and a *context*.

(3) (Expressings) The speaker can be forced to utter a certain *sentence* (from a certain concept, proposition) by a certain *context* being *the case*.

The three basic types of speech acts are called here operatives, judgments, and expressings. In a more politically

oriented mode one could call them also executives, judiciaries, and legislatives, for more or less obvious reasons.

*Comment on Ballmer's choice of legal/ political terms: executive, judiciary, legislative, in the context of his classification of speech acts.*

JOHN J. GUMPERZ: *Interactional Sociolinguistics: A Personal Perspective*, pp. 215-228

In: *The Handbook of Discourse Analysis*, Ed. by Deborah Schiffrin, Deborah Tannen, and Heidi E. Hamilton, Blackwell Publishers, Massachusetts USA, Oxford UK, 2001

p. 216

To look at talk as it occurs in speech events is to look at communicative practices. Along with others I claim that such practices constitute an intermediate and in many ways analytically distinct level of organization. A sociological predecessor here is Erving Goffman, who proposed the concept of "Interaction Order" as a distinct level of discursive organization bridging the linguistic and the social. Goffman's work on this topic has greatly influenced the conversational analysts' argument that conversation is separate both from grammar and from macro social structures and must be analyzed in its own terms. In my early approach to interaction I took a position situated somewhere between those of Erving Goffman (1981) and Harold Garfinkel (1967). The former looked at encounters from an ethnologist's perspective, while the latter was concerned with the often overlooked interpretive processes that make interaction work. I argue that all communication is intentional and grounded in inferences that depend upon the



assumption of mutual good faith. Culturally specific presuppositions play a key role in inferring what is intended.

Suggestive evidence to indicate that sociocultural background knowledge does in fact enter into everyday decision making comes from Garfinkel's (1967) ethno-methodological experiments. Garfinkel sees interaction as constituted by goal-oriented moves, and his main concern is with the interpretive processes through which interactional outcomes are achieved. Based on a variety of illustrative examples taken from what he refers to as naturally organized situations, he argues that everyday talk can never be precise and detailed enough to convey what is really intended, so that interactants inevitably and necessarily rely on what he calls "practical reasoning" and unstated, taken-for-granted background knowledge to fill in for what is left unsaid. He goes on to point out that in so doing they display a built-in, deeply internalized, and for the most part un verbalized sense of social order. Yet apart from advocating that analysts resort to historical methods to trace how specific understandings come about so as to recover what types of knowledge are at work, Garfinkel gives no further specifics of how interpretive processes work in everyday talk.

*How does Garfinkel employ the notions **interaction, interpretive processes, intetion?***

*What is the role of the un verbalized part in everyday communication?*

p. 218

A main IS theme is the inherent linguistic and cultural diversity of today's communicative environments. Research on the communicative import of diversity has been and continues to

be plagued by deep theoretical divisions. On the one hand there are those who regard communicative practices as shaped by *habitus*: embodied dispositions to act and to perceive the world that directly reflect the macrosocietal conditions, political and economic forces, and relationships of power in which they were acquired (Bourdieu 1977, 1994). They argue that it is to such conditioning factors that we must look for insights into the nature of diversity. Others take a more constructivist approach, claiming that since our social worlds are ultimately shaped through interaction, it is necessary to begin by learning more about the way localized interactive processes work before we can turn to research on diversity. Since the two traditions differ in what they regard as relevant data and in the methods of analysis they employ, their findings are for the most part incommensurable.

IS seeks to bridge the gap between these two approaches by focusing on communicative practice as the everyday-world site where societal and interactive forces merge. Hanks (1996) defines communicative practice as largely resting on the discursive practices of actors acting in pursuit of their goals and aspirations. Therefore speaking, when seen in a practice perspective, is not just a matter of individuals' encoding and decoding messages. To interact is to engage in an ongoing process of negotiation, both to infer what others intend to convey and to monitor how one's own contributions are received. In other words, what is at issue is shared or nonshared interpretations rather than denotational meaning. And background knowledge of the kind I alluded to above, i.e. that goes beyond overt lexical information, always plays a key role in the interpretive process. IS analysis therefore concentrates on

speech exchanges involving two or more actors as its main object of study. The aim is to show how individuals participating in such exchanges use talk to achieve their communicative goals in real-life situations, by concentrating on the meaning-making processes and the taken-for-granted, background assumptions that underlie the negotiation of interpretations.

*In what way is the interactional sociolinguistic perspective supported by Gumperz different from the two approaches to communicative practice discussed at the beginning of the passage? Is it more dynamic?*

pp. 221-222

Initial insights into the role of language use in inferential processes came from studies of *code-switching* (Blom and Gumperz 1972), a term commonly used to refer to alternation among different speech varieties within the same event. Such alternations are employed throughout the world, particularly among participants in local networks of relationship. They are commonly described via rules of alternation similar in form to rules of language usage. For example, in the old Catholic church service Latin was said to be appropriate for prayer, while the native language was used for sermons. Yet if we examine switching as it enters into the discursive practices that constitute the event, it soon becomes apparent that it is not the objective situation that determines language use. The data show that the discursive juxtaposition of grammatically and lexically distinct ways of speaking in any one stretch of talk evokes a shift in contextual presuppositions which then in turn affects interpretation. As recent comparative empirical studies

demonstrate (Auer 1998), code-switching constitutes a basic communicative resource that in many situations serves as a communicative strategy to achieve specific interpretive effects [...]

I use the term *contextualization cue* to refer to any verbal sign which, when processed in co-occurrence with symbolic grammatical and lexical signs, serves to construct the contextual ground for situated interpretation and thereby affects how constituent messages are understood. Code-switching is one such contextualization cue. Others include pronunciation along with prosody (i.e. intonation and stress), rhythm, tempo, and other such suprasegmental signs. Contextualization cues, when processed in co-occurrence with other cues and grammatical and lexical signs, construct the contextual ground for situated interpretation and thereby affect how particular messages are understood (Gumperz 1982a). As metapragmatic signs (Lucy 1993), contextualization cues represent speakers' ways of signaling and providing information to interlocutors and audiences about how language is being used at any one point in the ongoing exchange. What sets them apart from communicatively similar lexicalized signs is that they are intrinsically oral forms. Since no utterance can be pronounced without such signs, contextualization cues are ever present in talk, and to the extent that they can be shown to affect interpretation, they provide direct evidence for the necessary role that indexicality plays in talk. Moreover, contextualization strategies signal meaning largely by cueing indirect inferences. In conversation, we could not possibly express all the information that interlocutors must have to plan their own contributions and attune their talk to that of their interlocutors, so it is easy to see the reason for this indirectness.

*Comment on the connection between contextualization cues*

*on the one hand, and inferencing and presuppositions on the other.*

*How necessary are indirect inferences, and should they be understood as part of 'negotiating' meaning?*

MONICA HELLER: *Discourse and Interaction*, pp. 250-264

In: *The Handbook of Discourse Analysis*, Ed. by Deborah Schiffrin, Deborah Tannen, and Heidi E. Hamilton, Blackwell Publishers, Massachusetts USA, Oxford UK, 2001

pp. 250-252

What we have thought we can learn has the following major threads: (1) the nature of the interactional, discursive mechanics of the social construction of reality, and, in particular, what dimensions of these mechanics are universal and what are culturally, socially, or historically contingent or even specific; (2) the nature of the relationship between those mechanics and the conditions of their existence. Put differently, our goals have been to explore the nature of discourse in interaction itself as a way of understanding how we construct social reality, and to explain what we understand to be the nature of discourse in terms of the (local or elsewhere, or, to use Mehan's (1987) terms, proximal or distal) social, political, and economic conditions of discursive production. At the same time, once the question of that relationship between discourse and conditions of discursive production is posed, it is no longer clear what it is that affects what, and our focus shifts to approaching discourse itself as a form of social action [...]

Approaches to the question of the nature of interactional processes can be loosely grouped into two categories: *ethno-*

*methodological* and *interpretivist* (or *interactionist*). There are many ways in which the two are related, and in particular in which the first has influenced the second, but for the purposes of exposition it is useful to divide them. The major distinction which I want to make between them has to do with their stance with respect to data. Ethno-methodologists have a strong preference for restricting analysis to what is actually observable. Interpretivists or interactionists are prepared to bring other sources of data to bear on the analysis of interactional data. Needless to say, the distinction in specific cases may be largely heuristic, even inaccurate, but nonetheless it describes at least the difference between extreme outliers of each group, and captures something of the orientation of practitioners situated somewhere on the fuzzy boundary between the two groups.

An ethno-methodological approach to analysis of discourse in interaction has perhaps the strongest tendency to treat interactional data as text. The object of analysis is the text of the transcription of the interaction, whether the text is a literal, verbal one, based on audiotapes, or whether it combines verbal and nonverbal material, as has become possible with the availability of video-recording. (Indeed, as we will see below, one branch of ethno-methodology now prefers simply to think of itself as *conversation analysis*, reflecting this focus on observable interaction.) The reason for this is that social action is held to be ongoing and reflexive; one can only see how participants make sense out of the world by observing their actions in it, or more specifically, their reflexive interactions (Heritage 1984).

p. 254

In anthropology, the emergence of the ethnography of

communication (Gumperz and Hymes 1972; Bauman and Sherzer 1974) opened the way toward yet another approach to interaction, one which borrowed ethnomethodology's respect for the routines and patterns of language use in interaction, but which went beyond that to consider those patterns as embedded in complex cultural processes. While one impetus for this work has been to contest the Chomskyan insistence on taking an abstract structural idea of language as the proper object of linguistic inquiry (and as the right way to think about what language is), many of the questions which have informed this work have been more oriented to issues traditionally treated within sociology and anthropology, namely questions about the social order, about the nature of culture, and about social problems (notably the consequences of social difference and social inequality; cf. Gumperz 1982a, 1982b). One of the major ideas behind the ethnography of communication was that long-standing questions in social and cultural anthropology could be addressed by problematizing language as social process, rather than taking it as a neutral and transparent reflection of the social order. Language had to be seen as a privileged site for the study of society and culture. Here it joined sociological concerns for capturing the nature of the construction of social reality.

*Comment on the social dimension of interaction, and the place of language in it.*

*Social reality: is it given, or rather constructed in discursive production?*

DIANE BLAKEMORE: *Discourse and Relevance Theory*, pp. 100-118

In: *The Handbook of Discourse Analysis*, Ed. by Deborah

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p. 101

In drawing this analogy between relevance theoretic approaches to discourse and Chomskyan linguistics, I do not mean to suggest that there is an analogy between a theory of utterance understanding and grammar, or that a theory of discourse understanding is to be somehow accommodated within a theory of generative grammar. On the contrary, it is argued that Chomsky's modular view of the mind allows us to draw a principled distinction between a theory of grammar and a theory of utterance understanding. As we shall see in this chapter, while grammar plays a role in communication, this role is to deliver not representations of the thoughts that speakers communicate, but semantic representations which fall short of the complete interpretation intended. The contextual assumptions required for a complete interpretation of the speaker's intentions and the computations that are used in deriving this interpretation are *outside* the language module (grammar). As Deirdre Wilson (1995) has said, "there is no more reason to expect discourse to have the same structure as language than there is to expect it to have the same structure as vision." In particular, there is no reason to expect discourse to be analyzed in terms of a code or set of rules or conventions (see also Wilson and Sperber 1986).

*The notion of discourse is richer than that of grammar, and even language, in many ways: why and how?*

*Think of examples of possible contextual assumptions from 'outside'.*



JEF VERSCHUEREN: *Understanding Pragmatics*. Arnold, London – New York – Sydney – Auckland, 1999

pp. 148-149

If there is one indisputable linguistic universal, it is the bare fact that language use takes place over time. Although space is a powerful contextual correlate of adaptability (speech being incomprehensible at a large distance, spatial distance being influenced by aspects of social relationships relevant for the nature of the communication in question, etc. [...]), and though spatial relations underlie significant chunks of linguistically reflected conceptualization, **time** – as a contextual correlate of adaptability – clearly imposes more universal constraints on verbal interaction. What space is for lexical and grammatical meaning (a set of observable relations which can be metaphorically transformed and extended to build a wide range of concepts), time may be for linguistic action: time or the temporal dimension provides the raw material for communicative dynamics.

The constraints imposed by this raw material are immediately apparent when we consider processing by the medium of adaptation, mind in society [...] At the micro-level, the interlocutors' 'memory' imposes considerable time-related processing constraints; and communicative processing itself involves (again time-related) 'planning' [...] At a macro-level, earlier stages of development of languages and linguistic conventions are no longer readily accessible to the language user; conversely, communicative success vis-à-vis future generations cannot be taken for granted, not even with the channel of writing, and not even at the more trivial levels where few obstacles would be met in interaction with contemporaries.

Also at the micro-level, but now considering co-adaptation processes between contextual correlates of adaptability and linguistic choices, it is possible to distinguish *stages of adaptation* in linguistic interaction. Three types can easily be distinguished (but more configurations are possible): (i) linguistic choices may be made *after* certain circumstances ‘in the world’ (as seen by the utterer U and the interpreter I) have appeared; (ii) linguistic choices may *create* certain circumstances; (iii) choices may remain ineffective until or become ineffective when certain *later* conditions come into play.

*Time and space are central to language and communication; comment on the constraints that they impose. How do they affect linguistic choices?*

WALLACE CHAFE: *The Analysis of Discourse Flow*, pp. 673-687

In: *The Handbook of Discourse Analysis*, Ed. by Deborah Schiffrin, Deborah Tannen, and Heidi E. Hamilton, Blackwell Publishers, Massachusetts USA, Oxford UK, 2001

pp. 678-679

There are two problems that confront anyone engaged in talk. They are created by two kinds of **unconformity**, to borrow a term from geology, where it refers to a discontinuity in rock strata. I use it here to refer to disparate aspects of human experience that must somehow be brought into approximate (but only approximate) conformity if one is to interact with one's fellow humans. First, there is the inevitable unconformity between an individual's experiences - perceptions, actions, and evaluations that are either immediate, remembered, or imagined

- and the limited resources a language provides for verbalizing them. Second, there is the unconformity that inevitably exists between one mind and another. There is, in short, both a **verbalization** problem and an **interaction** problem. The language people produce often gives indications that a speaker recognizes both [...]

So far as the verbalization problem is concerned, language cannot fully or adequately express an inner experience. The verbalization process allows a speaker to get a useful handle on the experience and share it to some degree with others, but the linguistic organization of ideas is not the same as the experience itself [...]

So far as the interaction problem is concerned, one mind can never fully know what another mind is experiencing, and language can only imperfectly bridge the gap. Someone engaged in a conversation needs both to clothe an inner experience in language that will more or less adequately express it, and at the same time find language that will more or less satisfactorily take account of what is believed to be present in other minds, to the extent that that is possible.

*Considering the space- and time-related constraints discussed in the previous passage, what brings about unconformity?*

*Can there be successful interaction with major verbalization problems?*

ROM HARRÉ: *The Discursive Turn in Social Psychology*, pp. 688-706

In: *The Handbook of Discourse Analysis*, Ed. by Deborah Schiffrin, Deborah Tannen, and Heidi E. Hamilton, Blackwell Publishers, Massachusetts USA, Oxford UK, 2001

p. 696

The notion of discourse has its home in linguistic exchanges, storytelling, and the like. Before I go on to show how the scope of the concept must be enlarged to include nonlinguistic interchanges of certain sorts, we need to ground the whole enterprise in a suitable account of language as a discursive medium. Why do we say things to one another? For almost two millennia it was assumed that it was to exchange information. The job of language was primarily descriptive. "How many eggs this morning?" "Six." But think about some more of this conversation. "Come to breakfast." "How do you like them done?" "Sunny side up." "The yolks are too hard." "You're always complaining! Cook them yourself." "Aw! Mum!" We all know that even "You're always complaining" is not a simple description of someone's habitual behavior. It is at just this point that social psychology and linguistic analysis intersect. The last six utterances are performances of certain social acts: inviting, questioning, answering, complaining, expressing resentment, and apologizing. Seen thus the conversation is a complex social episode, with its own rules and conventions. Here we have a social episode and the medium is literally discursive. Utterances like those above have been called "performative" by Austin (1964), and the work they do "speech acts."

It is very important to resist the temptation to fall back into psychological individualism at this point. Austin realized that what someone said was effective only if it was said by the right

person in the right circumstances, and if it was so understood by the other people involved. He was insistent that the intentions and states of mind of speakers played a secondary role. To keep the distinction between what an individual speaker intended and what was jointly produced, I shall adopt the well-known distinction between actions (individual intended behavior) and acts (the jointly constructed social meanings of actions) in distinguishing between speech actions - what someone intends by an utterance - and speech acts - what is jointly accomplished by that utterance in context. Thus I may intend to praise you when I say "Not a bad show, old pal," while you and everyone else around take me to be belittling your achievement.

*The description "the notion of discourse has its home in linguistic exchanges" is not merely an instance of figurative use. What inferences of semiotic character does it allow?*

*Individual vs. social: how does the dichotomy apply to speech actions and speech acts?*

p. 698

What explains the sequential structures of speech acts, understood in the light of our intuitions as to the positions of the interactors? This question could not be posed within the framework of the old paradigm, with its essentially static conception of social interaction. Here we return to the important notion of model.

The most powerful and the most ancient heuristic abstraction used to throw the relevant structure of an episode into high relief is the dramaturgical model. Shakespeare famously used it, drawing on the social psychology of the Elizabethan era in authors such as Erasmus. It was revived as a

deliberate counterforce to behaviorism by Kenneth Burke (1945), and subsequently inspired some of Goffman's most illuminating studies (Goffman 1967). The idea is very simple: we juxtapose the staging of a play to the living out of an episode of everyday life, using the concepts from the stage to analyze the otherwise opaque happenings of the lived episode. Burke recommended a five-fold basic scheme: act, scene, agent, agency, and purpose. One would approach a scene from *Hamlet* with these in mind, and Burke recommended that we approach the scenes of everyday life with the same scheme. Taken in pairs he called them "ratios." He thought that the model could be enriched by looking for the act/ scene relationship, the agency/purpose relationship and so on. So to force the guilty pair to confess (act) Hamlet stages the play within the play (scene). The agency is the playlet while the purpose is to secure a confession. In like manner one might study the stages of the formation of a friendship as the unfolding of a drama.

*Linguist's reflections: "Is life a stage?"; "Are we actors?"  
How do we model acts, scenes, etc?*

COLEEN COTTER: *Discourse and Media*, pp. 416-436

In: *The Handbook of Discourse Analysis*, Ed. by Deborah Schiffrin, Deborah Tannen, and Heidi E. Hamilton, Blackwell Publishers, Massachusetts USA, Oxford UK, 2001

pp. 421-422

Different linguists or theorists offer different conceptualizations of the audience and its role in the construction of media realities. In the approaches I address here, the audience is conceived of as part of the discourse mechanism.

This is in contrast with more conventional assumptions about mass communication which rely on the active sender-passive receiver "conduit" model, which is now contested. The position of the audience may be one of the more salient differentiating features of the various research paradigms. A great deal of the research (from within discourse analysis and sociolinguistics and outside of it) either casts the audience as individuals who do not have much choice in resisting media power, or credits the audience's role with more equality in the relationship: as being *both* active and acted upon.

There are different ways to explore the concept of audience agency or interaction in media discourse. Goffman's frame analysis of radio talk (1981) was one of the first to articulate and apply the insight that the relationships among the different interlocutors determine the nature of the speech event and the talk that is appropriate to it. Similarly, in Bell's view (1991), which builds on Goffman's categories of participant roles, the media audience takes on multiple roles: that of speaker, addressee, auditor, overhearer, and eavesdropper. As media-savvy participants in the larger culture, we recognize audience roles and embedded points of view and are conscious when an interviewee - or an interviewer - departs from a prescribed position. (Bell 1991 cites former US President Jimmy Carter's oft-quoted *post-Playboy* interview remarks, in which he admits to lusting "in his heart": Carter's words were appropriate for the immediate addressee, but not for the ultimate listening audience, especially coming from a candidate for president.) In a related, but less Goffmanian way, Cappella and Jamieson (1997) employ the concept of frame to account for the influence of media language on public opinion. Their work on political campaign

coverage determined that audiences who read stories about strategy became more cynical about politicians and politics than those who read stories that focused on, and were thus framed in terms of, issues.

Meinhof's work on the visual and textual double messages in television news, which she argues have cross-cultural implications, is consciously predicated on a focus away from "text-internal readings, where readers are theorized as decoders of fixed meanings, to more dynamic models, where meanings are negotiated by actively participating readers" (Meinhof 1994: 212). Her own three-part taxonomy of communication, which circumvents the sender-receiver model and is briefer than Goffman's and Bell's characterizations, includes *actors*, *activities or events*, and *the affected, the effect, or outcome*.

The audience is considered from cognitive perspectives, as well. Van Dijk and Kintsch (1983) led the early work on the cognitive factors in the processing of information that influence comprehension of texts by readers. They establish that hierarchical relations exist among discourse strategies; that information comes from many sources within text and context; and that "forward" and "backward" interpretation strategies operate on the local level to specify the meaning and constrain interpretation - insights that background many current assumptions about audience interplay with text.

*The dichotomy speaker – addressee is obviously highly schematic: comment on the variation of roles, not forgetting about possible role-exchanges as well.*

NANCY AINSWORTH-VAUGHN: *The Discourse of Medical Encounters*, pp. 453-469



In: The Handbook of Discourse Analysis, Ed. by Deborah Schiffrin, Deborah Tannen, and Heidi E. Hamilton, Blackwell Publishers, Massachusetts USA, Oxford UK, 2001

p. 461

The term *question* sometimes is used to refer only to linguistic form, e.g. inversion of subject and auxiliary verb, or rising intonation at the end of a sentence. However, I follow Stenstrom (1984), West (1984a), and Frankel (1979) in using “question” to mean “request for information.” Stenstrom shows that linguistic markings alone cannot identify questions (e.g. rhetorical questions are linguistically marked but function otherwise), but that linguistic markings and situational features have some conventionalized relationships which speakers understand as suggesting and confirming question function.

The number of questions doctors and patients ask has been a central issue in research on medical discourse because to ask a question is to claim power over emerging talk. Studies in various cultures (e.g. West 1984b (United States); Hein and Wodak 1987 (Austria); Weijts 1993 (Netherlands)) have shown beyond doubt that medical encounters often consist primarily of doctors asking questions and patients answering. The usual conclusion is that medical encounters are an “interview” genre - highly asymmetrical, with only one person having the right to question.

The relationship between questions and power is important to specify. Questions are directives. By using directives, a speaker proposes to exert control over other conversational participants (Goodwin 1990), i.e. to direct their actions in the discourse. There are several ways in which questions claim power:

- A question addressed to another participant chooses that participant as the next speaker - an obvious exercise of control.
- A question, even an “open-ended” question, always in some way restricts the topic of the response - the referential content of the conversation. This second point is especially important in the medical encounter, because time for the encounter is limited and choice of topic determines which of the patient's problems will be addressed and which will not.
- Some questions entail the expectation that the floor will be returned to the questioner (Frankel 1979: 234), and control of the floor is usually thought to embody the “up” position in conversational asymmetry (Edelsky 1993; James and Drakich 1993).

*The one who asks the/a question has the power – how?*

*Name a few genres in which the role of questions and/or questioning is central.*

## **Information Structure, Coherence, Inferencing, Interpretation**

JEF VERSCHUEREN: *Understanding Pragmatics*. Arnold, London – New York – Sydney – Auckland, 1999  
pp. 135-136

Remembering that the generation of meaning is what language use is all about, it can be hardly surprising that the main utterance-building principles (extending further into the building of utterance clusters), guiding the production and interpretation of utterances (and utterance clusters), should be

related to the organization of content [...] At the level of meaning itself, the conglomerate of organizational principles involved could be captured with the term **coherence**, or, if allowed to transcend theory-specific idiosyncrasies of the label, **relevance** [...] Though the need for coherence or relevance derives from what utterers and interpreters set out to do at the discourse level, some of the ‘work’ is clearly reflected at the clause or sentence level in what is commonly called its **information structure** and/or **thematic structure** (depending on theory-internal options; the Hallidayan framework, for instance, handles a strict distinction between the two). That is why, for purpose of presentation, we will distinguish between principles of sentential utterance building as opposed to suprasentential utterance building.

*What semantic and pragmatic inferences does the passage allow?*

ROGER G. VAN DE VELDE: *Text and Thinking (On Some Roles of Thinking in Text Interpretation)*. Walter de Gruyter, Berlin – New York, 1992

p. 6

As to the problem of how to deal with the properties of the properties of verbal text itself, I point out that inferences are needed to identify the information parts and to relate them to each other. In a wider text-oriented perspective, inferences serve to discern the discourse-internal surface links, to disentangle the deeper meaning relations and to add information to the text under consideration in order to construct low-level coherence.

Regarding the problem of what the producer meant by the verbal text, I describe the ways in which **inferences** help

receivers to find relations which exist between discourse phenomena and the producer's intentions/ motives/ reasons. I also demonstrate the way in which inferences may contribute to identifying the complex difficulties which arise when the receiver attempts to approximate to the producer's person-internal meanings. In this respect, I am also concerned with the problem areas connected with the interpersonal relationships between the producer and the receiver and with the wider communicative contexts. Ultimately, these concerns with producer-oriented interpretation are to establish high-level coherence.

Regarding the problem of how the receiver relates the information of the verbal text and the information about what the producer meant by the verbal text to her/his value systems, preferences, attitudes, expectations, etc., I argue that text interpretation leads the receiver to transform the original text meaning. I also demonstrate that the justification and plausibility of the resulting text transformation can be controlled only by relying on inferences.

*Inferencing and coherence: comment on the connection in the framework of communication.*

*Do you agree that interpretation is transformation of meaning? Explain your position.*

EVA HAJIČOVA AND PETR SGALL: *Topic and Focus of a Sentence and the Patterning of a Text*, pp. 70-96

In: *Text and Discourse Constitution (Empirical Aspects, Theoretical Approaches)* Ed. by J. S. Petőfi, Walter de Gruyter, Berlin – New York, 1988

pp. 72-73

If the sentence is viewed not only statically, but is understood as an instruction given by the speaker to the hearer (i.e. as an elementary structure adapted to functioning in communication), then not only the speaker's intention "to tell someone something" by certain means (cf. Searle, 1970; 42ff.) should be taken into account, but also the fact that the speaker mostly uses such means that help the hearer to find the interpretation rather easily, avoiding much of the effort that would be necessary if the hearer had to find the meaning and reference of the expressions contained in the sentence in the vast domain of her/his memory without any aids. The sentence, as a systemic form of an elementary communicative linguistic act, is organized in such a way as to minimize this effort on the part of the hearer. Usually a sentence distinguishes certain items of the information stored in the accessible parts of the hearer's memory from the modifications concerning these points that the hearer should carry out according to the intention of the speaker. In uttering a declarative sentence, the speaker specifies the items of information s/he shares with the hearer and considers to be easily accessible to the latter at the given time point of the discourse (topic), and s/he specifies, further, what properties should be assigned to them by the hearer, in what relationships with what other items they should be introduced, or what other modifications they should undergo (focus).

*Considering the fact that a sentence is viewed as a dynamic entity – instruction, in this passage, do you think it possible to regard it as a form of questioning? Explain your position.*

*How are **theme** and **focus** defined in the communicative framework?*

ROLAND POSNER: *Semantics and Pragmatics of Sentence Connectives in Natural Language*, pp. 169-201

In: *Speech Act Theory and Pragmatics*, Ed. by John R. Searle, Ferenc Kiefer, Manfred Bierwiesch, vol. 10, D. Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht: Holland – Boston: USA – London: England, 1980

pp. 181-182

1. According to our initial assumption, the addressee proceeds from the literal meaning of an expression and, on this basis, establishes certain conversational suggestions corresponding to the particular features of the verbal and non-verbal context. A comparative analysis of the comprehension processes for all essential uses of an expression could thus furnish us with those content elements which are always involved, as against those elements that play a role only in certain classes of context. We may assume that the content elements involved in the comprehension of all the uses of an expression belong to the literal meaning of that expression; as to the other content elements, we may conclude that they are dependent on special circumstances of communication and are produced only in the process of special interpretive reasoning. This is the *postulate of variability* for suggestions.

2. Since conversational suggestions change as the situation of conversation changes, we can cancel them through the choice of certain contexts. Even simple verbal additions will do the job, and by claiming the contrary we can annul an alleged suggestion without giving rise to a contradiction. This is the Gricean *postulate of cancellability* for suggestions [...]

3. Finally, one cannot avoid a conversational suggestion by simply choosing another formulation with the same literal

meaning. Suggestions of the relevant sort do not result from the use of special words but rather from the specific use of meanings. Therefore a suggestion generated by a particular utterance in a given situation is detachable from the words, but not from the literal meaning of that utterance. This is the Gricean *postulate of non-detachability* for suggestions [...]

Variability, cancellability and non-detachability are useful indications, but, unfortunately, they are not sufficient as criteria in determining which content elements have to be excluded from the literal meaning of an expression. Nevertheless, we have to work with them, as long as there are no better analytical instruments.

*Summarize the first paragraph, using the following notions: content elements, circumstances of communication, variability of suggestions.*

*Comment on the role of literal meaning in comprehension/interpretation.*

DIANE BLAKEMORE: *Discourse and Relevance Theory*, pp. 100-118

In: *The Handbook of Discourse Analysis*, Ed. by Deborah Schiffrin, Deborah Tannen, and Heidi E. Hamilton, Blackwell Publishers, Massachusetts USA, Oxford UK, 2001

pp. 102-103

It might be argued at this point that while the hearer's recognition of coherence relations is not enough to provide a full account of how these sequences are interpreted, the recognition of coherence relations is nevertheless necessary for comprehension. In other words, it could be claimed that in order to understand the utterance *U1* in the sequence *U1. U2* it is

necessary to recover what Mann and Thompson (1987) call “relational proposition,” which expresses a particular structural relation.

However, as Blass (1990) has pointed out, everyday discourse is full of acceptable utterances which cannot be understood in isolation from the context, but which cannot be said to be part of a coherent text. For example, travellers on the London Underground are able to recognize that the utterance displayed at the foot of escalators is not intended to be interpreted as a requirement that everyone using the escalator must carry a dog, but only that travellers who are travelling with dogs on the escalator must carry them:

(1) Dogs must be carried.

It is not clear why the psychological processes involved in accessing and using contextual assumptions for the interpretation of isolated utterances like (9) and the principles governing those processes should be different from the ones involved in the interpretation of utterances which are part of a text.

*How important is the factor of context for us to interpret the sign ‘Dogs must be carried at the bottom of the escalator’ correctly? Think of a situation with a different ‘relational proposition’.*

p. 105

The assumption that an utterance is consistent with the Principle of Relevance is based on the hearer's recognition that it is an act of ostensive communication - that is, an act of deliberate, overt communication in which the speaker not only intends to convey a particular message but is also actively



helping the hearer recognize this. From the speaker's point of view, it is simply not worth engaging in such an act unless the audience pays attention to it. But equally, from the hearer's point of view it is not worth paying attention to an act of communication unless there is information worth processing - or in other words, unless it is relevant. This means that a speaker who requests the hearer's attention, for example by producing an utterance, communicates his or her assumption that his or her utterance is relevant.

Relevance is defined in terms of *contextual effect* and *processing effort*. Contextual effects are simply the ways in which a new piece of information may interact with contextual assumptions to yield an improvement to the hearer's overall representation of the world. These are not confined to new assumptions derived from combining the new information with contextual assumptions, but may also include increased evidence for existing assumptions or even the elimination of existing assumptions. Processing effort is a function not only of the linguistic complexity of the utterance itself, but also of the cost of accessing and using contextual assumptions in the derivation of contextual effects.

Sperber and Wilson (1986) argue that the presumption of relevance carried by every act of ostensive communication has two aspects: first, it creates a presumption that the information it communicates interacts with the context for derivation of adequate *contextual effects*; and second, it creates a presumption that no gratuitous processing effort is required for the recovery of effects. Taken together, these presumptions define a level of *optimal relevance*. And the principle of relevance is simply the thesis that every act of ostensive communication communicates

a presumption of its own optimal relevance.

*Relevance of information: explain the perspectives that the speaker and hearer take.*

*How do contextual effect and processing effort balance?*

NORMAN FAIRCLOUGH: *Analyzing Discourse (Textual Analysis for Social Research)*, Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group, London and New York, 2004

pp. 41-42

An important contrast between intertextuality and assumption is that the former broadly opens up difference by bringing other voices into a text, whereas the latter broadly reduces difference by assuming common ground. Or to put it differently, the former accentuates the dialogicality of a text, the dialogue between the voice of the author of a text and other voices, the latter diminishes it. The term voice is in part similar to the way I use the term style (meaning ways of being or identities in their linguistic and more broadly semiotic aspects), but it is useful in also allowing us to focus on the co-presence in texts of the voices of particular individuals (Bakhtin 1981, Ivanic 1998, Wertsch 1991). People differ in all sorts of ways, and orientation to difference is fundamental to social interaction. Giddens suggested in one of his earlier books that the production of interaction has three fundamental elements: its constitution as meaningful; its constitution as a moral order; and its constitution as the operation of relations of power (1993:104). Orientation to difference is central to the account of these three elements which he went on to give. The production of interaction as meaningful entails active and continual negotiation of differences of meaning; the norms of interaction

as a moral order are oriented to and interpreted differently by different social actors, and these differences are negotiated. Power in its most general sense of the transformative capacity of human action, the capacity to intervene in a series of events so as to alter their course, depends upon resources or facilities which are differentially available to social actors; and power in the relational sense of the capability to secure outcomes where the realization of these outcomes depends upon the agency of others is also differentially available to different social actors.

But social events and interaction vary in the nature of their orientation to difference, as do texts as elements of social events. We can schematically differentiate five scenarios at a very general level:

(a) an openness to, acceptance of, recognition of difference; an exploration of difference, as in 'dialogue' in the richest sense of the term;

(b) an accentuation of difference, conflict, polemic, a struggle over meaning, norms, power;

(c) an attempt to resolve or overcome difference;

(d) a bracketing of difference, a focus on commonality, solidarity;

(e) consensus, a normalization and acceptance of differences of power which brackets or suppresses differences of meaning and norms.

*What is the difference between intertextuality and assumption according to the passage?*

*Comment on the five scenarios presented in the passage.*

DEBORAH TANNEN: *Conversational Style (Analyzing Talk among Friends)*, New Edition, Oxford University Press,

2005, Oxford – New York

pp. 14-15

Speech - the use of language in all its phonological, lexical, syntactic, prosodic, and rhythmic variety – is one element of a range of behavioral characteristics that make up personal style. It would be ideal, ultimately, to link an analysis of language use with a comprehensive analysis of other elements of behavior. At the very least, a linguistic analysis should correlate verbal with proxemic, kinesic, and other non-verbal communicative channels, such as facial expression and gesture.

[...] The second issue raised by Sapir's observation is that of individual versus social differences. As Sapir points out, it is necessary to know what is 'unmarked', that is, what is conventionalized within a community, in order to know what special meaning an individual may be intentionally or unintentionally communicating by diverging from convention. Everyone, I believe, has had the experience of knowing someone and later meeting someone else – a family member or another person from the same part of the country or the same foreign country – and being overwhelmed by how similar the new person is to the known one. In other words, features that one had considered unique to the individual suddenly are seen as shared, or social, phenomena.

Gumperz and Tannen (1979) show that impressions of style grow out of the use of linguistic devices to signal how an utterance is meant. They attempt to identify the level of signaling on which individual as compared to social differences arise. For example, speakers from different countries (e.g. from the work of Gumperz, speakers of Indian as opposed to British English) may differ with respect to basic conversational control

devices such as whether they use increased amplitude to get the floor or use it as an expressive show of anger. In contrast, speakers from different regions of the same country (e.g., from the work of Tannen, speakers from New York as opposed to Boston) or men as compared to women may differ about when and how to apply similar devices, such as irony or indirectness.

*Comment on behavioral characteristics: verbal vs. non-verbal; individual vs. social.*

JOSEPH E. GRIMES: *Narrative Studies in Oral Texts*, pp.123-132

In: *Current Trends in Textlinguistics*, Ed. by U. Dressler, Walter de Gruyter, Berlin – New York, 1978

p. 123-126

Three themes recur in this body of work on narrative, themes so persistent in overview that I take them to reflect three partially independent subsystems of language. I call the three content, cohesion, and staging (Grimes, 1975 b). They subsume phenomena not only in narrative discourse but in hortatory, expository, and expressive discourse as well.

The first, content, refers to what we normally think of as semantics. The second, cohesion, has to do with redundancies in text: how the things one is saying now relate back to all that has gone before. The third, staging or topic or thematic structure, deals with the way the speaker controls the perspective from which he presents everything he says.

[...] One part of content that has been reviewed fairly thoroughly is the realm of *lexical* relationships. These involve a small, possibly universal set of roles or cases of the kind associated with Charles Fillmore's name (1968), or equivalent

relationships established by subcategorization (Winograd, Mel'chuk). Much of what can be said about meaning revolves around these relationships.

Lexical relationships are an important part of content, but they do not show up in the analysis of narratives in as fundamental a way as *rhetorical* relationships like result or attribution. These organize discourses by relating lexical complexes to each other, and recursively by relating rhetorical complexes to each other. The constraints on their arguments, unlike the constraints on the arguments of lexical relationships, do not involve role categories. The work of Beekman, Callow, and Callow on Biblical texts (1974) is an example of high level rhetorical analysis, which again is not strictly limited to narrative.

In thinking about these lexical and rhetorical relationships, it is significant that scholars from approaches as diverse as those of Quillian, Schank, or Simmons in artificial intelligence, the stratificational grammarians in ordinary linguistics, and Mel'chuk and Zholkovsky in lexicography have settled on networks that are not trees as a representation of content. The tree, though familiar to linguists and a perfectly adequate representation of much of what we want to say about grammar, may simply be too restricted for some kinds of study including the study of narrative.

One consequence of looking at content structure separately from cohesion and staging is that we find fairly regular ways in which different kinds of content in discourse map to different surface grammatical patterns, each in its own way. Robert C. Thurman has developed a chart format from a display originally proposed by H. A. Gleason, Jr., for separating out different

kinds of information. Applied to narrative, the Thurman chart is a useful analytical tool because it highlights the distinction between event information on the one hand and the identification of participants, setting, explanation, evaluation, and collateral information on the other. The events in a narrative constitute its backbone, from which other kinds of information depend. Other kinds of information are the backbone of other kinds of discourse; we find especially that explanatory information is at the core of logical-sounding discourses.

Distinct grammatical forms go with different kinds of information. For example, in Xavante of Brazil Ruth McLeod finds that the aspect system for events operates quite differently from the aspect system for explanations, even though the two systems share some of the same affixes (1974).

[...] In a sense, content gives us the bare bones of what we are saying, while cohesion, the second major system, tells us how we relate what we are saying to the hearer. The speaker has to decide as he goes along how the things he is saying relate to what he thinks his hearer already knows. As Halliday has shown (1967), the speaker decides what quantity of information he thinks the hearer can assimilate, and within the expression of that quantity, what part of it is likely to be the least predictable to the hearer. His judgment of redundancy may go back to situational factors, as in certain uses of pronouns. It may also go back to information already given or implied by the preceding part of the same text.

The speaker's judgments about redundancy influence his intonation in English. In Bacairi of Brazil, however, Wheatley cites cases where similar decisions influence word order instead; and in the highlands of Papua New Guinea, these same

judgments are expressed in the medial and final inflections of the verb (M. Lawrence, 1972).

Anaphoric or backward pointing reference is based on the same kind of judgment by the speaker: he assumes that the hearer already knows some of what he is talking about. Not only do we base pronominalization on situational and textual reference; we also use inclusive vocabulary items like *animal* to refer back to what was originally named more specifically as *horse*. From the point of view of discourse studies the significant question is not 'how do we pronominalize?' but rather 'under what circumstances do we not pronominalize?'

A special kind of cohesion system is discussed by Thurman and others. It is found in the *linkage* patterns of many languages. In linkage a portion of text is repeated to give a starting point for what follows. The extreme case of linkage encountered so far is that of Kayapo of Brazil (Stout and Thomson, 1971). In Kayapo one repeats an entire paragraph nearly verbatim as a lead into a paragraph that describes a new course of events. In most other languages a single clause is repeated or paraphrased as a link, or a conventional consequence (like 'leave'/'arrive') is given.

[...] We have seen how the speaker decides what he is going to say and how he will relate it to what has gone before. He also decides on a perspective from which he wishes to stage what he says.

To a remark like *Sally bought it in the market* there are several natural comebacks, including *How much did she buy it for?* And *How much did they sell it to her for?* Both take the same answer. The first, however, continues on the line of what Sally was doing, while the second shifts the perspective to that of the market people.



Sometimes we announce with a fanfare what it is we are talking about, as when we say *Our lecture this afternoon is about discourse*. Many languages including English also have more subtle ways of announcing a topic.

*How justified is it to separate structure of content from cohesion? How does quantity of information affect the balance?*

### **Cohesion, Discourse Markers, Deixis, Textual Resources**

H.G. WIDDOWSON: *Text, Context, Pretext (Critical Issues in Discourse Analysis)*. Blackwell Publishing, USA, 2004 pp. 63-64

We return to Brown and Yule and to the main point: constraints on co-occurrence itself, whether imposed by internal co-textual factors, or external contextual ones, have to do with the properties of text. Constraints on interpretation have to do with how text is processed as discourse. This involves tracing relationships not just between juxtaposed elements (as in collocations) but between elements which may be at a considerable textual distance from each other. And even then, as we have seen, interpretation does not follow from this tracing of semantic links. You can demonstrate the co-textual patterns that tie parts of a text together, thereby showing it to be **cohesive**, but this will not of itself indicate how the text can be made **coherent** as discourse.

Such a distinction is not, however, recognized in what is widely cited as the standard work on cohesion (Halliday and Hasan 1976). For them cohesion is a feature of discourse structure which, equivalently, gives a text its texture (the terms

are used in free variation) [...] Halliday and Hasan talk about the semantic linking of sentences but insist that ‘a text does not CONSIST OF sentences; it is REALIZED BY, or encoded in sentences’ (Halliday and Hasan 1976: 2; emphasis in the original). How a text can be encoded in sentences without then consisting of them is not made clear, but what is clear is that text is defined in terms of the semantic ties that relate different parts of it. It is co-textual cohesion that *constitutes* the text as a linguistic object. Halliday and Hasan then propose a number of distinct categories for the classification of cohesive devices [...] These categories represent general ways in which cohesion functions, and within each category there is a detailed list of the particular ways in which the cohesive relation is given formal instantiation. Thus reference can be instantiated by personal pronouns, by demonstrative adjectives, demonstrative adverbs, the definite article and so on. The listing of devices does not indeed provide a practical means for identifying their co-textual occurrence in any particular text. What does not emerge through the detail with any clarity is how far the formal differences of these devices correspond to any difference in their cohesive function. Are personal pronouns and demonstratives, for example, simply formally different alternative instantiations of reference, or does the use of the personal pronoun constitute a different *kind* of reference from the use of a demonstrative? If so, then how are these different subdivisions of cohesive function to be defined? And are they invariably instantiated by the same formal means – do demonstratives, for example, always have to function as reference, or can they function in substitution as well?

*“It is co-textual cohesion that constitutes the text as a linguistic object”*: comment on the parameter of co-textual cohesion for textuality.

*What cohesive devices are discussed in the passage?*

*What methodological weaknesses are pointed out in Halliday and Hasan’s approach?*

DEBORAH SCHIFFRIN: *Discourse Markers: Language, Meaning and Context*, pp. 54-75

In: *The Handbook of Discourse Analysis*, Ed. by Deborah Schiffrin, Deborah Tannen, and Heidi E. Hamilton, Blackwell Publishers, Massachusetts USA, Oxford UK, 2001

pp. 55-56

Halliday and Hasan's (1976) seminal work on cohesion in English provided an important framework for analyzing text by addressing a basic question stemming from the very inception of discourse analysis: what makes a text different from a random collection of unrelated sentences? Although Halliday and Hasan did not speak directly of discourse markers, their analysis of cohesion (based primarily on written texts) included words (e.g. *and, but, because, I mean, by the way, to sum up*) that have since been called markers and suggested functions for those words partially paralleling those of markers.

Halliday and Hasan propose that a set of cohesive devices (reference, repetition, substitution, ellipsis, and conjunction) help create a text by indicating semantic relations in an underlying structure of ideas (see Martin, this volume). A range of expressions (including, but not limited to, conjunctions) conveys conjunctive relations. Whereas most cohesive features establish cohesion through anaphoric or cataphoric ties to the

text, conjunctive items “express certain meanings which presuppose the presence of other components in the discourse” (Halliday and Hasan 1976: 236).

The meanings conveyed by conjunctive items are relatively straightforward: additive, adversative, causal, and temporal. Within these general meanings, however, are specific subtypes: a causal relation, for example, includes general causal (with simple and emphatic subtypes), and specific causal (with reason, result, and purpose subtypes). Each (sub)type of cohesive meaning can be conveyed through a variety of words: a general causal simple conjunctive relation, for example, can be conveyed through *so*, *then*, *hence*, and *therefore*. Multiplicity is found not just in a function (e.g. causal relation) → form (e.g. *so*, *hence*) direction, but also in a form → function direction. Thus a single word [FORM] can convey more than one conjunctive relation [FUNCTION]: *then*, for example, can convey temporal, causal, and conditional relations, between clauses (cf. Biq 1990; Hansen 1997; Schiffrin 1992).

Whereas many analyses of conjunctions argue for either a simple semantic interpretation or a set of polysemous meanings (e.g. Posner 1980), Halliday and Hasan allow variation in the degree to which meaning results from the semantics of a word itself or from the propositions in a text. For example, although *and* is a texture-creating device that can contribute an additive meaning, its meaning can also reflect the semantic content of a text: thus, if *and* prefaces an upcoming proposition whose meaning contrasts with that of a prior proposition, *and* would then convey an adversative relation (comparable to *but* and *on the other hand*).

*What makes a text different from a random collection of*

*unrelated sentences?*

*Comment on the semantic value of cohesive devices.*

pp. 58-59

[...] Fraser's (1990, 1998) perspective on discourse markers is embedded within a larger framework that impacts upon the analysis of markers. In contrast to Halliday and Hasan - whose main interest was the cohesion of text - Fraser's theoretical framework concerns the meaning of sentences, specifically how one type of pragmatic marker in a sentence may relate the message conveyed by that sentence to the message of a prior sentence. And in contrast to my approach in Schifffrin (1987a) - whose starting point was to account for the use and distribution of markers in everyday discourse - Fraser's starting point is the classification of types of pragmatic meaning, and within that classification, the description of how some pragmatic commentary markers (discourse markers) dictate an interpretation of "the message conveyed by S2 [S = segment] vis-a-vis the interpretation of S1" (Fraser 1998: 302).

Fraser's framework depends upon a differentiation between content and pragmatic meaning. Content meaning is referential meaning: "a more or less explicit representation of some state of the world that the speaker intends to bring to the hearer's attention by means of the literal interpretation of the sentence" (1990: 385). Pragmatic meaning concerns the speaker's communicative intention, the direct (not implied) "message the speaker intends to convey in uttering the sentence" (1990: 386). It is conveyed by three different sets of pragmatic markers: basic pragmatic markers (signals of illocutionary force, e.g. *please*), commentary pragmatic markers (encoding of another message

that comments on the basic message, e.g. *frankly*), and parallel pragmatic markers (encoding of another message separate from the basic and/or commentary message, e.g. *damn*, vocatives). Discourse markers are one type of commentary pragmatic marker: they are “a class of expressions, each of which signals how the speaker intends the basic message that follows to relate to the prior discourse” (1990: 387). Fraser's more recent work (1998) builds upon the sequential function of discourse markers, such that discourse markers necessarily specify (i.e. provide commentary on) a relationship between two segments of discourse: this specification is not conceptual, but procedural (it provides information on the interpretation of messages; see also Ariel 1998).

As suggested earlier, Fraser's framework presumes a strict separation between semantics (his content meaning) and pragmatics (his pragmatic meaning): speakers' use of commentary pragmatic markers - including, critically, discourse markers - has nothing to do with the content meaning of the words (cf. Halliday and Hasan 1976; Schiffrin 1987a; see also Norrick, this volume). Similarly, although discourse markers may be homophonous with, as well as historically related to, other forms, they do not function in sentential and textual roles simultaneously: “when an expression functions as a discourse marker, that is its exclusive function in the sentence” (1990: 189).

One consequence of these disjunctive relationships is that multiple functions of markers - including, critically, social interactional functions - are downplayed (if noted at all) and not open to linguistic explanation. What some scholars (e.g. Ariel 1998; Halliday and Hasan 1976; Schiffrin 1987a, 1992;

Maschler 1998; Schwenter 1996) suggest is an interdependence (sometimes clear, sometimes subtle) between content and pragmatic meaning - explained by well-known processes such as semantic bleaching (Bolinger 1977) or metaphorical extensions from a “source domain” (Sweetser 1990).

*Comment on Fraser’s approach to semantic meaning and pragmatic meaning.*

*Multiple functions of discourse markers and the Semantics – Pragmatics interface: your comments.*

NEAL R. NORRICK: *Discourse and Semantics*, pp. 76-99

In: *The Handbook of Discourse Analysis*, Ed. by Deborah Schiffrin, Deborah Tannen, and Heidi E. Hamilton, Blackwell Publishers, Massachusetts USA, Oxford UK, 2001

p. 80

Indexicality or deixis is the only area of meaning universally acknowledged to belong in the area of discourse or pragmatics, since it pertains to the contextual determination of reference which necessarily precedes a decision as to the truth or falsity of an assertion. Bar-Hillel (1954) estimates that over 90 percent of our declarative sentences are indexical in requiring implicit reference to the speaker, the addressee, the time and place of utterance with pronouns like *I* and *you*, adverbs like *now* and *yesterday*, *here* and *there*, *right* and *left*, and demonstratives like *this* and *that*. The meanings of such lexical items are simply not describable without noting that their reference shifts each time the setting changes, each time a new speaker takes over or points in a different direction. This sort of meaning is irrevocably bound to context, and it represents a historical foothold for discourse analysis within semantic theory.

Of course, we must also find referents for third person pronouns like *she* and *them* within the local context or within the foregoing discourse, though they do not necessarily shift with a change of speaker as true indexicals do. Those pronouns used to point to people and things in the immediate context are being used indexically/ deictically, while those assigned to referents based on "coreference" with a noun phrase in the preceding discourse are called anaphoric. Often a single pronoun will have both indexical and anaphoric possibilities: thus in sentence (1) below, *she* and *him* can be interpreted as coreferential with *Sue* and *Al* respectively, or they may refer to other people indicated or otherwise prominent in the context of utterance:

(1) Sue told Al she wished him luck.

*Explain the phrase 'contextual determination of reference'.*

*Comment on the connection between indexicality/ deixis and reference shift.*

MICHAEL STUBBS: *Computer-assisted Text and Corpus Analysis: Lexical Cohesion and Communicative Competence*, pp. 304-320

In: *The Handbook of Discourse Analysis*, Ed. by Deborah Schiffrin, Deborah Tannen, and Heidi E. Hamilton, Blackwell Publishers, Massachusetts USA, Oxford UK, 2001

pp. 309-310

Much recent linguistics emphasizes creative aspects of language at the expense of predictable combinations, which nevertheless constitute a large percentage of normal language use. The pervasiveness of such conventionalized language use, the correspondingly large role played by memory, and the implications for fluent and idiomatic native speaker competence



have, however, been emphasized by Bolinger (1976), Allerton (1984), Pawley and Syder (1983), Sinclair (1991), and Miller (1993).

Such observations concern probabilistic features of English. It is possible to have the "pleasant" combination *cause for celebration*, but vastly more frequent are combinations such as *cause for concern*. With the verb, there is nothing illogical (and nothing ungrammatical?) about the collocation *?cause an improvement*, yet it seems not to occur. (What does occur is *make an improvement*, or *achieve, bring about, lead to, produce, result in*, and *secure an improvement*.) Such syntagmatic patterning is much more detailed than is generally shown in grammars: it stretches well beyond words and short phrases, and provides a relatively unexplored mechanism of text cohesion. However, as I have illustrated, such analysis cannot be restricted to isolated texts, since it requires an analysis of intertextual relations, and therefore comparison of the actual choices in a given text, typical occurrences in other texts from the same text-type, and norms of usage in the language in general.

The literature on cohesion tends to neglect the role of collocations. For example, Halliday and Hasan (1976), in the standard reference on cohesion in English, have only four pages on collocations and regard them as "the most problematical part of lexical cohesion" (1976: 284). However, the role of collocations in text cohesion is discussed by Kjellmer (1991) and Bublitz (1996, 1998). Moon (1994, 1998: 259) argues that semifixed phrases provide a way of presenting stereotyped ideas, which avoids explicit evaluation, but encodes shared schemas which are institutionalized in the culture. Sinclair (1996) provides further detailed examples of the kind of lexical,

grammatical, and semantic relations which make such extended lexical units cohesive.

Conversely, the large literature on collocations and phrase-like units almost always regards them in their own right as linguistic units, and neglects their contribution to text cohesion. Early work on “word clustering” was done by Mandelbrot (who is nowadays more often associated with chaos theory), and as early as the 1970s he used a 1.6-million-word corpus to identify the strength of clustering between cooccurring words (Damerau and Mandelbrot 1973). More recent work (e.g. Choueka et al. 1983; Yang 1986; Smadja 1993; Justeson and Katz 1995) has used computer methods to identify recurrent phrasal units in natural text. Cowie (1994, 1999) provides useful reviews and discussions of principles.

These characteristics of language use - frequency, probability, and norms - can be studied only with quantitative methods and large corpora. However, cohesion (which is explicitly marked in the text) must be distinguished from coherence (which relies on background assumptions). Therefore, we also have to distinguish between frequency in a corpus and probability in a text. In the language as a whole, *launched an attack* is much more frequent than *launched a boat*. But if the text is about a rescue at sea, then we might expect *launched the lifeboat* (though *launched a plan* is not impossible). The probability of coming across a given word combination will be stable across the language: this is probability across a sequence of events. But this is not the same as the probability of a single event in a specific text: especially given that linguistic events are not independent of each other (unlike successive flips of a coin). Our linguistic competence tells us that one of these

general semantic patterns (*launched* “a plan” or *launched* “a boat”) is highly likely: but given what we know about the topic under discussion, we know which pattern is more likely in a given text.

*Comment on the connection between the phenomena: syntagmatic patterning, text cohesion, intertextuality.*

*Explain the mechanism of cohesion at the two levels – lexical, textual.*

*Does linguistic competence have any role in determining probability of language use?*

J. R. MARTIN: *Cohesion and Texture*, pp. 35-53

In: The Handbook of Discourse Analysis, Ed. by Deborah Schiffrin, Deborah Tannen, and Heidi E. Hamilton, Blackwell Publishers, Massachusetts USA, Oxford UK, pp. 35-53, 2001  
pp. 37-39

Martin (1992) worked on reformulating the notion of cohesive ties as discourse semantic structure, inspired by the text-oriented conception of semantics of the Hartford stratificationists (Gleason 1968; Gutwinski 1976) with whom he studied in Toronto. In his stratified account, cohesion was reformulated as a set of discourse semantic systems at a more abstract level than lexicogrammar, with their own meta-functional organization. Halliday's nonstructural textual resources were thus reworked as semantic systems concerned with discourse structure, comprising:

- identification
- negotiation
- conjunction
- ideation.

Identification is concerned with resources for tracking participants in discourse. This system subsumes earlier work on referential cohesion in a framework which considers the ways in which participants are both introduced into a text and kept track of once introduced. [...]

Negotiation is concerned with resources for exchange of information and of goods and services in dialog. This system subsumes some of the earlier work on ellipsis and substitution in a framework which considers the ways in which interlocutors initiate and respond in adjacency pairs. Drawing on earlier work at Birmingham (e.g. Sinclair and Coulthard 1975) and Nottingham (e.g. Berry 1981), a framework for exchanges consisting of up to five moves was developed, alongside provision for tracking and challenging side-sequences (Ventola 1987). This work is closely related to studies in conversation analysis (CA) but with a stronger grammatical orientation (such as that canvassed in Ochs et al. 1996). Eggins and Slade (1997) introduce ongoing SFL research in this area, in relation to wider questions of discourse structure and social context (Coulthard 1992 updates the Birmingham-based work).

Conjunction is concerned with resources for connecting messages, via addition, comparison, temporality, and causality. This system subsumes earlier work on linking between clauses in a framework which considers, in addition, the ways in which connections can be realized inside a clause through verbs, prepositions, and nouns (e.g. *result in*, *because of*, *reason*).[...]

Ideation is concerned with the semantics of lexical relations as they are deployed to construe institutional activity. This system subsumes earlier work on lexical cohesion in a framework which considers the ways in which activity

sequences and taxonomic relations (of classification and composition) organize the field of discourse (Benson and Greaves 1992). Drawing on Hasan (1985), a framework for a more detailed account of lexical relations was proposed - including repetition, synonymy, hyponymy, and meronymy; in addition, collocation was factored out into various kinds of “nuclear” relation, involving elaboration, extension, and enhancement (as developed by Halliday 1994 for the clause complex). This work is closely related to the detailed studies of lexical relations in discourse by Hoey (1991a), Francis (1985), and Winter (1977), and to work on the development of an ideational semantics by Halliday and Matthiessen (1999).

The result of these reformulations is a semantic stratum of text-oriented resources dedicated to the analysis of cohesive relations as discourse structure. Once stratified with respect to lexicogrammar, these resources can be aligned with meta-functions in the following proportions:

Identification	textual meaning
negotiation	interpersonal meaning
conjunction	logical meaning
ideation	experiential meaning.

In a stratified model of this kind the study of texture amounts to the study of patterns of interaction among discourse semantics, lexicogrammar, and phonology/ graphology in realization.

*Comment on Martin’s understanding of cohesion as providing discourse semantic structure, and the elements the latter comprises.*

*Comment on the meta-functions referred to above.*

HERBERT H. CLARK AND MIJA M. VAN DER WEGE:  
*Imagination in Discourse*, pp. 772-786

In: *The Handbook of Discourse Analysis*, Ed. by Deborah Schiffrin, Deborah Tannen, and Heidi E. Hamilton, Blackwell Publishers, Massachusetts USA, Oxford UK, 2001

p. 774

Narratives are ordinarily told from particular points of view. Melville's *Moby-Dick* is a first person account of a sailor, Ishmael, who describes his experiences aboard a whaler. When Ishmael moves from one place to the next, his point of view changes too. We are to imagine the world as he sees it in passing through it. We need first a visual, spatial, and conceptual representation of that world. We must then track not only where he is in that world, but which way he is moving, what he is looking at, and what he is hearing. We must track his moment-by-moment perceptual experiences.

Tracking the narrator, or the protagonist, requires following a *deictic center* - the *I*, *here*, and *now* of the narrator's point of view. This is especially important for interpreting deictic expressions like *come* and *go*, *this* and *that*, and *here* and *there* (see Buhler 1982; Duchan et al. 1995; Fillmore 1975). In Hemingway's *The Killers*, the narrator opens his story this way:

(2) The door to Henry's lunchroom opened and two men came in.

As Fillmore (1981) noted, the narrator must be inside the lunchroom, because he describes the door as opening by unseen forces and the men as "coming" in, not "going" in. The deictic center is inside the room. Point of view is essential to many of the narrator's choices, and imagining the scene from the narrator's or protagonist's vantage point is crucial to getting that point of view right.

*The deictic center as the visual, spatial, and conceptual representation of the author's world: is it a key to the interpretation of a fictional text? Comment on the reader's perspective.*

JACOB L. MEY: *Literary Pragmatics*, pp. 787-797

In: *The Handbook of Discourse Analysis*, Ed. by Deborah Schiffrin, Deborah Tannen, and Heidi E. Hamilton, Blackwell Publishers, Massachusetts USA, Oxford UK, 2001

p. 791

When it comes to the use of tense in literary works, the situation is no different from that surrounding deixis. Again, the question is how to use the resources that the language puts at our disposal in order to understand the text, in this case to determine who is saying what at which point of time in the narrative. The so-called indexical function of tense may be considered as a means of situating an utterance in time relative to a user. (See Mey 1999: ch. 3.)

A simple schema is that proposed by Ehrlich (1990), following the classical distinction introduced by the logician Hans Reichenbach in the 1940s (Reichenbach 1947). Ehrlich establishes the following distinctions: First, we have the time at which the utterance is spoken: this is "speech time" (ST). Then, there is the time at which the event that is spoken about took place: this is called "event time" (ET). And finally, we have the time that is indicated by the temporal indicators of the utterance (that is to say, both verbal tense morphemes and adverbs of time). This "temporal perspective" is called "reference time" (RT).

To show the contrast between the different "times," as expressed by these temporal indicators, Ehrlich provides the

following example (1990: 61):

John had already completed his paper last week.

Here, “the RT is last week, the ET is an unspecified time prior to last week, and the ST occurs after both RT and ET” (*ibid.*).

What this example does not show is the influence that a possible *context* may have on the use of tense. In a context of use, the various relations between RT, ST, and ET may well be disrupted, such that we only can understand what is going on by appealing to our understanding of the *pragmatic* world in which the interplay between the tenses is taking place. It is a bit like what happens when we are confronted with so-called “flashbacks” in a novel or on the screen. A story unfolds in (event) time, but suddenly the time perspective is broken, and events anterior to those related are “intercalated,” inserted into the stream of events, thus establishing a different time reference (sometimes, but not necessarily, accompanied by a change in time of “speaking”). In such cases, the morphemes of tense are not always sufficient by themselves to shore up a tottering, broken, or “unvoiced” narrative (Mey 1999: section 7.3).

*Time as a parameter of fictional worlds: comment on temporal indicators, and interplays between them.*

*Comment on the factor of the reader’s real time.*

### **The Cognitive Perspective: Entailment, Presupposition, Conceptual Domains**

NEAL R. NORRICK: *Discourse and Semantics*, pp. 76-99

In: *The Handbook of Discourse Analysis*, Ed. by Deborah Schiffrin, Deborah Tannen, and Heidi E. Hamilton, Blackwell



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pp. 82-83

Presupposition is also at heart a discourse or pragmatic notion, since the knowledge and beliefs of the speaker and the audience about things in the world are crucial in determining whether a sentence like the classic (4) makes sense:

(4) The present king of France is bald.

For Russell (1905) and his followers (Sellars 1954; perhaps Donnellan 1981) this sentence *entails* the existence of a particular individual, namely someone fitting the definite description "the present king of France." Hence the sentence counts as false in terms of truth-functional semantics - or perhaps simply false in any "possible world" in which there exists no king of France. By contrast, for Strawson and his (much more numerous) followers, existence does not count as a predicate at all. The existence of a present king of France amounts instead to a presupposition of sentence (4). In the absence of such a royal individual, the sentence simply fails to make any truth claim at all. For Strawson (1950) and his followers, the negation test for presuppositions is central: the presupposition that there is some current king of France adheres not only to sentence (4), but also to its negation (5):

(5) The present king of France is not bald.

Strawson later (1964) expressed concerns about some apparent counterexamples to his presupposition theory, saying that our intuitions about the truth or falsity of sentences containing definite descriptions may depend on discourse matters such as the topic of conversation. Thus in a discussion about the potential audience for this text, if I said the present king of France would be among its readers, I think most real

readers would be prepared to call my claim flat out false rather than to say it lacked a truth value; see Donnellan (1981). Still, the notion of presupposition received into linguistics was that of Strawson's original objection to Russell's theory of definite descriptions (Russell 1910).

pp. 85-86

Areas of meaning like entailment divide less obviously into truth-functional semantic versus discourse areas. That *uncle* entails some feature like <male> and that *dead* entails <not alive> may be easily described within traditional structural semantics by means of so-called redundancy rules. Thus, sentence pairs like those in (8) and (9) can be recognized as logically sound within semantics alone:

- (8) a. Sue's uncle arrived late.  
b. Therefore, some male arrived late.
- (9) a. Judy has been dead for years.  
b. Judy is no longer alive.

Other entailments, however - say, that *rob* entails <commit crime> and <punishable by prison term> - become quite cumbersome in any structural semantics. Such entailments involve world knowledge over and above lexical information proper. Consequently, the characterization of the inferences from the (a) to the (b) sentences in the pairs below must be accomplished through some version of frame/script/schema theory or the like:

- (10) a. Harry robbed a bank.  
b. Hence Harry committed a crime.
- (11) a. Harry finally got out of prison last week.  
b. That's because he robbed a bank in 1980.

*Summarize the two passages in formal semantic and pragmatic terms.*

*Think of contexts (or, mental spaces) in which “The present king of France is bald” would not be contradictory.*

GREGORY WARD AND BETTY J. BIRNER: *Discourse and Information Structure*, pp. 119-137

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p. 120

Although the term *focus* means different things to different people, we will use it here to refer to that portion of an utterance that represents new information, i.e. just that portion which augments or updates the hearer's view of the common ground (Vallduvi 1992). A focused constituent is realized intonationally with some kind of prosodic prominence, generally unclear accent. **Presupposed** information is the complement of focus: it represents the information that the speaker assumes is already part of the common ground, i.e. either salient or inferable in context. A **presupposition** is a proposition that is presupposed in this way.

Because utterances are intended to be informative, the presupposition typically does not exhaust the information in the utterance; instead, the proposition being presupposed is “open” - that is, lacking certain information. Such a proposition is represented with a variable in place of one or more constituents. For example, the utterance in (1a) would give rise to the presupposed open proposition (OP) in (1b), in the sense that a person hearing (1a) would immediately thereafter be licenced to

treat (1b) as part of the common ground:

(1) a. Pat brought those cookies to the BBQ.

b. Pat brought X to the BBQ.

Although only a single word, or syllable, of the focus bears nuclear accent, the focus itself can be indefinitely large; consider (2):

(2) Pat brought a bag of those yummy cookies from Treasure Island to the BBQ.

In a context in which the speaker has been asked *What did Pat bring?*, the focus in (2) would be *a bag of those yummy cookies from Treasure Island*.

It is also possible for a clause to have more than one focus, as in the exchange in (3):

(3) A: Who brought what to the BBQ?

B: Pat brought cookies.

The presupposition in this case is *X brought Y*, and *Pat* and *cookies* are foci. Notice that *Pat* need not represent entirely new information in order to count as new in this context. Even if *Pat* is salient in the discourse, *Pat* here is new as an instantiation of the variable in the presupposition.

*Comment on the connection between focus and presupposition.*

SUZANNE FLEISCHMAN: *Language and Medicine*, pp. 470-502

In: *The Handbook of Discourse Analysis*, Ed. by Deborah Schiffrin, Deborah Tannen, and Heidi E. Hamilton, Blackwell Publishers, Massachusetts USA, Oxford UK, 2001

pp. 485-486

Like all metaphors, "Medicine is war" has advantages and

drawbacks (...). While the imagery of fighting provides many patients with motivation, optimism, and comradery, whence its prominence in pathographies, it can also contribute to despondency if the disease becomes terminal (Stibbe 1997) or to a sense of personal failure. And Hodgkin (1985) points out that certain entailments of this metaphor - action is a virtue, doctors are fighters, technologies are weapons, disease is the enemy - only further the view that patients are not the “real” focus of medicine but merely the clinical stage on which the main protagonists of the drama do battle. Finally, to the extent that war is still a largely male enterprise, this metaphor subtly reinforces medicine's traditional gender bias.

As noted above, the language of medicine assigns physicians an active role and patients, by default, a passive role (cf. Burton 1982). This “transitivity” relationship is supported by both the war metaphor and the other major conceptual metaphor of biomedicine: “The body is a machine” (see Hodgkin 1985; Diekema 1989; Mintz 1992; van Rijn-van Tongeren 1997). This metaphor has a long tradition, from Descartes through nineteenth-century positivism. According to this view, the individual is seen as the sum of the body's parts, many of which have their own individual mechanical analogues: “The heart is a pump,” “The digestive system is plumbing,” “The brain is a computer,” “A cell is a machine,” and “Cells contain machinery.”

The conceptual macrometaphor suggests that we place our bodies in a custodial relationship to the medical establishment analogous to the relationship of our vehicles, for example, to the confraternity of auto mechanics to whom we turn for repairs or replacement parts (on the “fix-it” metaphor, see Kirkmayer

1988; Carter 1989). Doctors and patients alike may find objectionable, because dehumanizing, the image of physicians who work as mechanics or technicians and of illness sufferers metonymically reduced to a malfunctioning body part (see section 4.3). Warner (1976) goes so far as to suggest that the power of this metaphor might contribute to an overuse of surgical procedures.

pp. 486-487

As linguists, anthropologists, and cultural investigators of the body have long recognized, in virtually every language and every culture *body parts serve as metaphors*.

They come to stand for perceived physical or mental states, and as such, take on “a new life” in language. One need only think of expressions such as *eat your heart out!*, *he hasn't a leg to stand on*, *it makes my blood boil*, *she gets under my skin*, *a gut reaction*, *get off my back!*, or *in your face* - all based on associative meanings that attach to the respective body parts in English. Some of these associations extend across languages and across cultures.

The symbolic and metaphorical meanings that attach to body parts naturally carry over to illnesses affecting those body parts, and may have as profound an impact on the sufferer, consciously or unconsciously, as the bodily distress occasioned by the symptoms of the pathology. A disease of the *heart*, for example, calls up a potent symbolic universe in virtually every culture of the world (see Good 1997; Matisoff 1978), confronting us directly and unavoidably with our mortality. (The recent redefinition of death in terms of the *brain* and not the *heart* is bound to yield some interesting metaphorical shifts.)

The metaphoric potential of a disease of the *eyes* is likewise far-reaching, given the primacy of vision among our perceptual senses and its quasi-universal link to cognition (“I see” means “I understand”). Since *blood* is universally viewed as the transmitter of lineage, the taint of a blood disorder may extend symbolically (if not also in actuality) down through the entire vertical line of the sufferer’s “blood relations.” And especially in recent times, blood has also become the organ of contagion par excellence. And a disease that affects the *bone marrow* is symbolically one that touches the deepest cellular recesses, the core of one’s being (Fleischman 1999) [...]

Health-care professionals too commonly engage in linguistic (and conceptual) troping. The trope most frequently commented on involves reducing patients to an afflicted body part. Just as a waiter in a restaurant might say, metonymically, “the ham sandwich wants his check” (Lakoff and Johnson 1980), the physician or nurse may come to regard body parts as synecdoches standing in place of the patient as a whole: “the gall bladder in 312 needs his IV changed.” On consequence of such troping, which apparently occurs not only in biomedicine but also in traditional forms of medical therapy (Staiano 1986: 27), is the exclusion of the patient from the ensuing treatment, which becomes directed toward the synecdochic sign.

But if from the healer’s perspective the sufferer becomes the affected body part, from the sufferer’s perspective the synecdochic process may work in the other direction: the ailing body part becomes you. Oliver Sacks articulates this feeling of the body part’s takeover of the self when he writes: “What seemed, at first, to be no more than a local, peripheral breakage and breakdown now showed itself in a different, and quite terrible, light - as a breakdown of memory, of thinking, of will -

*not just a lesion in my muscle, but a lesion in me"* (1984: 46).

*Comment on the connection between metaphor and conceptualization in language.*

*What is the role of connotations in troping in medical discourse?*

## **Socio-Cognitive Aspects of Discourse and Interaction**

CAROLYN TEMPLE ADGER: *Discourse in Educational Settings*, pp. 503-517

In: *The Handbook of Discourse Analysis*, Ed. by Deborah Schiffrin, Deborah Tannen, and Heidi E. Hamilton, Blackwell Publishers, Massachusetts USA, Oxford UK, 2001

pp. 511-512

In recent years, discourse analysis has played an important role in testing and extending the theories of Vygotsky (1978) and other contributors to the sociocognitive tradition (e.g. Wertsch 1991; Rogoff 1991). While Vygotsky's thinking has been interpreted in very different ways (Cazden 1996), some of his insights have been highly influential in research on teaching and learning: that individuals learn in their own zones of proximal development lying just beyond the domains of their current expertise, and that they learn through interacting in that zone with a more knowledgeable individual and internalizing the resulting socially assembled knowledge. Thus learning is inherently both social and personal (Bakhtin 1981). A central question for scholars working in this tradition concerns the ways in which discourse between learner and expert mediates cognitive development. But research addressing this question has often given short shrift to the social dimension, viewing the



discourse as an accomplishment - the product of learning - and leaving underexamined the flow of interactional, interpretive acts through which it is accomplished (Erickson 1996). Hicks (1996) observes that while sociocognitive theories have contributed significantly to educational theory, methods for testing them are not well developed (but see Wells 1993). Hicks lays out a complex methodology that combines the study of interaction and the study of the group's texts, oral and written. This methodology is welded to sociocognitive theory: it examines the process of social meaning construction in light of the group's history, as well as the process of the individual's internalization or appropriation of social meaning.

*What is social meaning construction?*

*Comment on the two seemingly controversial aspects of learning – personal/individual and social.*

RON SCOLLON AND SUZANNE WONG SCOLLON:  
*Discourse and Intercultural Communication*, pp. 538-547

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pp. 543-544

While researchers have arrived at the position from rather different directions, perhaps we can say that a strongly unifying theme of discourse analysis and intercultural communication in the present decade is that all communication is constitutive of cultural categories. From this point of view the focus has shifted away from comparison between cultures or between individuals to a focus on the co-constructive aspects of communication.

With this change of focus has come a change in

assumptions about the purposes of research and of the entities upon which analysis should be focused. Rather than seeking an explanation of how given identities and meanings are communicated or fail to be communicated, what is sought is an understanding of how identities and meanings are constituted in and through the interaction itself. The role of culture and other *a priori* categories in this model is as historical and cultural archives of tools through which social actions are taken by participants.

We have called our own approach to intercultural communication a “discourse approach” (Scollon and Scollon 1995) and we have preferred to call what we do “interdiscourse communication.” We take the position that in any instance of actual communication we are multiply positioned within an indefinite number of Discourses (in the Gee sense) or within what we have called discourse systems. These discourse systems would include those of gender, generation, profession, corporate or institutional placement, regional, ethnic, and other possible identities. As each of these discourse systems is manifested in a complex network of forms of discourse, face relationships, socialization patterns and ideologies, this multiple membership and identity produces simultaneous internal (to the person) and external contradictions. Thus, we argue, it is as important a research problem to come to understand how a particular person in a particular action comes to claim, say, a generational identity over against the other multiple identities also contradictorily present in his or her own habitus (Bourdieu 1977, 1990) as it is to try to come to understand any two individuals as positioned as culturally or ethnically different from each other. An interdiscursive approach to intercultural communication has led

us to prefer to set aside any a priori notions of group membership and identity and to ask instead how and under what circumstances concepts such as culture are produced by participants as relevant categories for interpersonal ideological negotiation.

*What is inter-discursive approach to intercultural communication?*

*What is a discourse system?*

SHARI KENDALL AND DEBORAH TANNEN:  
*Discourse and Gender*, pp. 548-567

In: *The Handbook of Discourse Analysis*, Ed. by Deborah Schiffrin, Deborah Tannen, and Heidi E. Hamilton, Blackwell Publishers, Massachusetts USA, Oxford UK, 2001

pp. 548-549

The year 1975 was key in launching the field of language and gender. That year saw the publication of three books that proved pivotal: Robin Lakoff's *Language and Woman's Place* (the first part appeared in *Language and Society* in 1973), Mary Ritchie Key's *Male/Female Language*, and Barrie Thorne and Nancy Henley's edited volume *Language and Sex: Difference and Dominance*. These pioneering works emerged during the feminist movement of the 1970s, as scholars began to question both the identification of male norms as human norms, and the biological determination of women's and men's behavior. A conceptual split was posited between biological "sex" and sociocultural constructs of "gender." Early language and gender research tended to focus on (1) documenting empirical differences between women's and men's speech, especially in cross-sex interaction; (2) describing women's speech in

particular; and, for many, (3) identifying the role of language in creating and maintaining social inequality between women and men [...]

Lakoff identified the linguistic forms by which “women's language” weakens or mitigates the force of an utterance: “weaker” expletives (*oh, dear* versus *damn*); “trivializing” adjectives (*divine* versus *great*); tag questions used to express speakers' opinions (*The way prices are rising is horrendous, isn't it?*); rising intonation in declaratives (as seen in the second part of the sequence, *"What's for dinner?" "Roast beef?"*); and mitigated requests (*Would you please close the door?* versus *Close the door*) (1975: 10-18).

Lakoff's observations provided a starting point from which to explore the complexity of the relationship between gender and discourse. In one frequently cited followup study, O'Barr and Atkins (1980) examined features of “women's language” in courtroom discourse and found that the features Lakoff identified were related to the status (social class, occupation, and experience as a witness) rather than the sex of the speaker. They suggested that women use this style more than men in everyday interaction because they are more likely to be in lower-status positions. Later studies, however, showed that this is not necessarily the case. Cameron et al. (1989), finding that speakers who took up the role of conversational facilitator tended to use more tag questions, posited that women were more likely to do so because they were more likely to assume this role. Similarly, Preisler (1986) examined problem-solving situations in an industrial community, and found that managers who contributed most actively to the accomplishment of a task also used more linguistic “tentativeness features,” and these

managers were usually women. Tannen (1994a) also found women managers using strategies, including indirectness, to save face for subordinates when making requests and delivering criticism. Neither conversational facilitator nor manager is a low-status position.

*What conceptual split is referred to in the passage?*

*“The complexity of the relationship between gender and discourse”: what is meant by the phrase?*

p. 553

Combining the cross-cultural perspective of Gumperz, the interactional principles of Goffman, Lakoff's framework of gender-related communicative style, and her own work on conversational style, Tannen (1990) posited that gender-related patterns of discourse form a coherent web that is motivated by women's and men's understanding of social relationships. Building on Maltz and Borker's reinterpretation of the research on children's interaction, she concluded that patterns of interaction that had been found to characterize women's and men's speech could be understood as serving their different conversational goals: whereas all speakers must find a balance between seeking connection and negotiating relative status, conversational rituals learned by girls and maintained by women tend to focus more on the connection dimension, whereas rituals learned by boys and maintained by men tend to focus more on the status dimension. Put another way, conversational rituals common among women focus on intimacy (that is, avoiding the loss of connection which results in being “pushed away”), whereas conversational rituals common among men focus on independence (that is, avoiding the one-down position in a hierarchy, which results in being “pushed around”).

*In what way is men's understanding of social relationships different from that of women according to D.Tannen?*

*Do men and women converse differently?*

HEIDI E. HAMILTON: *Discourse and Aging*, pp. 568-589

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pp. 575-576

In these situations, the elderly individuals whose language is of interest are going about their business in a usual fashion and “just happen” to be observed; for example, on visits to the doctor and in support group conversations. One distinct advantage of this type of interaction, as contrasted with the contexts discussed above, is that there is no direct influence by the researcher on the language used by the elderly individuals. In cases where the researcher is in the immediate vicinity taping the interaction or taking notes, there may be a moderate indirect influence on the interaction due to the Observer's Paradox (see Labov 1972 for discussion of the fact that it is impossible to observe people who are *not* being observed). Another advantage in situations where the researcher is of a younger generation than his or her subjects (and, by definition, is involved in *intergenerational* encounters when talking with elderly individuals) is that it is possible to gain access to *intra*-generational interactions such as conversations held among residents in a nursing home. Also the researcher can examine language used by elderly interlocutors with persons *they* have chosen to talk with in everyday life situations that are meaningful to *them*, as contrasted with interactions, such as the

tests, interviews, and conversations, which usually take place outside their usual stream of life.

One possible disadvantage of “listening in on” real-life interactions has to do with the fact that the researcher is not part of the interaction. Because the talk is not constructed with the researcher in mind, it is quite likely that the researcher will not be privy to some of what is being talked about, will *think* he or she understands what is going on but actually does not, or will have a rather “flat” understanding of the discourse. These problems can be overcome to a certain extent through the use of playback interviews (see Tannen 1984), in which the original participants listen to the taped interaction along with the researcher. During or after the listening session, the researcher can ask questions for clarification, or the original participants can make comments on their own.

*In what way can reflective playbacks be useful for research?*

*Does “outside their usual stream of life” imply that there could be constraints or misunderstanding in interaction?*

DEBORAH TANNEN: *Conversational Style (Analyzing Talk among Friends)*, New Edition, Oxford University Press, 2005, Oxford – New York

pp. 21-22

Brown and Levinson (1987), building on Lakoff’s work on politeness and Goffman’s on deference as well as Goffman’s (1967) notion of ‘face’, identify two aspects of politeness semantics as negative and positive face. Their notion of negative face corresponds to Lakoff’s defensive function of indirectness,

or to a distance strategy: “The want of every ‘competent adult member’ that his actions be unimpeded by others”. (Hence Lakoff’s operating principle ‘Don’t impose’). Brown and Levinson’s notion of positive face corresponds to camaraderie and to the rapport function of indirectness: “The want of every member that his wants be desirable to at least some others” (p.67). Negative and positive politeness strategies grow out of these face wants. (One problem with the terms *positive* and *negative* is the possible and certainly unintended value judgments associated with them). Finally, Brown and Levinson’s terms ‘on record’ and ‘off record’ correspond to what has been referred to by others as ‘direct’ and ‘indirect’ communication.

Another paradigm that is not precisely parallel but suggests an important corollary to the politeness systems so far discussed is the now-classic study by Brown and Gilman (1960) of the dynamics underlying pronoun choice in languages that have both singular (informal) and plural (formal) second-person pronouns. Brown and Gilman demonstrate that pronoun choice derives from ‘two dimensions fundamental to the analysis of all social life – the dimensions of power and solidarity’ (p. 253). Solidarity (associated with reciprocal pronoun use, like Lakoff’s suggestion that camaraderie is the strategy of conventionalized equality) is another way of expressing rapport; it is the goal of positive face. Power (associated with nonreciprocal pronoun use, the one in power using the familiar and the other using the polite form) is the dimension the exercise of which provokes defensiveness or negative face.

*Comment on the categories of politeness semantics.*

*What is conventionalized equality?*



JENNY COOK-GUMPERZ AND AMY KYRATZIS:  
*Child Discourse*, pp. 590-611

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p. 594

A key site for looking at children's complementary roles within the family is dinner-table conversations. Children's discourse has been explored from the point of view of the participation frameworks of family routines and in particular looking at children's speech strategies during dinner-table talk and narratives. Richard Watts (1991), in a study of power in family discourse, states that the distribution of power in families can be directly related to members' success in verbal interaction, and in particular the ability to achieve and maintain the floor to complete any interactional goal. Blum-Kulka, looking at family dinner-time narratives in Israeli and American middle-class families, shows that in families, children are less likely to master the more complex kinds of interruptions and only manage to gain the floor if it is conceded to them by adults. Moreover, there is cultural variation in how interruptions of another's turn are interpreted, whether as involvement or as inappropriately taking the floor (Blum-Kulka 1997).

Ochs and Taylor (1995) documented children's understanding of the linguistic marking of status and power relationships within families in a different way. They focused on the participation structure of dinner-time storytelling among family members. In white middle-class American families, mothers and children share reports of trouble and fathers take the role of problematizer, often negatively evaluating other

members' actions. This participation structure, in which children share, helps to construct power differentials within the family.

One way in which the child becomes aware of the social order is that it is modeled for them by the adult caretakers around them. Their place in the social ordering can differ cross-culturally or with other social-cultural factors, such as social class, family size, and birth order. As we explore in the next section, the child's identity is not a social given, not merely an expression of the social world into which she or he is born; rather it is realized through the interactive use of language.

*What are the social constituents of identity?*

*What is the role of language and culture in social ordering?*

p. 597

A critical aspect of moral learning is emotional socialization. Children develop the capacity to recognize the consequences of actions for their own and others' feelings, and learn to express these feelings in an accepted form. Mothers' and other caretakers' expressions of love, joy, annoyance, displeasure, concern, and admonishment provide their children with moral insight into human relations and how these are encoded in a discourse of feeling. In enacting family relationships during peer play, children reveal and often overcommunicate mothers' or fathers' caring talk by scolding, shouting, cajoling, and other expressions of concern for the correct behavior of others. In this way, what Cook-Gumperz (1995) has called "the discourse of mothering" not only reproduces a version of the activity but enables the child to practice the situational enactment of relationships through talk. The process of acquisition here is somewhat similar to that

illustrated in earlier grammar acquisition studies, namely an overgeneralization followed by a progressive refinement of patterns governing both grammar and a discourse of feeling (Ochs 1988; Duranti 1992). Schieffelin goes further in her ethnographic study of the Kaluli children by showing how children are socialized into the performance of the relationship of talk in action, by making appropriate voicing and prosody to communicate concern. That is, as both Ochs and Schieffelin (1987) argue, it is not only through the correct formulaic expressions and the appropriate lexical and syntactic forms that emotion is conveyed, but through correct performance in which children may learn to display an appropriate understanding or stance vis-a-vis their own and others' actions. In a similar vein, Heath (1983) in the Trackton study and Miller (1982) in south Baltimore have shown how many working-class mothers encourage their children to engage in challenging verbal routines, even with adults, which reveal their ability to be resilient in a difficult public world. These community-based displays of toughness can be problematic for children in the multicomunity-based context of school and preschool (Corsaro and Rosier 1992). In teasing routines, child and adult enter into a mutual verbal sparring exchange. These are part of a cultural nexus of challenge that enables children to rehearse the skills deemed necessary by adults to show resilience to life's adversities (Eisenberg 1986; Miller and Sperry 1988).

pp. 598-599

As described, peer talk is important in the development of the study of child discourse, in that it shifts the focus away from how children reproduce culture as it is transmitted to them from

adults to how they produce culture for themselves. One area in which this has been explored extensively is in that of gender, where children appropriate gender ideologies from the adult culture, displaying and altering them for their own purposes. This topic is explored below.

One of the earliest concerns in the study of peer talk was in the creation of coherence and cohesion (McTear 1985). This concern arose from Piaget's (1926) claim that children were incapable of nonegocentric speech until age seven. Piaget characterized children's peer conversations in the pre-operational period of development as "collective monologue," conversations where children's responses to their conversational partners were noncontingent. Only older children were capable of engaging in cooperative speech. Later researchers, including Parten (1933) and Bakeman and Gottman (1986), graded levels of the cline between noncontingent and cooperative speech.

McTear (1985) examined turn-taking in children's conversations. It had been proposed that children's turn-taking differs from the model proposed by Sacks et al. (1974) for adults in that there are fewer overlaps and longer gaps. Children have difficulty projecting possible turn completion points; Garvey and Berninger (1981) reported that gaps were only slightly longer than in adult conversation in their child data. McTear (1985) reported that in a longitudinal sample of two children's talk, overlaps increased as the children grew older. However, even younger children displayed the ability to monitor the turn in progress, not only for its projected completion, but for its projected content, as seen in self-initiated other-repair when the partner had trouble completing her turn.

*What is encoded in a discourse of feeling?*

*How and why do children imitate adult roles in peer communication?*

pp. 590-591

Researchers' interests began to turn away from exclusively psycholinguistic concerns with factors underlying the development of formal structures to concentrate on contextually situated learning. The discourse focus looked at children in naturally occurring settings and activities, and paid attention to their speech and communicative practice in everyday situations (Cook-Gumperz and Gumperz 1976; Keller-Cohen 1978). This research went beyond linguistic competence to what became known as the child's acquisition of communicative competence, which is seen as the knowledge that underlies socially appropriate speech. This approach was influenced by ethnography of communication (which saw communicative competence as a contrastive concept to the Chomskyan notion of linguistic competence), and involved theories of sociolinguistics, speech act usage, and conversational analysis. Although little conversational analytic work was done at that time, by the late 1970s and 1980s there was a growing interest in children's conversational competence (McTear 1985; Ochs and Schieffelin 1979) [...]

The ethnographic approach to acquisition served to refocus studies of children's acquisition to the problem of how language learners are able to be participating members of a social group by acquiring social and linguistic skills necessary for interaction. The term language socialization came to represent this new focus. As Ochs and Schieffelin, who provided one of the first collections to address these concerns (Ochs and Schieffelin 1986), commented: language socialization involves "both

socialization through language and socialization to use language” (Ochs and Schieffelin 1986: 2). The focus on language-mediated interactions as the mechanism of production-reproduction is the unique contribution of language socialization to the core problem of how societies continue. From this perspective both the sociocultural contexts of speaking, and the ways of speaking within specifically defined speech events of a social group or society, became primary research sites (Heath 1983). In contrast to earlier studies of language acquisition, which focused on the acquisition of grammatical patterns, and later studies, which looked at children's speech acts, the new approach looked at speaking embedded in specific interactive situations and at the communicative, as distinct from linguistic, competence that these practices revealed (Hymes 1962).

*What is communicative competence, and is it learned?*

*Explain the statement: “language socialization involves ‘both socialization through language and socialization to use language’”.*

### **Style, Register, Norm, Cultural Connotations**

DOUGLAS BIBER AND SUSAN CONRAD: *Register Variation: A Corpus Approach*, pp. 175-196

In: *The Handbook of Discourse Analysis*, Ed. by Deborah Schiffrin, Deborah Tannen, and Heidi E. Hamilton, Blackwell Publishers, Massachusetts USA, Oxford UK, 2001

pp. 175-176

In many cases, registers are named varieties within a culture, such as novels, memos, book reviews, and lectures. However, registers can be defined at any level of generality, and

more specialized registers may not have widely used names. For example, “academic prose” is a very general register, while “methodology sections in experimental psychology articles” is a much more highly specified one.

There are many studies that describe the situational and linguistic characteristics of a particular register. These studies cover diverse registers such as sports announcer talk (Ferguson 1983), note-taking (Janda 1985), personal ads (Bruthiaux 1994), classified advertising (Bruthiaux 1996), and coaching (Heath and Langman 1994). Analyses of register variation have also been conducted within a Hallidayan functional-systemic framework (see, e.g., the collection of papers in Ghadessy 1988, which include registers such as written sports commentary, press advertising, and business letters); several studies employing this approach are particularly concerned with describing school-based registers and their implications for education (e.g., Christie 1991; Martin 1993). [...]

In addition to describing single registers, studies have also made comparisons across registers. These comparative studies have shown that there are systematic and important linguistic differences across registers, referred to as the patterns of *register variation*. This comparative register perspective is particularly important for two major arenas of research: (1) linguistic descriptions of lexical and grammatical features, and (2) descriptions of the registers themselves. With respect to traditional lexical and grammatical investigations, it turns out that functional descriptions based on texts without regard for register variation are inadequate and often misleading; we illustrate the importance of register for such analyses in section 1. For register descriptions, a comparative register perspective provides the baseline needed to understand the linguistic

characteristics of any individual register. That is, by describing a target register relative to a full range of other registers, we are able to accurately identify the linguistic features that are in fact notably common in that register.

*What is register variation according to the passage?*

*Comment on the terms **register**, **genre**, **functional style**, **text type**.*

NILS ERIK ENKVIST: *Stylistics and Text Linguistics*, pp. 174-190

In: *Current Trends in Textlinguistics*, Ed. by U. Dressler, Walter de Gruyter, Berlin – New York, 1978

pp. 175-176

The central point is that for both the critic and the linguist, the text and the ‘norm’ must have a contextually significant relationship. Sonnets are worth comparing with other sonnets, with other poems and with certain kinds of prose; comparing them with, say, textbooks of anatomy or with laundry lists would be more far-fetched and perhaps even futile. But the insistence on a contextually relevant relation between text and norm brings with it an important corollary. Styles are at the same time examples of context-bound language.

Let us assume that a text differs from another text, and that it is possible to define how the contexts of these two texts differ. Then the differences between the two texts can at once be correlated with those contextual differences that distinguish the context of one text from that of the other. Styles, then, are at the same time both context-bound varieties of language and sums of differences between text and norm. Which of the two views we opt for depends on which approach happens to be more



expedient for our particular purpose. As such, these two views are perfectly compatible: they are two sides of the same coin.

This leads us to a definition of ‘style markers’: A style marker is any linguistic feature whose density in the text is significantly different from its density in the contextually relevant norm. Thus the occurrence of a given feature in the text becomes a style marker if that feature does not occur in the norm. The absence of a feature in the text becomes a style marker (but a ‘negative’ or ‘minus’ one) if that feature does occur in the norm. And if the same feature occurs both in the text and in the norm, it can still be a style marker if its density in the text is significantly different from its density in the norm. This is why linguistic stylistics often turns into a quantitative discipline. It involves counts of potentially interesting features and assessments of the significance of differences in their occurrence in text and norm. This also explains why many linguists regard stylistics as the statistical level of language.

*Why are style, text and norm defined in connection with context?*

*What is contextually relevant norm?*

DOUGLAS BIBER AND SUSAN CONRAD: *Register Variation: A Corpus Approach*, pp. 175-196

In: *The Handbook of Discourse Analysis*, Ed. by Deborah Schiffrin, Deborah Tannen, and Heidi E. Hamilton, Blackwell Publishers, Massachusetts USA, Oxford UK, 2001

p. 183

A major issue for discourse studies since the early 1970s concerns the relationship between spoken and written language. Early research on this question tended to make global

generalizations about the linguistic differences between speech and writing. For example, researchers such as O'Donnell (1974) and Olson (1977) argued that written language generally differs from speech in being more structurally complex, elaborated, and/or explicit. In reaction to such studies, several researchers (including Tannen 1982, Beaman 1984, and Chafe and Danielewicz 1986) argued that it is misleading to generalize about overall differences between speech and writing, because communicative task is also an important predictor of linguistic variation; therefore equivalent communicative tasks should be compared to isolate the existence of mode differences.

Multidimensional (MD) analyses of register variation (e.g. Biber 1986, 1988) took this concern one step further by analyzing linguistic variation among the range of registers within each mode, in addition to comparing registers across the spoken and written modes. Further, these analyses included consideration of a wide range of linguistic characteristics, identifying the way that these features configured themselves into underlying “dimensions” of variation. These studies show that particular spoken and written registers are distinguished to differing extents along each dimension.

*What is mode in the context of verbal communication?*

*Do mode differences affect linguistic variation?*

SUZANNE FLEISCHMAN: *Language and Medicine*, pp. 470-502

In: *The Handbook of Discourse Analysis*, Ed. by Deborah Schiffrin, Deborah Tannen, and Heidi E. Hamilton, Blackwell Publishers, Massachusetts USA, Oxford UK, 2001

p. 473

The literature on medical language tends to concentrate in two areas: doctor-patient communication (section 1 above and Ainsworth-Vaughn, this volume), where the focus is on *spoken* discourse, and the language of particular genres of medical discourse. The latter are primarily *written*, save for case presentations, formal oral performances made by physicians in training to their peers and superiors, typically in the context of hospital “grand rounds” or other types of case conferences. The case presentation is a highly conventionalized linguistic ritual involving stylized vocabulary, syntax, and discourse structures which, when examined under a linguistic microscope, reveal tacit and subtle assumptions, beliefs, and values concerning patients, medical knowledge, and medical practice to which physicians in training are covertly socialized (see Anspach 1988).

With regard to spoken language, attention has also been paid to the in-group dialect physicians use in speaking to one another, notably about patients (cf. Klass 1984; Donnelly 1986; and Anspach 1988: 358-9 for additional references). The (largely ethnographic) literature on this topic uses medical language, particularly teaching hospital slang, as a key to understanding the subculture that develops among physicians-in-training partly as a response to stresses generated by their work environment. Ethnographers of medical socialization, Anspach notes, have been particularly intrigued by the “black humor” and pejorative expressions for referring to hospital patients (*gomers, turkeys, crocks, brainstem preparations*) or their clinical status (a terminally ill patient is *CTD*, “circling the drain,” a patient who has died is said to have *boxed*), since these language phenomena fly in the face of the ostensible aim of

medical training: to impart humanitarian values or a service orientation.

*Why is genre variation greater in written medical discourse?*

*Comment on the character of in-group dialect.*

pp. 474-475

Johnson and Murray (1985) explore the role of euphemism in medical language. Nineteenth-century disease names, like popular disease names since earliest times, were often euphemistic - consumption, St. Vitus' dance, shingles, "tourista" - testifying to the hope, mystification, and resignation of patient and physician alike. Our elaborate system of euphemistic signifiers apparently evolved for the purpose of allowing medical teaching to take place with the patient present. While this language is still used in many cultures, particularly when the diagnosis is "bad," American doctors, Johnson and Murray report, claim to avoid euphemisms with their patients. Johnson and Murray offer several possible explanations for this change in communicative practice. On the one hand, there is a sense in which "the real, solemn, Latin [or Greek!] name of something (put there by doctors) confers upon a disease, or on its sufferer, an importance which may be a kind of comfort" (1985: 151). This is the name, at any rate, that the sufferer will repeat to friends, telling them that she or he has *pityriasisrosea* (a harmless rash), *lymphadenopathy* (swollen glands), or *pernicious anemia* (a low red blood count, easily treated). Another rationale for scientific names is obviously pragmatic. Johnson and Murray (1985: 156-7) report that US physicians prefer "a clear and carefully worded scientific explanation of a

patient's condition" as a precaution against lawsuits (cf. Gordon 1996). But in patients' experience "scientific explanations" are frequently anything but "clear" (cf. West 1984; Hirschberg 1985; Bourhis et al. 1989; Hadlow and Pitts 1991; Platt 1992). Scientific nomenclature has thus, paradoxically, come to carry out the original function of euphemism.

*Name one reason for euphemism in medical discourse.*

*Comment on the paradoxical effect of scientific nomenclature in medical discourse.*

MICHAEL STUBBS: *Computer-assisted Text and Corpus Analysis: Lexical Cohesion and Communicative Competence*, pp. 304-320

In: *The Handbook of Discourse Analysis*, Ed. by Deborah Schiffrin, Deborah Tannen, and Heidi E. Hamilton, Blackwell Publishers, Massachusetts USA, Oxford UK, 2001

pp. 312-312

Again, collocations can have such connotations only because patterns in a given text reflect intertextual patterns in the language. I studied 300,000 occurrences of the adjectives *little*, *small*, *big*, and *large*, and found that they occur in largely complementary distribution, with quite different uses and collocates (Stubbs 1995b). In particular, *little* has strong cultural connotations. The following facts are very simple, but not explicitly presented in any dictionary I have found. In the database constructed from a 200-million-word corpus (Cobuild 1995b), the most frequent noun to co-occur with *little* is GIRL, and the most frequent adjective to co-occur with *girl* is *little*. The phrase *little girl(s)* is nearly 20 times as frequent as *small girl(s)*, whereas *little boy(s)* is only twice as frequent as *small*

boy(s). *Little* typically occurs in phrases such as *charming little girl* (or *funny little man*), and *small* typically occurs in rather formal phrases such as *relatively small amount*.

What follows from such data? First, even on its own, one of the most frequent words in the language can convey cultural stereotypes, and this provides an inter-textual explanation of why *little* has the connotations it does in phrases such as *Little Red Riding Hood*. In combination with other words, however, *little* conveys even stronger expectations. The combination *little old* is cute and folksy, or critical and patronizing; it can also be used purely pragmatically, with an atypical adjective-pronoun construction:

(1) this frail little old woman; the dear little old church; a ramshackle little old van; any weedy little old man

(2) little old New York; little old me.

Of over 70 instances, selected at random from the corpus data, of *little old* before a noun, over half were in phrases such as *little old lady/ies* and *little old grandma*. The combination *little man* has two distinct uses. Both convey speaker attitude, one pejorative, and one approving:

(3) a ridiculous little man; an evil, nasty, frightful and revolting little man

(4) the little man against the system; little man versus Big Business; a victory for the little man.

Second, paradigmatic oppositions (e.g. *little* - *big*, *old* - *young*) might appear to be permanently available in the language system. But co-selection severely limits such choices in syntagmatic strings. There are stereotyped phrases such as *little old lady*, but combinations such as \**little young lady* or ? *small old lady* are impossible or highly unlikely. Indeed it is frequent

for paradigmatically contrasting items to co-occur (syntagmatically) within a text. Justeson and Katz (1991) discuss quantitative aspects of several adjective pairs including *large* and *small*, such as the tendency (highly statistically significant) of lexically antonymous adjectives to co-occur within a span of a few words, as in:

(5) from the *large* departmental store to the *small* shoemaker

(6) a *large* area of the *small* kitchen.

In summary: in terms of cohesion, the word *little*, especially in frequent collocations, allows a hearer/reader to make predictions about the surrounding text. In terms of communicative competence, all words, even the most frequent in the language, contract such collocational relations, and fluent language use means internalizing such phrases. In terms of cultural competence, culture is encoded not just in words which are obviously ideologically loaded, but also in combinations of very frequent words. (Cf. Fillmore 1992 on *home*.) One textual function of recurrent combinations is to imply that meanings are taken for granted and shared (Moon 1994).

*Comment on the connection between frequency of usage and stereotypicality.*

*How can the paradigmatic and syntagmatic axes intersect in common collocations?*

ROBIN TOLMACH LAKOFF: *Nine Ways of Looking at Apologies: The Necessity for Interdisciplinary Theory and Method in Discourse Analysis*, pp. 199-214

In: *The Handbook of Discourse Analysis*, Ed. by Deborah Schiffrin, Deborah Tannen, and Heidi E. Hamilton, Blackwell

Publishers, Massachusetts USA, Oxford UK, 2001

p. 201

Let me take as an example of the interdisciplinary nature of discourse analysis a case that at first may seem overly simple, hardly a part of “discourse analysis” at all, more typically considered as an exercise in pragmatics or conversation analysis: the apology. But we have to understand apologies as contributions to a larger discourse, viewing them from a variety of perspectives, formal and functional, cognitive and interactive, individual and group, intra-language and societal; to examine the apology from the perspective of phonology, syntax, lexical semantics, speech act pragmatics, conversational analysis, narratology, and sociolinguistics. In some ways any speech act verb might illustrate the point. But apologies are particularly good examples, theoretically rich as well as practically important. They are hard to identify, define, or categorize, a difficulty that arises directly out of the functions they perform. Hence too, they occur in a range of forms from canonically explicit to ambiguously indirect; the functions served by those forms range from abject abasement for wrongdoing, to conventional greasing of the social wheels, to expressions of sympathy, advance mollification for intended bad behavior, and formal public displays of currently “appropriate” feeling. Thus, in terms of the relation between form and function, apologies are both one-to-many and many-to-one, a fact that only makes the analyst's task more daunting (and more exciting).

*Comment on the summarizing final sentence of the passage.*

p. 204

While there are in English no specific sounds associated



with canonical or appropriate apology, there do exist supra-segmental and nonverbal levels that are important, especially for the addressee, in the determination of the acceptability of an apology. These levels are the basis for hearers' judgments about the apologizer's sincerity and sufficiency of "remorse," since we see them as beyond a speaker's control and therefore more likely to be truthful than the verbal utterance (cf. Ekman and Friesen 1969). So for instance an apology made too quickly, or in a monotone, will strike a hearer as scripted, non-spontaneous, and so not deeply felt. A breaking voice, on the other hand, bespeaks sincerity, as do certain nonverbal cues. An inability to make eye contact, generally judged negatively by Americans, has positive value (signifying appropriate shame) with apologies; the shuffling of feet and the use of self-adaptors (Ekman and Friesen 1968) like hand-wringing play a similar role. President Clinton is notorious on such occasions for biting his lip. While smiling is usually positively evaluated in American social interactions, its presence (often identified as a "smirk") usually detracts from the effectiveness of an apology.

A question for any analysis of this kind is the extent to which these assumptions are universal. It is popularly believed that nonverbal signifiers of emotion, like the emotions they signify, are universal: everyone feels, or should feel, remorse over the same events; the same amount of remorse; and therefore, should express it in the same way. But this is not necessarily true. What occasions embarrassment in one culture may not in another. The way genuine feelings are translated into surface representations (both how and how much), what Hochschild (1983) terms "emotion-work," may well differ across cultures, even cultures that are closely related and whose

members speak the same (verbal) language.

*Comment on the paralinguistic and multimodal features of apologies.*

*Are non-verbal signifiers of emotions involved in apologies culture-specific too?*

DEBORAH TANNEN: *Conversational Style (Analyzing Talk among Friends)*, New Edition, Oxford University Press, 2005, Oxford – New York

pp. 24-25

[...] human beings are always balancing the paradoxical fact that they are simultaneously individuals and social creatures. They need each other and yet they need to be separate. This conflict can be seen in what I think of as the paradox of cross-cultural communication. Individuals of any minority or special interest group can be heard to protest, alternately, ‘Don’t assume I’m different from you,’ and ‘Don’t assume I’m the same as you’. Assuming some people are different leads to discrimination and even persecution. But assuming everyone is the same effectively locks out those who actually are different in some ways – another form of discrimination. Hence, affirmative action. It is not that members of minority groups want to eat their cakes and have them too, but that we are all caught in the double bind of being the same and not the same as others. That is why all communication is a double bind, as Scollon (1982:344) points out, in the sense that participants receive and send ‘a double and contradictory message, and a bonding that makes it difficult to leave the situation’. Scollon observes, too, and this I think is crucial, that it is not that each message must service either one or the other need, but that ‘any message must

be a carefully concocted blend of the right amounts of deference and solidarity’.

A final related strand of research that reflects the cline of person as an influence on discourse form is a broad range of discourse features that have been identified as characterizing spoken or written language, respectively. Such features, which are summarized and discussed elsewhere (Tannen 1982, 1985a) include such phenomena as complexity of syntactic structure, discourse organization, degree of elaboration or ellipsis of necessary background information, and a variety of features that Chafe (1982) groups under the headings integration versus fragmentation and detachment versus involvement. I have suggested that these various features of discourse reflect not the spoken versus written modes per se but rather relative focus on interpersonal involvement. That is, the features that we have come to expect and that scholars have identified in spoken language (for example, prolixity, use of intonational cues to express attitudes and establish cohesion rather than complex syntactic structures, indirectness and omission of contextual and background information) all grow out of and contribute to interpersonal involvement between the speaker (or writer) and the audience. By leaving maximal information for the hearer to fill in, a speaker is creating involvement by requiring the hearer to participate in sense making.

There are complementary discourse features that have been identified in written language but in fact are most often found in specific written genre of expository prose. Those features seem to focus on content, for example, filling in more steps of an argument and background information, and making use of complex syntactic structures to lexicalize cohesive relationships.

This focus on content, which is also associated with spoken language in formal or non-dialogic genres, also conspires to ignore interpersonal involvement, a way of honoring participants' needs to avoid the negative effects of involvement.

*Why is interpersonal involvement a key factor in communication? How is it achieved?*

*What complementary discourse features define written discourse?*

JOHN WILSON: *Political Discourse*, pp. 398-415

In: *The Handbook of Discourse Analysis*, Ed. by Deborah Schiffrin, Deborah Tannen, and Heidi E. Hamilton, Blackwell Publishers, Massachusetts USA, Oxford UK, 2001

p. 410

Despite this natural link between phonological work in variationist sociolinguistics and political and social facts, there have been few studies of the potential of phonology in the *direct* construction of political discourse. There is no reason to presuppose, however, that this level of linguistic structure may not also be available for political orientation. There is general evidence, for example, that Margaret Thatcher modified her speech in very particular ways in order to make herself more attractive to voters. And in the work of Gunn (1989; Wilson and Gunn 1983) it is claimed that leading politicians and political supporters may make adjustments within their phonological systems for political effect. For example, Gerry Adams is said to have adopted phonological forms as representative of southern Irish dialect alternatives, and placed these within his own Belfast phonological system. Similarly, selected members of the Democratic Unionist Party, at the opposite end of the political

spectrum from Adams's Sinn Féin, were shown to modify some of their phonology in the direction of a perceived and geographically (North Antrim) located Ulster Scots dialect. What this means is that politicians can choose to *sound* ideological/political, and indeed that such modifications are perceptually salient to the public. Matched guise studies (see Lambert et al. 1960), manipulating the kinds of phonological variables noted by Gunn (Wilson and Gunn 1983), revealed that certain variables were associated with political factors such as Unionism and Republicanism and general social factors such as Protestantism, Catholicism, Britishness, and Irishness. By adopting particular alternative phonological forms, one could be perceived as either more Catholic/Irish/Republican or more Protestant/British/Unionist.

*What connotations can phonological forms carry?*

*Phonological adjustments for ideological effect – comment on the strategy of political manipulation.*

## **Development of the Discipline**

NILS ERIK ENKVIST: *Stylistics and Text Linguistics*, pp. 174-190

In: *Current Trends in Textlinguistics*, Ed. by U. Dressler, Walter de Gruyter, Berlin – New York, 1978  
pp. 179-181

A number of features qualifying as textual style markers - patterns of organizing texts ('dispositio'), argument patterns, the explicit marking of certain types of cohesion, transitions between text units, paragraph structure, and so forth — have been discussed by rhetoricians and by teachers of composition

ever since the ancients. This tradition of course goes on, as seen in modern textbooks on composition, for instance on paragraph structure (Christensen 1967, Chaplen 1970). Literary critics and theorists have often dealt with such matters too, though usually with the aid of an apparatus more impressionistic and even metaphorical than strictly descriptive or linguistic. Traditional philologists have often concerned themselves with relevant phenomena. The Russian formalists and their followers, including particularly the Soviet semioticians, the Italian semioticians and the French neo-structuralists, have shown an active interest in approaches that unite stylistics and the study of textual spans beyond the sentence.

Within linguistics proper in a more restricted sense, at least three schools require special mention. These are the Prague school, the Tagmemic school, and Text Linguistics proper, as I shall call them for short.

The hallmark of Prague-School structuralism, as opposed to other brands of structuralism, was a determination not to impose any preconceived limitations on the subjects and materials studied. One manifestation of this catholicity of approach was the emphasis on the correlation of language with extra-linguistic factors. Whereas American structuralists had achieved their finest results in the narrowly restricted fields of phonemics and morphemics (if we exclude the ethno-linguists, who perforce had to look at language in context), Prague-school linguists dealt with a wider spectrum of problems. Often they crossed over from the study of linguistic form into the study of the organization of texts, including literary ones. Some scholars indeed defy traditional pigeonholing into literary scholars or linguists: they qualify as both. One of the most concrete

contributions of Prague-school thought to text linguistics has been the study of theme, rheme and focus, initiated by Vilem Mathesius and developed by a large group of Czechoslovak linguists: P. Adamec, Jan Firbas, Frantisek Danes, Petr Sgall, and many others (see Tyl 1970, Danes 1974 and Firbas 1964 and 1974). Though the students of theme and rheme, like the Russian analysts of theme, rheme and *aktual'noe clenenie predlozenija*, originally did not stress the textual functions of their units, it has now become increasingly obvious that theme, rheme and focus are integral parts of the cohesive mechanisms integrating sentences into a text. They are devices which help to signal the progression of the argument and the difference between given or known and new information. In stylistics, a prominent Prague-school concept has been 'functional style', that is, a variant of language used for a specific function. This principle has been fertile also in the Soviet Union, the DDR and other socialist countries in Marxist frames of reference. A social theory readily makes functions of language primary to forms. Such a view leads to an emphasis on functional variation and on connections between social and economic forces and functional categories, which appears in a host of works of style theory as well as in many individual investigations. (Two East-German examples are Gläser 1969 and Fleischer et al. 1975).

Ever since the 1940's and 50's, Kenneth Pike, the founder and leader of the Tagmemic school, has shown an interest in relating linguistic structures to larger patterns of human behaviour. More recently, the work of Pike and his group has been increasingly anchored in descriptions of discourse, largely in 'exotic' languages. This emphasis on language in context and on speech acts, in addition to linguistic units, has made the

tagmemicists pay special attention to discoursal phenomena. Thus in the 1960's, Pike, Robert Longacre and several others were systematically relating grammatical features to discourse structure and situational roles. They were also beginning to develop stringent, even algorithmic, models for the description of discourse structure. Studies of narrative patterns in Philippine and other languages have been another focus of their interest. Though tagmemicists have not made much explicit use of the term 'style' in their writings, their work has rich implications for students of style and text. (Brend 1974 is a useful introduction to tagmemic linguistics.)

[...] Nevertheless it is obvious enough that, in the 1960's, a host of scholars began emphasizing that inter-sentential, textual and discoursal phenomena were insufficiently catered for in current linguistic theory and practice. (A good bibliography of such studies is available in van Dijk 1972 and in Dressler and Schmidt 1973.) Sometimes there were attempts to deal with discoursal phenomena in terms of sentence grammar. Texts were even commuted into one sentence to bring them within the scope of existing grammars. Often, aspects of textual and inter-sentential context were brought into the structure of the individual sentence through devices such as performatives, presuppositions, conversational implicatures, referential indices, and the like. But many linguists went further in emphasizing that text linguistics was in fact a new kind of linguistics rather than an attempt at patching up sentence grammar with the introduction of new features. In Germany, under the stimulus of Peter Hartmann and a host of others, theories were set up to cater for expressly textual problems; they have also found resonance in Austria. At the same time in England, grammarians



such as M.A.K. Halliday (e.g. 1967, 1968, 1976) and Ruqaiya Hasan (1968) did pioneering work in integrating textual considerations into a holistic approach to language. Their ideas and grammatical models of textual functions as one systemic level of language have been further applied to stylistics and sociolinguistics. An example of such applications is Robinson and Rackstraw (1972), which reports on question-and-answer sequences within a sociolinguistic frame. Also the grammarians who work with large bodies of texts, for instance those associated with Randolph Quirk's Survey of Contemporary English, have come to observe discoursal features.

*The passage summarizes the development of the discipline through principal categories, correlations, focal points. What are they? Outline the main tendencies.*

H. RIESER: *On the Development of Text Grammar*, pp. 6-20

In: *Current Trends in Textlingustics*, Ed. by U. Dressler, Walter de Gruyter, Berlin – New York, 1978.

p. 10

The integrative capacity of text grammar led to considerable difficulties from the very beginning, because the basic assumptions of sentence grammars which were accepted explicitly or implicitly also in text grammar, carry with them the foundational problems connected with these assumptions such as the choice of semantic component, the application of transformation apparatus, how to make use of syntactic and semantic features, the formulation of strategies for text analysis, and whether one should use meaning postulates or definitions in the lexicon. It has remained true that the more comprehensive

and empirically motivated tasks are formulated for a text grammar, the greater is the tendency to integrate different formal techniques and methods into this text grammar. The increase in integrative power then enormously multiplies the foundational problems, thus too much integration may lead to pointless syntheticism and permanent ad hoc modifications. It is therefore one of the important future tasks of text-grammatical research not to lose control of the accumulated foundational problems and to reduce them step by step. This can only be achieved by observing rigid formal standards without abandoning the empirical basis.

*‘Integrative capacity of text grammar’ – explain the phrase.  
Which period of development is referred to above?*

RUQAIYA HASAN: *Text in the Systemic Functional Model*, pp. 228-246

In: *Current Trends in Textlinguistics*, Ed. by U. Dressler, Walter de Gruyter, Berlin – New York, 1978

p. 228

In examining the development of the systemic-functional model (SF model), one soon becomes aware of the fact that, here, from the very earliest stages, text has been viewed as a linguistic entity, the description of which is as legitimate a concern of linguistics as the description of the traditionally recognized units in the grammar and lexicon of a language. The questionable opposition between ‘sentence-centred’ and ‘text-centred’ theories of language (Petofi: 1975) is regarded as a distortion of the nature of human language. In this, as in many other respects, the SF model is very close to the Firthian view of language; according to Firth, a major part of the semantics of a

sentence could be stated only if the sentence were studied as a part of a text, occurring within a context (Firth: 1956; Mitchell: 1975). It is all the more interesting that at no stage does this model view the text as a 'super-sentence'. By implication, it also rejects a taxonomic hierarchy with an unbroken constituency chain from morpheme to text - a view implied in Harris (1952; 1963) Pike (1963), van Dijk (1972) and others. Instead, the question of text study has been approached from two seemingly distinct and unrelated directions, which, on closer examination, can be seen to derive from the two notions most fundamental to the text-ness of text: *texture* and *structure*.

*'Chain from morpheme to text' name the levels of linguistic analysis referred to by the phrase.*

LITE OLSHTAIN AND MARIANNE CELCE-MURCIA:  
*Discourse Analysis and Language Teaching*, pp. 707-724

In: *The Handbook of Discourse Analysis*, Ed. by Deborah Schiffrin, Deborah Tannen, and Heidi E. Hamilton, Blackwell Publishers, Massachusetts USA, Oxford UK, 2001

pp. 707-708

Discourse analysis and pragmatics are relevant to language teaching and language learning since they represent two related discourse worlds that characterize human communication. The first represents intended meaning transmitted within context, and is, therefore, concerned with sequential relationships in production; and the other explains the interpreted meaning resulting from linguistic processing and social interaction, all the while taking into account a variety of contextual factors, at the receptive end. Language teaching needs to focus on both (1) strategies of message construction to facilitate learner

production of the communicative intent and (2) strategies of interpretation, in order to ensure some ability on the learner's part to process inferentially (even if only approximately) the speaker/writer's intent.

For many years during the first half of the twentieth century and well into the second half, language teaching, like linguistics, used the sentence as its basic unit of analysis. In language teaching this meant that rules, examples, exercises, and activities focused on individual sentences. Consequently, this was an approach which legitimized decontextualized language practice. Individual sentences can be interesting, unusual, or mysterious, but when separated from context, they lack real meaning. Generations of learners practiced sentences in the target language and remained quite incapable of linking these sentences into meaningful stretches of discourse. In the more recent approaches to language learning and teaching, discourse or text has become the basic unit of analysis. More recent language textbooks present texts, short or long, as a basis for both understanding and practicing language use within larger meaningful contexts. This approach has greatly altered the type of activities undertaken in language classrooms. Learners need to focus, therefore, on various discourse features within any specified language activity.

Another perspective that was added to language materials and classroom activities, once discourse became the unit of analysis, is the set of sociolinguistic features that accompany any natural interaction. The real or imaginary participants involved in a communicative activity in the classroom become important. If the classroom activity is to represent real-life interaction, then age, social status, and other personal

characteristics of the interactants cannot be ignored, and learners are expected to develop awareness of the linguistic choices which are related to such features. They need to gain experience in decision-making related to choices of linguistic representations that are compatible with the characteristics of the participants and with the pragmatic features of the given situation. Simulated speech events become an important feature of the language classroom, and although such a simulated speech event is a classroom artifact, it must represent as closely as possible a real speech event that could occur in natural interaction.

*Of what tendencies in linguistics are changes in language teaching indicative?*

*Simulated speech event vs. real speech event: comment on the similarities and differences.*

KAREN TRACY: *Discourse Analysis in Communication*, pp. 725-749

In: *The Handbook of Discourse Analysis*, Ed. by Deborah Schiffrin, Deborah Tannen, and Heidi E. Hamilton, Blackwell Publishers, Massachusetts USA, Oxford UK, 2001

pp. 727-728

In the first handbook of discourse analysis van Dijk (1985) identified classical rhetorical writers (e.g. Aristotle, Quintilian, and Cicero) as the first discourse analysts. Within Communication this claim has two sides. At one level, rooting contemporary discourse studies in classical rhetoric is unproblematic: classical rhetoric is the intellectual starting point for much of what goes on in the communication field today. At another level, however, it generates confusion. Within the field

the study of public life (rhetorical criticism and theory) is an ongoing area of scholarly work and is, itself, a distinct academic specialization. Scholars who label themselves rhetorical theorists and critics are rarely the same individuals as ones who consider themselves discourse analysts. Rhetorical criticism and discourse analysis share the commitment to close study of texts in context. Yet the commitment gets understood and pursued against markedly different intellectual backdrops. Rhetorical criticism is pursued within a humanistic frame where analyses of texts are related to literary criticism, political and continental philosophy, history, film studies, and so on. Discourse analysis, in contrast, is typically grounded in social science and considers its cognate disciplines to be psychology, sociology, linguistics, education, and so on. Moreover, where rhetorical critics tend to study speeches and unique political actions, discourse analysts tend to study those aspects of social life that are ordinary and unremarkable. Although the division between social science and humanistic work is considerably more blurred than it was in the late 1980s (e.g. Mumby and Clair 1997; Taylor 1993), it continues to demarcate intellectual communities.

One distinctive feature of Communication is its recognition, even embracing, of the value of multiple perspectives on issues. Communication has an openness to other fields' ideas and models of inquiry rarely found in other academic disciplines. On the negative side, this openness can make it difficult to figure out how a piece of communication research is distinct from one in a neighboring discipline. For instance, depending on one's place in the field, communication researchers might be asked how their research is different from social psychology, business and industrial relations, anthropology, political science,

sociology, pragmatic studies within linguistics, and so on. Yet as I will argue at this review's end, the discourse analytic work carried out by communication scholars reflects a shared disciplinary perspective. Although the distinctiveness of the perspective has not always been well understood, even by its practitioners, the perspective embodies a set of intellectual commitments that can enliven and enrich the multidisciplinary conversation about discourse.

*The phrase 'multidisciplinary conversation about discourse' sounds as a brief and informative description of the field. Give your explication.*

*The conclusion drawn by Karen Tracy is to the point: 'where rhetorical critics tend to study speeches and unique political actions, discourse analysts tend to study those aspects of social life that are ordinary and unremarkable'. Explain the observation, using your own wording.*

pp. 731-732

Most people, at least some of the time, experience communication as problematic. The reason for this, Sanders (1987) argues, is that people have other purposes when they communicate than just expressing what they are thinking or feeling: "On at least some occasions, people communicate to affect others - to exercise control over the understandings others form of the communicator, the situation, their interpersonal relationships, the task at hand, etc., thereby to make different actions and reactions more or less likely" (1987: vii). How people do this is Robert Sanders's focus in *Cognitive Foundations of Calculated Speech*, a book that proposes a theory of strategic communication grounded in people's

interpretive practices. Beginning with Grice's (1975) notion of conversational implicature and the work of speech act scholars (e.g. Austin 1962; Searle 1969), Sanders distinguishes three types of meaning that utterances can have. Simply put, an utterance's propositional content can be distinguished from the illocutionary act that it performs, and from the conversational implicatures that may be triggered. Typically, Sanders argues, while all of these meanings are available, only one is focal. How the particular level (and content) of meaning becomes focal depends on specific choices a speaker makes about wording construction and delivery. Wording an utterance one way will constrain a fellow conversationalist from offering responses that a speaker does not want to get, and channels him or her toward desired other responses. This constraining (channeling) process is never more than partial, but it is the communicative resource that every communicator seeks to use as an exchange unfolds to accomplish his or her preferred goals. Thus while every utterance constrains what may reasonably follow, subsequent actions may cause prior utterances to be reinterpreted.

The key challenge in a theory of meaning-making, as Sanders sees it, is to identify how relatively stable aspects of meaning are acted upon by the shaping and changing power of context (especially prior utterances). A set of forecasting principles which communicators use to make decisions about what to say next is identified. Sanders draws upon a range of procedures to assess his theory. In addition to using hypothetical examples and experiments that assess interpretive preferences for utterance sequences, the principles are applied to a range of interpersonal and public conversations and written texts. Through analysis of multiple instances of very different kinds of



discourse, the broad applicability of the theory is displayed. In this regard, like studies in the ethnography of communication tradition, Sanders's work would be regarded as a methodological hybrid that is part discourse analytic (see also Sanders 1984, 1985). Studies that combine discourse analysis and quantitative coding are in fact a common methodological hybrid (e.g. Tracy and Eisenberg 1990/1; Villaume et al. 1997).

Another line of communication research centrally informed by speech act theorizing comprises studies of argumentative discourse. Van Eemeren et al. define argumentation as the use of "language to justify or refute a standpoint, with the aim of securing agreement in views" (1993: 208). Making of an argument, then, is conceived as performing a complex speech act in which the propositional content of the act can be specified, as well as its sincerity and preparatory conditions. Texts whose arguments have been analyzed include advertisements (Jacobs 1995), divorce mediation proceedings (Aakhus 1995), interviews with police officials (Agne and Tracy 1998), school board elections (Tracy in press), college classes in critical thinking (Craig 1998; Craig and Sanusi in press), and group decision-making occasions that are mediated by computers (Aakhus 1998; Brashers et al. 1995). More explicitly than in other discourse traditions, studies of argumentative discourse meld empirical description with normative theorizing. As linguist Cameron (1995) has argued, language use not only is, but should be conceptualized as, a normative practice. A normative stance undergirds studies of argumentative discourse, and within this tradition the focus is on assessing the practical usefulness and moral reasonableness of different normative proposals (Jacobs and Jackson 1983; van Eemeren et al. 1993).

*Paraphrase the statement: "Thus while every utterance constrains what may reasonably follow, subsequent actions may cause prior utterances to be reinterpreted".*

*What is argumentative discourse? How does normative practice relate to it?*

MICHAEL STUBBS: *Computer-assisted Text and Corpus Analysis: Lexical Cohesion and Communicative Competence*, pp. 304-320

In: *The Handbook of Discourse Analysis*, Ed. by Deborah Schiffrin, Deborah Tannen, and Heidi E. Hamilton, Blackwell Publishers, Massachusetts USA, Oxford UK, 2001

p. 316

It is often said that a corpus is (mere) performance data, but this shorthand formulation disguises important points. A corpus is a sample of actual utterances. However, a corpus, designed to sample different text-types, is a sample not of one individual's performance, but of the language use of many speakers. In addition, a corpus is not itself the behavior, but a record of this behavior, and this distinction is crucial. Consider a meteorologist's record of changes in temperature. The temperatures are a sequence of physical states in the world, which cannot be directly studied for the patterns they display. But the record has been designed by human beings, so that it can be studied. The intentional design of the record can convert the physical states in the world into a form of public knowledge. (This example is from Popper 1994: 7.) And, developing Halliday's (1991, 1992) analogy, such temperature records can be used to study not only local variations in the weather (which are directly observable in a rough and ready way), but also

longer-term variations in the climate, which are certainly not directly observable.

Chomskyan linguistics has emphasized creativity at the expense of routine, which is seen as habit and as the unacceptable face of behaviorism. Other linguists (such as Firth 1957 and Halliday 1992) and sociologists (such as Bourdieu 1991 and Giddens 1984) have emphasized the importance of routine in everyday life. Corpus linguistics provides new ways of studying linguistic routines: what is typical and expected in the utterance-by-utterance flow of spoken and written language in use.

*“Corpus linguistics provides new ways of studying linguistic routines: what is typical and expected in the utterance-by-utterance flow of spoken and written language in use”: comment on the statement in light of the observation made by Karen Tracy (pp.727-728).*

SUSAN C. HERRING: *Computer-mediated Discourse*, pp. 612-634

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p. 613

The study of computer-mediated discourse developed alongside of interactive networking itself, as scholars became exposed to and intrigued by communication in the new medium. As early as 1984, linguist Naomi Baron published an article speculating on the effects of “computer-mediated communication as a force in language change.” The first detailed descriptions of computer-mediated discourse soon

followed, with Denise Murray's (1985) research on a real-time messaging system at IBM, and Kerstin Severinson Eklundh's (1986) study of the Swedish COM conferencing system. However, it was not until 1991, with the publication of Kathleen Ferrara, Hans Brunner, and Greg Whitemore's "Interactive written discourse as an emergent register," that linguists and language scholars began to take serious notice of CMD. The immediately following years saw the rise of a wave of CMD researchers, working independently on what has since emerged as a more or less coherent agenda: the empirical description of computer-mediated language and varieties of computer-mediated discourse. Since the mid-1990s, CMD research has continued to expand at a rapid rate, staking out new areas of inquiry and resulting in an ever-growing list of published resources.

In part, the first wave of CMD scholarship was a reaction against misunderstandings about CMD that had gone before. Popular claims - some endorsed by published research - held that computer-mediated communication was "anonymous," "impersonal," "egalitarian," "fragmented," and "spoken-like," attributing these properties to the nature of the medium itself, and failing to distinguish among different types and uses of CMD. Ferrara et al. (1991), although contributing useful observations on one form of real-time experimental CMD, also overgeneralized, characterizing what they termed "interactive written discourse" as a single genre. In fact, subsequent research has revealed computer-mediated language and interaction to be sensitive to a variety of technical and situational factors, making it far more complex and variable than envisioned by early descriptions.

*Comment on the phrase: 'computer-mediated language and varieties of computer-mediated discourse'.*

p. 614

Computer networks are often considered a *medium* of communication distinct from writing and speaking. Thus CMD researchers speak of electronic “medium effects” on CMD, rather than treating CMD as a form of “writing” (typing) that happens to be distributed by electronic means (see, e.g., Murray 1988). The justification for this is that while the means of production of CMD is similar to that of other forms of typing, including allowing for the editing and formatting of text in asynchronous modes, other aspects of computer-mediated communication preclude easy classification with either writing or speaking. CMD exchanges are typically faster than written exchanges (e.g. of letters, or published essays which respond to one another), yet still significantly slower than spoken exchanges, since even in so-called “real-time” modes, typing is slower than speaking. Moreover, CMD allows multiple participants to communicate simultaneously in ways that are difficult if not impossible to achieve in other media, due to cognitive limits on participants' ability to attend to more than one exchange at a time (Herring 1999a). In addition, the dissemination of computer-mediated messages involves distribution to an unseen (and often unknown) audience, while at the same time creating an impression of direct and even “private” exchanges (King 1996). For these and other reasons, participants typically experience CMD as distinct from either writing or speaking, sometimes as a blend of the two, but in any event subject to its own constraints and potentialities.

Media may differ in the number of *channels*, or sources of communication, they comprise. Face-to-face communication is a “rich” medium, in that information is available through multiple channels: visual, auditory, gestural, etc. In contrast, CMD is a “lean” medium (Daft and Lengel 1984), in that information is available only through the visual channel, and that information is limited to typed text. This has led some to posit that the computer medium is “impoverished” and unsuitable for social interaction (Baron 1984). However, there is ample evidence that users compensate textually for missing auditory and gestural cues, and that CMD can be richly expressive.

*‘Face-to-face communication is a “rich” medium’ – How and why?*

pp. 616-618

It is a popular perception that computer-mediated language is less correct, complex, and coherent than standard written language. Thus a writer for *Wired* magazine describes messages posted to the Internet as “a whole new fractured language - definitely not as elegant or polished as English used to be.” Similarly, Baron (1984: 131) predicted that participants in computer conferences would use “fewer subordinate clauses” and “a narrower range of vocabulary” - and that as a result of computer communication over time, the expressive functions of language could be diminished.

Actually, although computer-mediated language often contains nonstandard features, only a relatively small percentage of such features appears to be errors caused by inattention or lack of knowledge of the standard language forms (see, e.g. Herring 1998a). The majority are deliberate choices made by

users to economize on typing effort, mimic spoken language features, or express themselves creatively (Cho forthcoming; Livia forthcoming). Economy of effort seems to be the motivating force behind Murray's (1990: 43-4) observation that computer science professionals using synchronous CMD in a workplace environment "delete subject pronouns, determiners, and auxiliaries; use abbreviations; do not correct typos; and do not use mixed case", as illustrated in the following exchange between Les and Brian:

(1) *Les1*: as it stands now, meeting on weds?

*Les2*: instead of tues

*Brian1*: idiot Hess seemed to think you were there tues morning

*Brian2*: that that mtg from 9 to 10 would solve

*Brian3*: if you not in ny I'm going to have mtg changed to wedne.

[...] Strategies such as these, rather than reflecting impoverished or simplified communication, demonstrate the ability of users to adapt the computer medium to their expressive needs. Significantly, this results in a linguistic variety that, despite being produced by written-like means, frequently contains features of orality.

One medium variable, however, does exercise a powerful influence over structural complexity: synchronicity. Just as the structure of unplanned speech reflects cognitive constraints on real-time language encoding, for example in length of information units, lexical density, and degree of syntactic integration (Chafe 1982), so too synchronous modes of CMD impose temporal constraints on users that result in a reduction of linguistic complexity relative to asynchronous modes. Thus in a

study of InterChange, a type of synchronous CMD used in educational settings, Ko (1996) found fewer complements, more stranded prepositions, and shorter words than in a comparably sized corpus of formal writing. Moreover, for features involving “information focus and elaborateness” (e.g. lexical density, ratio of nouns to verbs, and use of attributive adjectives), the InterChange messages had lower average frequencies than *either* writing or speaking. Ko attributes this finding to the heavy production and processing burden placed on users by the InterChange system - not only must they type, which is slower and requires more conscious attention than talking, but they must type quickly, leaving little time for message planning.

In contrast, asynchronous CMD permits users to take their time in constructing and editing messages. Variation in structural complexity in e-mail messages, therefore, must be understood as reflecting social situational factors which determine what level of formality - and with it, standardness and structural complexity - is appropriate to the context. For example, staff in an Australian university exchange private e-mail filled with informal, spoken language features: contractions, abbreviations, use of lower case in place of upper case, omission of punctuation, and omission of grammatical function words (Cho forthcoming). Yet the same e-mail technology, when used by computer scientists interacting professionally in a public discussion group on the ARPANET, produced highly standard messages containing features of syntactic complexity such as nominalizations, subordinate and complement clauses, use of the passive voice, and heavy noun phrases (Herring 1998a). Still, the ARPANET case notwithstanding, e-mail tends not to be as formal as other edited



forms of writing. This is due in part to the less formal purposes e-mail is typically used to fulfill, and in part to the relative openness of e-mail as a new communication mode that has not yet been colonized by rigid prescriptive norms.

*“One medium variable, however, does exercise a powerful influence over structural complexity: synchronicity”:*  
*paraphrase.*

*Comment on the factor of context in internet communication.*

ELIZABETH COUPER-KUHLEN: *Intonation and Discourse: Current Views from Within*, pp. 13-34

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pp. 15-16

In a second and no less lively tradition, intonation is thought of as related not to grammar but to *information flow*, the movement of ideas into and out of active, semi-active and inactive states of consciousness. In Chafe's work (1979, 1980, 1993), for instance, intonation is said to provide a window on consciousness via the establishment of two different types of unit: the intonation unit and the accent unit. The intonation unit encompasses the information that is in the speaker's focus of consciousness at a given moment (1993: 39); the accent units are the domains of activation for new, accessible and/or given information. Also within this tradition, Du Bois et al. (1992, 1993) have elaborated the notion of transitional continuity between one intonation unit and the next, marked by different sorts of terminal pitch contours. The term *transitional continuity*

describes the extent to which “the discourse business at hand will be continued or has finished” (1993: 53). Thus, depending on whether some material is segmented into one or, say, two intonation units and on how these intonation units are linked transitionally to one another, claims can be made about its status in consciousness and about whether it is viewed as completed or not.

In contrast to the intonation-as-grammar approach, the intonation-and-information-flow approach has paid less attention to type of pitch accent and more attention to issues of unit segmentation and inter-unit continuity. Methodologically - also in marked contrast to the intonation-as-grammar school of thought - it has developed out of close observation of real discourse rather than from introspection and constructed examples. At times, the discourse under observation in the intonation-as-information-flow tradition has been prompted by an experimental set-up (for instance, the Pear Story film in Chafe 1979 or an instructional task e.g. in Swerts and Geluykens 1994). And it has tended to be primarily monologic as well as uniform in genre (e.g. oral narration, instructional monologue). In this sense the information-flow approach is different from the third school of thought, which takes a deliberately interactional approach.

The third approach might be called provisionally the intonation-as-contextualization approach, to make it comparable with its contemporaries. It is complementary, rather than contrastive, to the intonation-as-information-flow approach but stands in stark contrast to the intonation-as-grammar school of thought. The idea of contextualization goes back to seminal work by the anthropologist Bateson (1956, 1972). But it was

first applied specifically to language and intonation in the second half of the 1970s (Cook-Gumperz and Gumperz 1976). Contextualization refers to the fact that linguistic signs need embedding in a context in order to be fully interpretable. In this sense *all* linguistic signs are indexical, not just a small subset of them. Contexts are not given but are said to be invoked, or made relevant, by participants through so-called contextualization cues. The cues may be verbal or nonverbal in nature: they include such stylistic uses of language as code-switching as well as gestural, proxemic, paralinguistic, and prosodic phenomena which accompany linguistic forms (see also Auer and di Luzio 1992). Contextualization cues function by indexing or evoking interpretive schemas or frames within which inferential understanding can be achieved (Gumperz 1982; Tannen 1993). Intonation - by its very nature non-referential, gradient, and evocative - is seen as a prime contextualization cue in this approach.

*How can intonation be viewed as a contextualization cue? Does that line of thought in understanding intonation lead to multimodal discourse analysis? What is the role of inferences?*

JANE A. EDWARDS: *The Transcription of Discourse*, pp. 321-348

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p. 331

Next the researcher must decide how to subdivide the text into units for purposes of analysis. Should the unit of analysis be an idea unit, a unit containing a predicate, a speaker turn, a unit bounded by pauses or uttered under a completed intonational

contour, or some combination of these? Should text be subdivided into paragraphs or episodes? These are just a few of the possibilities.

This choice will determine which dimensions of structure are highlighted for purposes of analysis (e.g. prosody, syntax, information packaging), as well as the relevant scope of descriptive codes. (For further discussion, see Edwards 1993b; Lampert and Ervin-Tripp 1993.)

This choice affects the location of line breaks. In some transcription systems, line breaks occur before each intonation or ideational unit (as in Du Bois et al. 1993). Where analysis is focused on turn-taking, line breaks may be less common, perhaps occurring only between turns, or for long utterances (to keep them on the screen or page).

The unit of analysis also has implications for the temporal organization of the transcript. In the ChiLDES archive, utterances are the primary units of analysis. Gestures are treated as clarifying information, tied to specific utterances. They are placed on subordinate tiers beneath the utterances they are believed to clarify. If the gesture occurs before the utterance, this is indicated by adding the tag “<bef>” to the gestural-proxemic tier. Time is preserved spatially only for utterances in that format. Where a gesture or event is deemed relevant to more than one utterance, it is duplicated for each utterance (without notation distinguishing this case from the case in which the gesture itself is repeated in the interaction). This introduces ambiguity, and hinders automatic conversion from this format to others.

An alternative approach is to place verbal and nonverbal communication events in the transcript in order of occurrence.

This approach is more theory-neutral because researchers are not required to guess the scope of relevance of nonverbal events (as is required in the former approach). In addition, having utterances and nonverbal acts in chronological order provides a more immediate sense of the flow of an interaction. This second approach is the more common in discourse research (e.g. Bloom 1973; Ehlich 1993; Jefferson 1984; Psathas 1990; Gumperz and Berenz 1993).

*What two semiotic principles underlie the two approaches referred to above?*

pp. 332-333

Prosodic features are properties that “generally extend over stretches of utterances longer than just one sound” (Cruttenden 1997: 1). These include such things as perceived duration, prominence, and intonation. These are perceptual/linguistic rather than acoustic phenomena. Although they are related to objectively measurable properties, the correspondence is far from perfect.

Listeners make many adjustments which acoustic measuring machines do not. There are far more frequency variations in the speech signal than are noticed by the listener (see, for example, Couper-Kuhlen 1986: 7). An utterance may be sprinkled with sudden high frequencies at high vowels (e.g. /i/) and silent spots at devoiced stop consonants (e.g. /p/) (Cruttenden 1997), but somehow the listener looks past these perturbations and perceives what seem to be reasonably smooth frequency contours.

Seemingly simple categories such as “rising intonation” actually cover a wide variety of acoustic contours. Contours may stretch over utterances of different lengths, or have

differing numbers of pitch peaks or different speeds of pitch change, and still be judged as belonging to the same contour category. These adjustments rely on norms:

As Crystal (1975) has pointed out, we apparently do use norms or standards in auditory perception. For one, we can form a notion of “natural speaking level” and are able to determine (regardless of individual voice range) whether someone is speaking near the top or the bottom of his/her voice. (Couper-Kuhlen 1986: 9)

Since discourse researchers wish to describe interactions in categories which are as similar as possible to perceptions by participants, it is necessary to use interpretive categories. A variety of interpretive categories has been found useful. We examine them with reference to three aspects of prosodic encoding: **prominence, duration, and intonation.**

Prominence: A common feature of English is that some syllables are perceived as more prominent than others. The location of a prominence is determined in part lexically. In *Elephants* the first syllable is the most prominent; in *esCAPED*, the last. When these words occur in the same utterance, one of them will typically receive more prominence than the other, depending on such things as information focus or surprisingness of content (cf. Bolinger 1986; Tench 1996). For example, in response to 'What happened today?' the reply might be “The *elephants* escaped,” with the greater prominence on *elephants*, whereas in response to “Did you feed the elephants today?” the response might be “The elephants *escaped.*”

*Comment on the cognitive aspects of intonation in the context of interaction.*

*Comment on the connection between norm and perception.*

## **C. TEXTUAL GENRES: FROM DEFINITION TO PLAY**

**ASTGHIK CHUBARYAN  
LILIT SARGSYAN**

### **THE TEXT-ORGANIZING FUNCTION OF COMPRESSION IN ENGLISH SCIENTIFIC DISCOURSE**

**The economy principle in language** plays a significant role in the choice of linguistic units as well as their combination in such a way as to ensure maximum efficiency in the exchange of information in line with the situational, functional and pragmatic requirements of communication. As recent studies in linguistics show, the economy principle can be tracked throughout all levels of linguistic structure such as phonological, morphological, lexical, syntactic and semantic<sup>14</sup>. Furthermore, it has been established that, due to unique syntactic structure, various means of text compression as a medium of the economy principle realization in speech serve the purpose of forming implicit meanings and presuppositions, which in their turn enable to convey a great volume of information during communication, by using as few linguistic units as possible. It is

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<sup>14</sup> The analysis of the materials studied within the framework of the given research has enabled us to add to this traditionally accepted classification the textual and semantic-cognitive levels at which the economy principle is realized.

by the latter fact that the extensive use of text compression in different functional styles of the language can be accounted for. Namely, English scientific discourse can be characterized as a key area of the economy principle realization in the form of text compression given some basic requirements of this particular sphere of human communication such as the conciseness and clarity as well as high degree of informativity of scientific texts, the economical use of time, space, etc. In other words, text compression as the realization of the economy principle in actual communication carries out a major **text-organizing function** in English scientific discourse, to elucidate which it is essential to elaborate on such key concepts as **linguistic economy and compression, compression and implicitness, informativity as well as some basic pragmatic parameters of communication**.

**Linguistic Economy vs. Compression:** First of all, it is to be noted that though linguistic economy and compression often tend to be identified with one another, they actually constitute different phenomena<sup>15</sup>. The point is that the economy principle, which is also referred to as the principle of least effort, consists in tending towards the minimum amount of effort that is necessary to achieve the maximum result and displays itself in

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<sup>15</sup> The term “compression” (from Latin “compressio” meaning contraction, condensation), which was initially used in the communication theory to refer to the process of condensation of the verbal signal without a loss of the information contained in it, was borrowed by Soviet linguistics in the 1960s. Despite its common use in linguistic theory, the term has no unanimously accepted definition. Some linguists view it as a source of formation of implicit meanings and presupposition (Glukhov, Komarova 2004), or define it in terms of the concrete means of its realization (Litvin 2003), whereas others regard it as the economy principle realization in speech (Vasilyeva, Vinogradov, Shakhnarovich 2003), etc.



language use as a conscious or unconscious tendency of language users to save more time and energy by conveying more information with as few language units as possible (Zhou 2012: 100). However, compression is not merely a way of using as few linguistic units as possible thus making the understanding of the conveyed message easier and saving the addressee's efforts but also, and more importantly, it pursues the ultimate purpose of carrying out other functions, through economizing on language means, which are more relevant to the final aim of the communication. Thus, for instance:

*We still have an opportunity to not only bring the fish back but to actually get more fish that can feed more people than we currently are now. How many more? Right about now, we can feed about 450 million people a fish meal a day based on the current world fish catch... (SJ SO: 5:41)*

The example adduced above, which is an excerpt from a lecture on how to efficiently manage fish stocks, illustrates the use of ellipsis as a means of text compression at the syntactic level. Namely, the elliptical utterance How many more? (which constitutes the compressed, reduced variant of the non-contracted construction *How many more people can we feed?\**) does not, in fact, simply serve to reduce the number of used words but, by doing so, helps the speaker draw the audience's attention to the key message of the lecture, i.e. the increase in the number of people who could be fed on fish if the actions described in the lecture were implemented. In other words, by using the elliptical utterance constituting a question, the speaker emphasizes the important information in the lecture so that the audience can be concentrated to grasp it in the answer to the question, which is to be found in the following part of the

lecture. In this way she also activates the audience's attention, keeping them focused on the topic of the speech.

Hence, **compression can be defined as an economy principle based regular process, which covers all the levels of linguistic structure and consists in the reduction of the form of linguistic units and parallel preservation of the information contained in them with a view to ensuring the maximum efficiency of communication in line with the pragmatic requirements of the communicative act.** Moreover, the efficiency and completeness of communication is to be determined not by the volume or number of the verbal means being used, but by the situational and functional relevance of the latter.

**Compression and Implicitness:** Speaking about compression as a means of linguistic economy principle realization in English scientific discourse, we cannot but dwell upon the interrelation between compression and implicitness. Thus, according to the way of representation, the information contained in a text can be of two major types: **explicit and implicit**. A smart combination of these two types of information in the informative structure of the text serves two main purposes: ensures conciseness in terms of the form, and increases the degree of informativity in terms of the content. It is to be noted that the term "implicit" is used to refer to the elements in the semantic structure of the utterance that have an incomplete verbal expression or no verbal expression at all. Furthermore, implicit information is decoded on the basis of the explicit. Therefore, the implicit element in the structure of the text can be defined as that part of the information contained in the text, which is not directly represented via verbal means or

has an incomplete verbal expression; however, it can be inferred or restored from the explicit content, the context of speech as well as other relevant factors.

Among the latter **the principle of pragmatic sufficiency** should be mentioned. As we know, the general goal of any text created within a certain context of interaction is to make a particular intended impact on the addressee, and to achieve this goal the speaker not only in scientific discourse but also any other situation, should know how much information to convey and how. So the principle of pragmatic sufficiency implies that only that part of information should be conveyed explicitly which is necessary and sufficient to achieve the goal of the communicative act within a given context. Moreover, it's a well-established fact that very often the main purpose of the speaker, influenced by various linguistic and extra-linguistic factors, is not to get to the hearer what is said explicitly but to make him perceive what is left unsaid (Bagdasaryan 1983: 10-11). As they say, language serves not only the purpose of expressing thoughts but also of concealing them. Thus, for instance:

*Good afternoon. My name is Uldus. I am a photo-based artist from Russia. I started my way around six years ago with ironic self-portraits to lay open so many stereotypes about nationalities, genders, and social issues — ["I am Russian. I sell drugs and guns"] ["Vodka = water. I love vodka!"] (Laughter) — using photography as my tool to send a message. ["Marry me, I need a visa."]. (BU WP: 0:11)*

The example adduced above, which is an excerpt from a lecture on stereotypes delivered by a Russian photo-based artist, illustrates the use of implicit information inferred on the basis of stereotype-based presuppositions in creating a special humorous

effect, which helps to keep the audience entertained. Namely, while the speaker is delivering her speech, the audience is watching a number of funny photos representing common stereotypes with the corresponding subtitles following one another on the screen. So the speaker, being well aware that people, namely those sitting among the audience, stereotypically associate Russians with vodka for their great love and consumption of it on daily basis as if it were water for them, as well as that it's a common practice throughout the post-Soviet countries to marry American citizens to obtain a US visa, intentionally chooses to leave this part of the information implicit to be inferred by the audience. Thus, she not only uses short compressed texts based on implicit meanings to express stereotypes in the form of photos but also produces a certain impact on the audience keeping them amused throughout her speech.

As it can be concluded from the above, compression and implicitness are two sides of the same coin. Namely, in text production when we proceed from the content to the form of expression, i.e. in considering the text from the point of view of the speaker, we deal with the process of implicitness, expressing the information implicitly, whereas in text perception when we proceed in the opposite direction, from the form to the content, i.e. in considering the text from the viewpoint of the hearer, we deal with compression. In other words, it is the task of the hearer to identify and restore the compressed elements in the text in order to decode and adequately restore the implicit information. Therefore, on the one hand, compression functions as a means of encoding implicit information, on the other hand, it serves as a means of decoding it. Moreover, both processes are largely

influenced by the context as well as extra-linguistic factors which make up the situation in which communication proceeds.

**Pragmatic Factors Underlying Text Compression:** It follows from what has been said above that in the process of speech production, i.e. in choosing an appropriate form of verbal expression for the information to be conveyed, the speaker is normally guided by a set of principles which determine the use of this or that surface structure for verbalizing the same piece of information. Those principles are to be tracked at the pragmatic level. In other words, the choice of this or that syntactic construction for giving a verbal expression to a given content, which is closely related to text compression as a means of the economy principle realization, is to be accounted for by a number of pragmatic factors. Among the latter, of special significance to the production of scientific discourse are the following: distribution of information in the text (functional sentence perspective), the so-called **pragmatic universe of discourse** (otherwise referred to as “frame of reference”<sup>16</sup>) by which we mean the mutual knowledge of the speaker and the hearer, the genre peculiarities of the text as well as the potential addressee of the message or the target audience, the communicative environment, etc. Namely, a key role in text production, which is closely related to compression as a text-organizing function, is attributed to the distribution of information within the text.

It is a well-known fact that in order to ensure effective communication first the known or so-called “old” information (theme) should be conveyed, which is essential to the adequate

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<sup>16</sup> The term was introduced into the theory of pragmatics by Jan Nuyts to refer to the mutual knowledge of the speaker and the hearer (Nuyts 1992).

perception and interpretation of the following message. Furthermore, in terms of text compression, the known or old information is normally conveyed in the form of presupposition, which is defined as a proposition or set of propositions which, in the speaker's opinion, are known to the hearer at the moment of speech and are essential in the context of speech. It is here that the concept of pragmatic universe of discourse comes in, by which the totality of presuppositions shared between the speaker and the hearer is meant (Luzina 1996: 15). In other words, they constitute the mutual knowledge of the speaker and the hearer. Accordingly, the informativity or the degree of informativity of the text is determined by that part of the utterance which does not constitute the pragmatic universe of discourse. Hence, in order to ensure the highest degree of informativity and, therefore, maximum efficiency of scientific communication, the main purpose of which is to convey new knowledge or information, it is essential for the speaker to have a good idea of the hearer's awareness of the state of affairs, which is otherwise used to refer to the extra-linguistic situation (Nuyts 1992: 51-54). In summarizing terms, not only the speaker's own knowledge but also his awareness of the pragmatic universe of discourse matters in the production of scientific discourse, of which compression is an intrinsic component.

Last but not least, text compression as a means of conveying implicit information with a view to raising the degree of informativity of a text, is largely determined by the genre peculiarities of communication, which in their turn are closely related to such factors as the potential addressee of the text, or the target audience, and the communicative environment. Thus, for instance, in lectures as a traditionally academic genre, the

speaker is supposed to take into account the background of the audience (students, specialists, narrowly specialized professionals) in determining the feasible limits within which he or she is allowed to speak “implicitly”. The higher the level of awareness of the audience, the larger the scope of the pragmatic universe of discourse is supposed to be. On the other hand, there are the requirements of the communicative environment. Namely, lecture as a genre of oral discourse always presupposes imposition of certain time limits, which often account for the speaker’s effort to compress as much information as possible within the boundaries of the oral presentation in order to manage in terms of time. Hence the wide use of various tools such as slideshows, video and photo materials, diagrams, etc. accompanying oral speech, which in this case serve as means of not only facilitating understanding but also compressing information.

To illustrate the role of the above-mentioned pragmatic factors in lectures as a genre of scientific discourse, let’s adduce an excerpt from Noam Chomsky’s lecture entitled “Who Owns the World” delivered at the University of Massachusetts at Amherst, September 2012:

*In a few weeks, we'll be commemorating the 50th anniversary of "the most dangerous moment in human history." Now, those are the words of historian, Kennedy adviser, Arthur Schlesinger. He was referring, of course, to the October 1962 missile crisis. "the most dangerous moment in human history." Others agree. Now, at that time, Kennedy raised the nuclear alert to the second-highest level, just short of launching weapons. He authorized NATO aircraft, with Turkish or other*

*pilots, to take off, fly to Moscow and drop bombs, setting off a likely nuclear conflagration. (CN WW)*

In the example the speaker refers to the 13-day (October 16-28, 1962) confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union concerning Soviet ballistic missile deployment in Cuba. In fact, it was one of the “hottest” episodes of the Cold War period, being the closest the Cold War came to escalating into a full-scale nuclear war. Now, the speaker, having in mind the level of knowledge of his audience, presupposing that those who have come to listen to his lecture, are supposed to have a basic idea of at least the most famous moments in the history of the United States, chooses not to elaborate on what the 1962 missile crisis was and why it is described as “the most dangerous moment in human history”. Thus, the speaker’s awareness of the shared knowledge with his audience makes it possible for him to avoid overloading the surface structure of the text with information which is deemed as already known to the audience. In other words, on the basis of the pragmatic universe of discourse, he conveys the so-called “old” information implicitly, in the form of presuppositions, thus compressing the text of the lecture, reducing the time allocated to the lecture as a result, as well as drawing the audience’s attention to the new and more important information expressed explicitly.

**Metaphor as a Means of Text Compression at the Semantic-Cognitive Level:** The role of the interaction of the so-called “old” and “new” information in text compression displays itself in the use of **metaphors** in scientific discourse, which act as means of economy (principle realization) at the cognitive-semantic level. Namely, metaphor as a linguo-cognitive model of non-stereotypical perception and



reproduction of the objective reality<sup>17</sup> constitutes a condensed or compressed image of the latter and enables the speaker to verbalize as much information concerning this or that object or phenomenon as possible, while reducing the number of used language units to the minimum. Besides, it allows the speaker to introduce or explain a new/ unknown object or phenomenon to the hearer by analogy with another object or phenomenon well known to them. It is this property of the metaphor that makes the latter a key mechanism of scientific thinking (Mishankina 2010), correspondingly displaying itself in scientific discourse as well. Thus, for instance:

*So I was about 11 when I went along to my first meditation class...Now as I was there, I guess, like a lot of people, I assumed that it was just an aspirin for the mind. You get stressed, you do some meditation. (PA MM: 02:12)*

The excerpt from a lecture on the effects of meditation illustrates how the speaker explains to the audience the tranquilizing effect of meditation on the human mind, by implicitly (i.e. by using the underlined metaphor) comparing it with an aspirin. On the basis of the extra-linguistic knowledge (which the speaker and the audience share) about the properties of aspirin - that it is a medication used to treat pain, fever, inflammation, the audience easily decodes this implicit message. So, due to the use of the metaphor, the speaker manages to convey to the audience a basic but comprehensive image of the impact of meditation on the human mind with as few linguistic means as possible. On the other hand, such a strategy helps the

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<sup>17</sup> This interpretation of metaphor as a linguo-cognitive model of thinking is based on the cognitive theory of metaphor elaborated by G.Lakoff and M.Johnson (Lakoff, Johnson 1980).

speaker give a special stylistic effect to his speech making it entertaining for the audience.

The role of shared extra-linguistic knowledge in conveying and adequately decoding implicit information through a metaphor, which enables to economize linguistic means and carry out other accompanying functions in speech, can be commonly tracked in most metaphors used in scientific discourse, including in the genre of lecture. For example:

*... For my part, what I wanted us to do was just to look at terrorism as though it was a global brand, say, Coca-Cola. Both are fairly bad for your health. If you look at it as a brand in those ways, what you'll come to realize is, it's a pretty flawed product. As we've said, it's pretty bad for your health, it's bad for those who it affects, and it's not actually good if you're a suicide bomber either. It doesn't actually do what it says on the tin. You're not really going to get 72 virgins in heaven. It's not going to happen, I don't think. And you're not really going to, in the '80s, end capitalism by supporting one of these groups. It's a load of nonsense. (McJ TB: 01:00 – 17:33)*

In the excerpt from a lecture on ways to fight terrorism, the speaker compares the struggle between the state and the terrorists with a market competition, identifying terrorists with Coca-Cola as “a pretty flawed product”. Namely, implicitly referring to the ideology in which Muslim suicide-bombers are raised (the speaker avoids mentioning the religion for ethical reasons), the speaker denounces it as a lie, and at the same time avoids sounding critical due to the use of the metaphor *It doesn't actually do what it says on the tin*. And the audience understands what the speaker means, being familiar with the history of the advertising slogans of “Coca-Cola” company such

as Coca-Cola...Makes Good Things Taste Better (1956), Things Go Better With Coke (1963), It's the Real Thing (1969), Coke Adds Life (1976), Have a Coke and a Smile (1979), America's Real Choice (1985), Always Coca-Cola (1993), Coca-Cola. Enjoy (2000), Life Tastes Good (2001), Coca-Cola...Real (2003), Open Happiness (2009), etc., each of which could be found on the tin of Coca Cola at different periods. In other words, the speaker compares terrorism with Coca Cola: as Coca Cola advertisements promise that Coca Cola will do its consumers good but actually it ruins their health, terrorists too promise their suicide-bombers that the latter will find bliss and happiness in heaven after killing themselves, yet, in fact, they destroy their as well as their victims' lives. Thus, due to the use of a single metaphor based on the shared extra-linguistic knowledge, the speaker manages to express his position and does so implicitly, without sounding too critical. In other words, the example illustrates the role of extra-linguistic knowledge in the production and perception of metaphor in scientific discourse as a text-organizing element due to its function of compressing information.

**Conclusion:** Linguistic literature abounds in various ideas regarding the nature of compression. The latter is frequently identified with the economy principle or is defined in terms of the concrete means of its realization. The analysis of theoretical literature as well as factual manifestations of the economy principle in English scientific discourse allows us to claim that compression is an economy principle based process aimed at ensuring the maximum efficiency of verbal interaction, which is determined not only by linguistic factors but also – and even more importantly – by the situational and pragmatic

requirements of communication. Compression inherently presupposes encoding and decoding of implicit information, the latter processes being guided by a set of pragmatic rules and principles. Due to its potential for contributing to the informativity of the text while using as few verbal means as possible, text compression is recognized as an inherent text-organizing element of scientific communication given certain key requirements of the given variety of discourse. Furthermore, compression as the economy principle realization in actual communication affects all levels of linguistic structure, from the lowest to the highest, semantic-cognitive level, with the metaphor as a linguo-cognitive model for non-stereotypical reproduction of the compressed image of the objective reality. Hence, the findings of the research are not only meant to constitute a useful contribution to discourse theory but also to provide grounds for further studies along these lines.

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## WORD-PLAY IN JOCLAR DEFINITIONS

### 1 Introduction

“Everyone plays with language or responds to language play. Some take mild pleasure from it; others are totally obsessed by it; but no one can avoid it.” (Crystal 2001: 1)

These words by David Crystal clearly and comprehensively reveal one of the main features of language – flexibility in the way it takes new forms, develops new senses and responds to innovative handling on the user’s part. In fact, we play with language when we use it creatively – exploring its figurative potential, or when we regard it as a source of enjoyment. In doing so, we can occasionally ask ourselves: Is it us playing with language, or is language continuously engaging us in the interaction? How is it that language yields to our interference in its structure, system of senses, imagery etc.? Also, what is the extent of our involvement for the play to hold and not break up even when it verges on the nonsensical? Is dealing with language a matter of manipulation on the user’s part? Or does language rather respond, by opening up to us? Obviously, whatever we answer, the fact is that we play and pun, creating paradoxes and indulging in solving puzzles.

The material we have chosen for analysis might foreground the above stated questions most graphically, considering that the textual bits (pre-textually, they are playful definitions) gain full

force in the inter-discursive dimension, with the factor of knowledge being central to their ontology.<sup>18</sup> The data of our analysis are from five devil's dictionaries: *The Devil's Dictionary* by Ambrose Bierce (2002), *The Unabridged Devil's Dictionary of Language Teaching* by Tom McArthur (1998: 256–264), *Lucifer's Lexicon* by L.A Rollins (2009), *The Devil's IT Dictionary (after Ambrose Bierce)* by Phil Payne (1999–2011), and *A Barrel Full of Words* by Jim Wegryn (2003–2014) – collections, which seem to defy unified description though formally all of them are arranged by alphabetical order, and on closer examination, their purpose is to illustrate a parody on previous texts/ definitions. At the same time, however, as they challenge the stereotype of a dictionary as a source of informative definitions/ descriptions, they tend towards a great variety of expression. We believe that the rich diversity in register, expressive and stylistic connotations, etc., will not distract attention from the common features that the five collections share (and will rather even help their understanding) if we consider devil's dictionaries as texts. In other words, we intend to see what textual parameters are indispensable to such textual realizations; how word-play correlates with the main parameters; how 'genre' applies to a devil's dictionary.

## 2 Textual parameters

The initial source of devil's dictionaries was the compilation of witty definitions by Ambrose Bierce (1842–

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<sup>18</sup> Specifying that it covers perlocutionary purpose in general, Widdowson defines the term *pretext* as generally referring “to an ulterior motive: a pretending to do one thing but intending to do something else” (Widdowson 2004: 79).



1914), an American writer and journalist. His collection of satirical aphorisms was designed as a parody of Noah Webster's great work<sup>19</sup> and of the social conventions of his own time. *The Devil's Dictionary* claimed to present the so-to-call true definitions of the words, or rather the reality, fragments of which they denoted. In this now traditional play initiated by Bierce, a segment of lexis and respectively the underlying concepts were placed in a new light – a dramatic one, often shaped in verse form for a more profound impact on the reader.

The very fact that these apparently diverse “discursive practices” (following Widdowson [2004: 138] in naming such texts “informed by socio-political purposes”)<sup>20</sup> are viewed on common grounds could be explained by a number of factors. The first is their explicit belonging to the convention – they are intended as playful definitions by the authors and are readily identified as such by readers. Moreover, considering their social and political significance as a dominant unifying feature, and despite the thematic, stylistic, and functional variety, they form a class of texts in which the question of form in terms of the traditional opposition literary vs. non-literary seems of secondary importance, subject to the humorous/ satirical

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<sup>19</sup> In 1806, Webster published his first dictionary, *A Compendious Dictionary of the English Language* and in 1807 he began compiling *An American Dictionary of the English Language*, an expanded and fully comprehensive dictionary, which took him twenty-six years to complete.

<sup>20</sup> Writing on the discourse of satire, Simpson proceeds from the premises that “satire is a preeminent form of humour which, when successful, accomplishes simultaneously a number of humour functions” (Simpson 2003: 4); and that it should be viewed as a discursive practice functioning “as a higher-order discourse in the Foucaultian sense”, higher than what can be classified as genre or register, including the literary critical perspective that the term “genre of literature” opens (Simpson 2003: 8).

purpose. Conditioned by the latter, as well as due to the use of irony, the tonality of such textual realisations ranges from mild, playful humour to bitter sarcasm.

## 2.1 Word-Play

The second feature that all devil's dictionaries share is word-play as a mechanism which allows the co-existence of discrete senses in the semantic continuum<sup>21</sup> and which at the same time sets the machine of meaning creation in motion. We would like to suggest that the function of word-play here is to so-to-call spur a dynamic interpretative process, which starts from, but is not restricted to the senses involved in the play,<sup>22</sup> word-play itself serving as a skeleton for the build-up of further associative links. This peculiarity of word-play in devil's dictionaries is closely connected with the third factor. Namely, as playful echoes of definitions implying wide application, the playful counterparts (and with them word-play too) evoke multitudes of contexts and presuppositions, also due to their aphoristic character.

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<sup>21</sup> Writing about the semantic functions that linguistic signs acquire as part of a text, as well as about the formation of text categories, Turajeva (2012: 83) emphasizes the interdependence of the two principles: continuity of meaning on the one hand, and qualitative uniqueness, semantic discreteness of linguistic phenomena on the other.

<sup>22</sup> In this connection it is worthwhile to cite Joseph Stern (2006: 178), who examining the nature of metaphor in particular and figurative language on a larger scale, observes: "What distinguishes a metaphor is not the kind of feature that enters into its interpretation, but its context-sensitive meaning (character) that yields different features in different contexts". We think that in the case of word-play too, the semantic extensions are open to contextual effects, considering the concise and generalising character of descriptions in devil's dictionaries.

Finally, in this mode of verbal creativity and playfulness, where the serious and light-hearted, traditional and paradoxical meet and/ or intertwine, it is not surprising that there will be switches from one register to another too, including overlaps between literary (fictional) and technical discourse, thus undermining the functional stylistic distinction.<sup>23</sup> Moreover, this tendency to shift any conventional boundaries is enhanced by the fact that word-play as a semantic phenomenon, can be represented by alliteration, rhythmic patterns, grammatical transformations, substitution of synonyms, etc. as Malcolm McInnes (1987) clearly demonstrates.<sup>24</sup>

Thus, word-play can be characterised as having complex mechanics as it can bring together an abstract term with a concrete one, figurative extension with literal use, allowing meanings to co-exist, compete and even clash for the effect of complex images, novelty, connotations, surprise and paradox.

We could also mention in passing that unless it is deliberately retained for certain rhetorical or other purposes, the presence of multiple meanings is not common in everyday communication, nor does a context tend to materialize more than one definite meaning. However, when lexical units or structures suggest varieties of readings (for instance, both primary and derivative meanings are valid) we face the

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<sup>23</sup> The argument that the dichotomies intellectual vs. fictional (prose), and communicative vs. emotive (functions) are to a certain extent conventional as all the elements of language are in constant interaction is supported by S. Gasparyan, G. Muradyan and N. Gasparyan in *Gortsarakan Vochagitutyun* [Functional stylistics] (Gasparyan et al. 2011: 32–33).

<sup>24</sup> McInnes (1987) studies word-play in the works of Heimito von Doderer, but the observations made in reference to the specific material are a valuable contribution to the understanding of the phenomenon in general.

polysemous effect of interweaving meanings, to understand which we might need to consider a rather large span of utterance, a whole text, not overlooking the immediate environment with its “contextual effects” of “selection” and “modulation” (Cruse 2001: 49–54).

Besides, as a way of playing with senses/ meanings, concepts, cultural symbols, etc., where the systems of shared knowledge can hardly be ignored, word-play exceeds verbal limits and shows its full force in the semiotic space of culture. And for this statement there are two arguments. The first is that in the modern reality of hybrid or multimodal texts, where the verbal and non-verbal elements are in constant interaction and are combined to produce complex signs involving non-verbal constituents (e.g. graphic symbols, images), such phenomena as visual puns often used in advertising, emblems, logos, etc. could not be confined to the limits of verbal communication. The message that they communicate – whether in terms of information or emotional impact – is much more complex and intricate. Needless to say, the translatability of such content into the verbal medium is rendered more complex too.

The second is that word-play, even if it does not include any non-verbal elements, has some sort of graphical and iconic aspect to itself due to the factor of images behind expressions, which are experienced (e.g. visualized) by the author and the reader as well. Characteristically, the iconic elements should not be limited to the visual medium either, as sound symbolism can have a semantic value in word-play/ punning as well. In other words, in the mode of playing, where the known and unexpected, the new and the conventional meet, the images that occur can be

so rich in associations that they would be perceived as multi-sensory.

We believe that is why playing with words is such a powerful device in humorous/ jocular contexts. Besides, another fact that adds to its effect is that humour is a social phenomenon: it is communicated, and we communicate by means of it. In either perspective, what is communicated has some shared basis of language and knowledge, which is also co-experienced. This means that whether expressed by a single word, phrase, sentence or any other fragment, word-play usually has an emotive charge which renders its co-text emotive too. This is also true about the definitions in devil's dictionaries.

## **2.2 Generic specification; Intertextuality**

As an expressive mechanism, word-play is central to the very existence of playful definitions in devil's dictionaries, and definitive in terms of classifying them as a separate genre of emotive prose. In our choice of the often interchangeably used terms *genre* and *text type* we are aware of a number of definitions available in linguistic literature,<sup>25</sup> and have followed Chernjavskaia, who proposes the following set of parameters for a textual variety to be classed as a type: historically/ culturally

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<sup>25</sup> Linguists stress the importance of "typical patterns of characteristics" (Beaugrande and Dressler 1981: 10), "schematic and textual conventions" accepted by "a particular discourse community" (Widdowson 2007: 129), or view the variety of speech act types, conversational and non-conversational types of events, texts under the broader categories of *discourse*, *text* and *conversation* (Verschuere 1999: 49) to mention a few of the developments. The problem of text type or genre of discourse has achieved so much attention because its correct identification is obviously an interpretative task, especially that the notion has narrower and wider scopes (cf. *literary genre*, *genre of art*, *genre of discourse*).

established productive model; exemplary textual realisation in terms of functional and structural features; thematic and other variety at the level of individual texts; unity of invariant and variable features (Chernjavskaia 2009: 62). These seem to best apply to devil's dictionaries in the light of what has been mentioned so far, including the definitive role of word-play, whose realization is intertextual.

When we use the term *intertextual*, we have three things in mind.

The first is the generic understanding of the phenomenon that all texts are inter-texts in so far as they “refer to, recycle and draw from other pre-existing texts”. This scope of the term is representative of the original theory of intertextuality created by Julia Kristeva by combining Saussure's notion of the “systematic features of language in establishing the relational nature of meaning and texts” and Bakhtin's view of “language use within specific social situations” (see Allen 2000: 2–3).

This perspective is important as it also stresses the inclusion of foreign elements in every text even though readers may not always recognize the references as they occur. More important, we believe, is the awareness that the individual spaces/ worlds (e.g. fictional) of texts “never stay isolated or closed to one another”, rather – they are open to be involved in an intertextual dialogue, meeting in the reader's horizon of understanding in the Gadamerian sense (Girunyan 2008: 101).

The second is the text-typological scope of intertextuality. It is in this sense that we can identify a devil's dictionary as a genre or a text type. This means that with whatever variation (for example thematic peculiarities, stylistic features, etc.) a prototypical devil's dictionary (even if a different name is to be

chosen for it) retains its main features: dictionary ordering; mosaic of definitions, each of which can be considered as a separate text/ joke, but which are unified by the author as one composition; secondary status of text(s) due to the parodying and/ or allusive nature; word-play. The last parameter can be claimed to be representative of the others in the sense that for the interpretation of the instances of word-play all the other features need to be taken into account.

Finally, the more specific and somewhat richer notion of intertextuality that is relevant for the definition of devil's dictionaries, and hence word-play as a central device for their realization, is rooted in the fact that as secondary texts such so-called dictionaries presuppose the existence of prior sources, i.e. they are allusive of textual entities – definitions in the least, if not dictionaries as wholes. Being based on parody, they stand out as pieces of emotive writing even if they evoke specialized knowledge and proceed from intellectual/ scientific/ non-fictional sources – such an example is *The Unabridged Devil's Dictionary of Language Teaching* by Tom McArthur. We could also notice that it is in this dimension of intertextuality: along the vertical axis of prior text – alluding/ parodying text that playing in general and word-play in particular emerge to further actuate interpretations.

And it is natural that the play is not confined to the text or texts, but is inter-discursive, including the reader's background and understanding. And this is so also because, although the original dictionary entries are readily identifiable as textual entities (very similar definitions can be found in different dictionaries), for the readers of secondary texts, the original sources are and are supposed to be part of their knowledge and/

or linguistic competence. In fact we could say that readers have model texts in their memory against which any playful variation is interpreted. In this sense, and considering the mode of hermeneutical dialogue in which one participant is the text (with the author's intention, and use of language) and the other is the reader, the interpretation of word-play is a challenge the reader has to face, at times very similar to the interpretive steps related to literary allusion (Girunyan 2006).

Thus, the reader is involved in a complex hermeneutical situation, in which the awareness of play, intertextual links, and freedom of associations need to be balanced. The challenge of the situation can grow even more exciting because parody itself allows variation. According to Ross, the purpose of parody can range from a playful imitation to harsh satire, and it can also sometimes be viewed as a celebration of the success of the original work (Ross 2005: 49). Agreeing with Ross, as well as with Norrick that "for parody to work, it has to establish a noticeable congruence with the original work" (Norrick 1989: 132), we have to state that in case of devil's dictionaries, the parodying reference is to a great extent to our common lexis and background knowledge including any information of social relevance.

### **3 Discussion of examples**

We have preferred to present the analysed examples as part of the collections where they belong, wishing to stress their compositional relatedness, though the individual examples are a matter of random choice.



### 3.1 *The Devil's Dictionary* by Ambrose Bierce

*The Devil's Dictionary* by Ambrose Bierce actually started a new genre, form of parodying established modes of presenting reality, serving as an inspiration for a number of later works.

(1)*APPEAL*, v. t. *In law, to put the dice into the box for another throw.*

In (1), the word *box* is used to evoke its primary sense (a container typically constructed with four sides perpendicular to the base and often having a lid or cover) and derivative one (jail). In the mind of the reader two domains/ frames of knowledge are activated: LAWSUIT and GAMBLING. The contrastive effect is obvious – irony, which is enhanced with evaluative connotations due to the lexical unit *throw*.

The definition in (2) is based on another homonymic pun – on the two meanings of *draft* as a verb (to draw up an outline or sketch for something) and as a noun (a written order directing the payment of money from an account or fund).

(2)*ARCHITECT*, n. *One who drafts a plan of your house, and plans a draft of your money.*

Again, one form presupposes two domains/ frames: CREATION/ DESIGNING vs. CHARGING MONEY/ DECEIVING. The combination of the two frames results in irony. The effect is enhanced by the stylistic device of chiasmus, reversing of the main phrase involving the words *draft* and *plan*.

The next, (3) is an example of a complex pun. The language play becomes obvious in the quote following the definition.

(3)*BENEDICTINES*, n. *An order of monks otherwise known as black friars.*

*She thought it a crow, but it turned out to be  
A monk of St. Benedict croaking a text.*

*"Here's one of an order of cooks," said she –  
"Black friars in this world, fried black in the next."  
"The Devil on Earth" (London, 1712)*

The word *friar* (a member of a usually mendicant Roman Catholic order) is associated with *fried* to arouse infernal images by gradation: first in the culinary sense due to the unexpected collocation *order of cooks*, then followed by a more dramatic use of chiasmus reversing the words *friars/ fried* and *black*. The satirical twist in the word-play becomes resonant also due to the expressions *order of monks* and *order of cooks*, in which the senses *a group of persons living under a religious rule*, *a group of cooks*, *a request made by a customer at a restaurant for a portion of food* come into play.

In (4), allusive punning is performed for the purpose of political satire.

(4) *CABBAGE, n. A familiar kitchen-garden vegetable about as large and wise as a man's head.*

*The cabbage is so called from Cabagius, a prince who on ascending the throne issued a decree, appointing a High Council of Empire consisting of the members of his predecessor's Ministry and the cabbages in the royal garden. When any of his Majesty's measures of state policy miscarried conspicuously it was gravely announced that several members of the High Council had been beheaded, and his murmuring subjects were appeased.*

The allusive reference reminds the reader of O'Henry's *Cabbages and Kings* – a series of stories, each depicting some aspect of monotonous way of life in a Central American town. The political component of the criticism of inert and inactive

people is based on the metaphor A HUMAN/ HEAD IS A CABBAGE.

A very interesting example of a double pun is presented in (5).

(5)CEMETERY, *n.* *An isolated suburban spot where mourners match lies, poets write at a target and stone-cutters spell for a wager. The inscriptions following will serve to illustrate the success attained in these Olympian games:*

*His virtues were so conspicuous that his enemies, unable to overlook them, denied them, and his friends, to whose loose lives they were a rebuke, represented them as vices. They are here commemorated by his family, who shared them.*

*In the earth we here prepare a*

*Place to lay our little Clara.*

*– Thomas M. and Mary Frazer*

*P.S. – Gabriel will raise her.*

We presume that the phrase *match lies* implies two separate readings. On the one hand, it means that mourners in the cemetery *match lies*, i.e. exchange and share ideas or baseless rumours which are not true. On the other hand, if we consider the phrase in the phonic medium, where punctuation could be overlooked, it might mean: mourners' partners lie in the cemetery.

The following two entries (6), (7) from *The Devil's Dictionary* are connected with the word *dice*.

(6)DICE, *n.* *Small polka-dotted cubes of ivory, constructed like a lawyer to lie on any side, but commonly on the wrong one.*

(7)DIE, *n.* *The singular of "dice." We seldom hear the word, because there is a prohibitory proverb, "Never say die." At long intervals, however, someone says: "The die is cast," which is*

*not true, for it is cut. The word is found in an immortal couplet by that eminent poet and domestic economist, Senator Depew:*

*A cube of cheese no larger than a die*

*May bait the trap to catch a nibbling mie.*

In (6), *dice* is the target domain and *lawyer* is the source domain – an analogy used for the harsh criticism of lawyers who can be so corrupt as to take the wrong side – just as in (1) – playing dishonest games of chance.

In (7), Bierce chooses a different route and a more complex figure disclosing consecutive interpretive steps throughout the whole co-text. Thus, the singular form *die* is mentioned to arouse associations with the notions of death and misery, by quoting the proverb *Never say die*. The playful use of homonyms is further supported by a few more turns. The first is the unexpected argument that *Never say die* is a recommendation about language use. The next is the mentioning of the proverb: *The die is cast* as a historical reference to Julius Caesar and his crossing of the Rubicon. And finally, the third component of the word-play, which sounds as the most dramatic development in the meaning, is that Bierce replaces *cast* by *cut* – *The die is cut*. Obviously critical of the county's economic policy aimed at cutting expenses and economizing on the people's welfare, Bierce employs an outstanding device of iconic character – he illustrates the effect of curtailment and reduction by deleting the sound [s] in the words *dice*, *cast* and *mice*. Still, at this point the word-play is not complete yet – it expands to include another graphic image and hence analogy – with a trapped mouse. The occasional coinage *mie*, supposedly a singular form of the word *mice*, feels as an echo of *die* (cf. *dice - mice*). The immediate association is with a dramatic situation in

which one would respond with the exclamation *Oh, my!* We could also add that *mie* rhymes with *die* both literally and figuratively, at the level of form as well as semantics, therefore the interplay of meanings and the rich emotional associations that build up make the complex image so vivid.

The creative approach to vocabulary – playing with the form as well as meaning, is well illustrated in the next three fragments.

(8) *FRIENDSHIP*, *n.* *A ship big enough to carry two in good weather, but only one in foul.*

(9) *MISFORTUNE*, *n.* *The kind of fortune that never misses.*

(10) *HARANGUE*, *n.* *A speech by an opponent, who is known as an harangue-outang.*

The free handling of the components of the words: the suffix *-ship* as an equivalent of the noun *ship* denoting a vessel, esp. a large oceangoing one propelled by sails or engines, the prefix *mis-* identified with the verb *miss* (escape or avoid) and involved in chiasmus, and the blending *harangue-outang* based on phonetic similarity, results in colourful images, emotive charge and aphoristic wisdom.

### **3.2 *The Unabridged Devil's Dictionary of Language Teaching* by Tom McArthur**

This variant of devil's dictionary is an unofficial glossary of terms in applied linguistics and language teaching first published in serial form in the monthly newspaper the *EFL Gazette*, in 1988. *The Unabridged Devil's Dictionary of Language Teaching* is included as an appendix in McArthur's *Living Words: Language, Lexicography and the Knowledge Revolution*.

This scholarly variety is unique and entertaining in its own way and addresses the community of linguists, people especially sensitive to the word and matters related to language. Maybe it is natural that even the alphabet, to know about which you do not need to be a linguist, can occur at the centre of theoretical dispute.

(11) *ALPHABET* - *A set of symbols so arranged as to persuade us that, although spoken language came first, written language comes first.*

Definition (11) is based on the opposition of the frames ORIGIN vs. IMPORTANCE. Characteristically, the collocations *came first* and *comes first* presuppose different perspectives and foregrounding, and it is the change in the tense form (past and present respectively) that allows the so-to-call telescopic, or zooming effect due to the shift from *first* as the *most distant* in time to *first* as the *closest* choice – both implying the evaluative component PROMINENCE too.

Being illustrative of a field which has its own meta-linguistic developments – with a specific use of terms and abbreviations, as well as requiring specialized knowledge – these humorous linguistic definitions still retain their emotive power characteristic of the genre.

Thus, (12) initiates a play between the components *language* and *foreign* in the linguistic term *EFL* with their playful counterparts *linguists* and *fellow*.

(12) *EFL* - *English for Fellow Linguists.*

Obviously, when *English as a Foreign Language* is read as *English for Fellow Linguists*, the implications that arise involve self-irony – what we study and teach is just for ourselves,

having little relevance in real life as users handle the language in their own way, maybe breaking its rules, etc.

In (13), *English Language Teaching (ELT)* is replaced by *English Language Tension*, where *teaching* is on a par with *tension*.

(13) *ELT - English Language Tension, a deliberating syndrome to which publishers and conference organizers are particularly prone before sales conferences and annual conventions, and which also afflicts teachers who aren't sure which book not to photocopy out of.*

And considering the previous playful decoding of the abbreviation, where English is for fellow linguists, i.e. teachers themselves rather than students, then the tension is for them too. Hence, it is the teachers that are most concerned about which textbooks to choose and what illustrative material to study.

Punning in (14) is achieved through the associations aroused by the phrases *second language* and *slow lane*, hinting at the slower progress than a teacher might expect, especially if the teacher's perspective is a perfectionist one.

(14) *ESL - English for the Slow Lane.*

The transformation of *English as a Second Language* into *English for the Slow Lane* (the same could be said of the previous and next examples) is certainly a joke of a secondary character, to understand which the prior text should be referred to. In other words, the highest emotional and humorous "tension" is achieved only if the two definitions are handled together.

In (15), the linguist redefines the abbreviation ESP (*English for Special (or Specific) Purposes*) in an unexpected and imaginative way to stand for *Extra-Sensory Perception*.

(15) *ESP - Extra-Sensory Perception (and don't let anybody persuade you otherwise).*

The play involves the opposition MIND vs. SENSES and emphasizes the importance of the first, as if implying that English for Specific Purposes is not always accessible. Still, however great the importance of abstract thinking and algorithms, the very mentioning of sensory perception allows further associations, for example, what we feel about language, what its experiential bases are, etc.

Another vivid example of allusive character is the playful explication of an old scholarly controversy well known not only in linguistics but also in other social sciences.

(16) *Nature versus nurture - The controversy about whether our inability to communicate and live decently together should be blamed on our remoter ancestors or on our immediate ancestors.*

Critical of the perspective of opposing the two factors: heredity vs. environment (with other alternative developments as determinism vs. environmentalism, evolution as being biological vs. socio-cultural, or language as a means of conceptualizing and categorizing reality vs. language as a means of communication, etc.) as well as of human behaviour, the linguist invites us to give up any theoretical dispute unless we learn to be human. This interpretation is possible due to the inclusion of the phrases *our remoter ancestors* and *our immediate ancestors*. Obviously, *our remoter ancestors* hints at the inclusion of both scopes: human and non-human, depending on how further away we depart if we are to take the Darwinian view, for example; on the other hand, *our immediate ancestors* sounds somewhat enantiosemic, considering that we usually call



ancestors those who lived long ago, while the component *immediate* stresses CLOSE/ NEAR as distinct from REMOTE/ DISTANT. It is about how we see ourselves and our relationships with others – whether we are ready to see our own mistakes, etc. At the level of image too, the telescopic effect highlights the awareness of us versus others. As well as all the examples above, this one is illustrative of emotive use on the interface language – meta-language.

### 3.3 *Lucifer's Lexicon* by L.A Rollins

In the spirit of Ambrose Bierce's *The Devil's Dictionary*, *Lucifer's Lexicon* is another collection of biting definitions, often characterized by irony and sarcasm. The objects of the author's criticism are social life, its institutions, etc.

Below are a few to illustrate the point.

(17) *LAWYER, n. A master of the court-martial art of Tongue Fu, AKA Jew Jitsu.*

The parodying definition is based on puns. The Chinese martial art using fluid movements of the arms and legs, *Kung Fu*, is replaced by *Tongue Fu* to hint at the involvement in so-to-call tongued combat by lawyers; and the Japanese martial art using grappling and striking techniques, *Jiu Jitsu*, has a homophonic counterpart *Jew Jitsu*. The incompatibility in the occasional words reveals the contrast in ARMS/ LEGS vs. TONGUE, and CHINESE vs. JEWISH.

Outstanding instances of punning, triggering a multitude of associations, are included in (18).

(18) *POET, n. One who is penny foolish but Pound wise. One who knows a word's worth.*

Apparently, *Pound* is an allusive mentioning of Ezra Weston Loomis Pound's name, an American expatriate poet and critic and a major figure in the early modernist movement in poetry, apart from referring to a unit of money worth 100 pence as a common noun. The antithetical image of OUTSTANDINGLY WISE against INSIGNIFICANTLY FOOLISH serves to portray a true poet – such are Pound and Wordsworth. The parallel readings are also proved by the last part of the definition *word's worth*, which besides the literal sense: *a person aware of the power of word*, is homonymous to and allusive of the name of William Wordsworth, the English Romantic poet. The word-play actually balances between linguistic competence and cultural knowledge to evoke numerous associations.

The next, very dramatic example (19) is shaped as zeugma.

(19) *BASKET CASE*, *n.* *A soldier who has said a farewell to arms - and legs.*

*Farewell to arms* means *saying goodbye to the army* and *farewell to legs* means *losing legs*. The brief description is already polysemous due to the interplay between the senses *weapons* and *limbs*, and the image is impressive, presupposing tragic developments: LOSS, HANDICAP, possibly DESPAIR. However, this word-play is not straightforward, but bears a literary allusion to Ernest Hemingway's *Farewell to Arms*, allowing further semantic extensions, analogy and associations in the reader's response.

In (20), the play is enclosed in the nonce-word *facist*.

(20) *FACIST*, *n.* *One who judges another person based on his or her face.*

The occasional coinage is transparent both semantically and structurally, and can therefore be interpreted literally and in humorous terms. However, on a closer look, it is a complex sign that resonates with its co-text, being apparently allusive of *racist* and *fascist*. Naturally, it then acquires the status of a bias word, and as such triggers associations which are emotively charged and depend on each person's background.

The next description in (21) is based on homographic pun.

(21) *JUST WAR. n. Merely war.*

Rollins plays with the two identical forms *just*<sub>1</sub> [dʒʌst] (guided by reason, justice, and fairness) and *just*<sub>2</sub> [dʒəst] (merely; only) for a powerful effect. Whether as an underestimation: *merely war* (as if it were something ordinary and usual) or *fight for justice and for the good* (which involves destruction and death despite the virtuous prospects) the complex sign *just war* provokes contemplation and stirs mixed emotions. What is GOOD and what is BAD? Can WAR be GOOD? Can't we live without WAR?, etc.

### **3.4 *The Devil's IT Dictionary (after Ambrose Bierce) by Phil Payne***

*The Devil's IT Dictionary* is available in Services and Search Engine Optimization Website.<sup>26</sup> As an IT dictionary it abounds in terms and abbreviations common in the field. The connection between media technology and the growth and change of not only our lives, but also language is a fact that does not need proving. However, the most amazing tendency is that it speeds up such changes, as observed by David Crystal in three

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<sup>26</sup> It is compiled by Phil Payne, the owner of the website <<http://www.isham-research.co.uk>>.

ways – due to the emergence of new terminological domains, use of words outside the technical domain, extensive communication (Crystal 2005: 518–519). All three factors are felt in the amusing redefinitions in this collection too.

Thus:

(22) *ISDN (Integrated Services Digital Network) - It Still Does Nothing.*

(23) *NDA (Non-Disclosure Agreement) - Nominally Deniable Announcement.*

(24) *SCSI (Small Computer System Interface) - System Can't See It.*

(25) *JAVA - Just A Vague Approximation.*

(26) *MACINTOSH - Macs Always Crash, If Not The Operating System Hangs.*

Such examples are creative instances representing the author's critical approach and are designed to arouse emotional response, by associating the phenomena with the conceptual domains of FAILURE, INAPPROPRIATENESS, etc.

In the same ironic tonality as the examples above, (27) and (28) are based on puns. In (27), *profit* is handled as a misspelling of *prophet*, with a further humorous comment, which applies to both concepts. In (28), the play involves the words *web* and *wait*.

(27) *Profit - n. Misspelling of 'prophet' - an unreliable indicator of what has happened, much less what will.*

(28) *WWW (World Wide Web) - n. World Wide Wait.*

In the centre of the long description with a repetitive pattern in (29) is *bit*. The first five uses of it denote a fundamental unit of information having just two possible values (either of the binary digits: 0 or 1) and the last one is a homonymic unit which

means a small portion, degree, or amount of something. Actually, the repetition starting with *bit*<sub>1</sub> to range to *bit*<sub>2</sub> demonstrates a descending gradation (32 – 16 – 8 – 4 – 2 – 1), with the indication of the smallest amount in the final part.

(29) *Windows 95 - n. A 32-bit patch to a 16-bit GUI for an 8-bit operating system written for a 4-bit processor by a 2-bit company that can't stand one bit of competition.*

(30) *Windows 98 - n. Windows that takes 98 hours to install - three hours more than Windows 95.*

The joke in (30) is to be read with (29). In this case too, there is play around numbers (98 and 95). The author defines them not as years of release but as the number of hours one has to wait for the operating system to be installed. Exaggeration and underestimation go hand in hand here.

### **3.5 *A Barrel Full of Words* by Jim Wegryn**

This is another collection of humorous definitions of English words and phrases, which involves the reader in word-play for the sake of playing even more than the first four varieties. And the author's awareness of the process is reflected in his own classification of the innovative material. The latter is designed to comprise *daffynitions* (twisted and humorous definitions of English words), *goofinitions* (comical definitions derived from parts of a word), mock antonyms (pairs of words that look like antonyms but are not), collective nouns, *hyp-hens* (sentences that take on new meanings when words are hyphenated incorrectly), *bundle words* (words that can be broken apart into other words, with some humour) to mention but a few. As the author states on his website, this is a must-visit

site for comedians, speech writers, punsters, toastmasters, English teachers, and all students of language.

Thus, among the so-called daffynitions are:

(31) *Cannibal* — *Someone who is fed up with people.*

(32) *Committee* — *A body that keeps minutes and wastes hours.*

(33) *Statistics* — *Where the truth lies.*

(34) *Politics* — *Where truth lies.*

The aphoristic descriptions speak for themselves, their wit and profound insight into life, human characters, relationships, etc. are somewhat paradoxical – oscillating between the amusing/ entertaining and serious/ dramatic, and thus indicating *where the truth lies*. Both the paradoxical transitions from literal to figurative use, and specific contexts to proverbial generalizations make them catchy and the mood that they create catching. A few more twisted descriptions are:

(35) *Hanging* — *A suspended sentence.*

(36) *Yawn* — *An honest opinion openly expressed.*

(37) *Politician* — *One who shakes your hand before elections and your confidence after.*

The next mechanism employed by Jim Wegryn is a parody on lexical analysis, shaped as descriptions – goofinitions. In goofinitions, literal associations and spelling are important too.

(38) *Balderdash* — *rapid hair loss.*

(39) *Hostility* — *what guests should expect.*

(40) *Midwife* — *second spouse of three.*

In this group of *fractured units*, the playfully *identified* parts can be prefixes (*auto-*, *pre-*, *un-*, *ex-*, etc.) or fragments homonymous to them:

(41) *Auto - nomy* — *study of cars names.*

(42) *Ex - plain — now decorated.*

(43) *Pre - diction — baby talk.*

In fact, whether fully realized in the graphic or phonic medium, or both at the same time, the well-known words are seen in a new and unexpected light to be compounds, a dramatic factor being the breaking point. Such bundles of two or more words, or charades can suggest something completely different from the global meaning of the word, but in the best instances preserve the two interpretations side by side, thus allowing a more profound insight. Here are a few of the more interesting ones:

(44) *Can - did — free will.*

(45) *Night - mare — dark horse.*

(46) *Thin - king — skinny monarch.*

(47) *Cruel - ties — arranged marriages.*

(48) *Now - here — currently present.*

(49) *Sin - king — Satan.*

#### **4 Conclusion**

The investigation of the data in the light of interplay of meanings demonstrates that verbal play in parody reveals its full force in inter-discursive relations due to the factor of shared background knowledge, with the receiver of the joke relating what has been said to specific texts or the information they already possess in their mind. As a genre of parody the devil's dictionary is an instance of emotive writing, in which the playful mode touches the conceptual content of the lexical units, the images/ symbols behind the expressions, the social, moral and aesthetic dimensions of the inferences and generalisations that they trigger. Devil's dictionaries are informative in their own

way, and the message that they convey – ranging from mild humour to bitter sarcasm, can be a challenge for the reader both in cognitive terms – to decode the diverse associations between the domains of knowledge, and as demanding creative effort on the reader’s part. This is even more so due to the stylistic manifestation of the play – pun, zeugma, irony.

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## **THE RIDDLE IN THE (INTER)TEXTUAL DIMENSION**

### **1. Introduction**

The riddle as a textual form is subject to study from Cognitive, Semantic and Structural perspectives, the phenomenon itself being part of linguistic and cultural tradition, a unique type of communication, which can be a challenge, often with humorous effect. The central function of riddles is educational in the broad sense, including knowledge of the real world as well as of the linguo-cultural space. As for the language of riddles, the lexical and stylistic choice gains force, with the riddler's attempt to outwit the riddlee by presenting ambiguities that cannot be resolved. The effect of riddles is thus often derived from deviations from ordinary language.

A form of guessing game that has been part of the traditional, epic folklore of most cultures since ancient times, the riddle requires a thoughtful and often witty answer because the correspondence between its actual phrasing (surface structure) and the message (deep structure) is not straightforward. This difference makes the answer ambiguous, oscillating between the literal, and metaphorical/ symbolic readings.

In fact, as an ancient cultural phenomenon, the riddle has been around since before history was recorded. Initially, before becoming a genre of folklore, it served for expressing human thought. The oldest written testimony to the riddle as having a cognitive value is preserved in one of the sacred books of the

Indians, Rigveda, where a ritual-like conversation abounds in riddle-proverbs between two people<sup>27</sup> (Harutyunyan 1965).

As Archer Taylor summarizes in 'English Riddles from Oral tradition', "we can probably say that riddling is a universal art" (Taylor 1951: 3), which means that we can meet riddles in nearly every culture: English, Finnish, American Indian, Chinese, Russian, Dutch, Armenian and many more. In all the traditions telling a riddle is a sort of performing anew each time, and as such is perceived as a way to new discovery.

On a more specific scale, Okumba Miruka defines: "Riddles are word puzzles in which familiar objects or situations are referred to in figurative terms for us to decipher what is actually meant" (Miruka 1980: 135). In other words, riddles contain certain characteristics worthy of studying in terms of style, language and embedded knowledge since when solving a riddle we combine our general thinking, linguistic competence, and creativity, considering that we reject many possible answers, searching for the only one.

Well-aware of the fact that the discussion of the aspects of any phenomenon as separate items is highly conventional, especially that the problem under question - the riddle as a text (genre) – is meaningful in its totality, we intend to show that all the aspects are interrelated.

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<sup>27</sup> Various classes of riddle stories are known. One is the neck riddle plot, where the right guess is the only way to avoid death. Another is the wager or contest riddle, in which a riddle is put to someone for large stakes; or the suitor riddle, in which a wife can be won upon guessing a riddle; the clever girl riddle, in which a girl wins a husband by answering riddles, and others.

## **2. Interpreting Riddles: A Cognitive and Semantic Challenge**

Riddles, however familiar to everyone, still remain somewhat endlessly fascinating, and though considered a “minor genre”, they are hardly a mere matter of entertainment. They have, in fact, a complex linguistic, compositional, informative, and aesthetic structure, the systematic study of which reveals and at the same time requires knowledge about traditions, human reasoning, language play, ingenuity, etc<sup>28</sup>.

Riddles represent a model of communication made up of a code and an encoded message which is first transmitted and then decoded. As, what Pepicello and Green term, ‘a licensed artful communication’, the riddle employs ordinary language in conventional ways. However, as an art form, the riddle is subject to constraints that are semiotic (some primary graphic, aural, or other code), aesthetic (artistic conventions that are also semiotic), and grammatical (linguistic restrictions) (Pepicello and Green 1984: 143).

Considering the semiotic dimension of riddles, linguistic context is not enough to provide an appropriate answer, and the wider context of knowledge becomes part of the communication. Moreover, from the cognitive perspective the two types of competence/ knowledge are mutually complementary for the existence of riddles, and riddling. In cognitive linguistic sources we read that linguistic knowledge is

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<sup>28</sup> Some researchers seem skeptical about riddles as serious texts unlike proverbs and folktales, especially considering that they are often designed for children. There are, however, scholars who appreciate the value of riddles in the education of communities, since riddles reflect shared knowledge of the environment, cultural values, as well as the concerns of people.

part of general cognition, and general knowledge, both being crucial in meaning production and reception. Thus meaning is connected to and based on conventionalized conceptual structures, which means that semantic structure reflects the mental categories which people have formed from their experience of growing up and acting in the world (See Croft & Cruse 2009).

The above mentioned principles of Cognitive linguistics are significant to the study of riddles, as the latter tend to be based on figurative shifts, with cognitive mechanisms, conceptual structures and processes which are intersected in the metaphor: as it will be shown in the proceeding pages, the prototypical stylistic device that is used in riddles is the metaphor.

Paying attention to some of the semantic peculiarities of riddles, it can be seen that ambivalence, wit and ambiguity are features that riddles often involve, and they serve as a strategy aimed at misleading and distracting the audience from the right query. As a result, the riddlee should see through the “solution” imposed by the riddler. This obviously enhances the fascinative component of perception, especially that “the producer of a riddle appeals to some domains of human cognition, specifically mythical, philosophical, linguistic, historical, experiential, and metaphorical”. Therefore, it is claimed, we can analyze riddles, proceeding from the categories of logical semantic space, metaphorical space, personal experiential space and linguistic space (Olaosun and Faleye 2015: 65).

On the other hand, there is a block element, an element resisting solution, contained within the composition of the riddle. This block element is directly related to linguistic ambiguity, when two or more different underlying semantic

structures may be represented by a single surface structure representation. The nature of this surface structure is such that the actual utterance has a number of semantic interpretations due to phonological, morphological, or syntactic levels of grammar (See Pepicello and Green 1984)<sup>29</sup>.

Thus, in terms of *logical semantic space*, riddles may involve inferences as in the example below:

*What does man love more than life,  
Fear more than death or mortal strife,  
What the poor have the rich require,  
and what contented men desire.  
What the miser spends and the spendthrift saves  
And all men carry to the grave? (Nothing)*  
(riddlesbrainteasers.com)

The philosophical questions asked in the riddle appeal to reasoning. The answer to each of these questions is “*nothing*”: if you are content, then you neither ask for, nor want anything; the poor have nothing, the rich require nothing, etc. Besides, the characteristic rhyming and rhythm (of the final sounds in lines 1 and 2, 3 and 4, 5 and 6; and the structural repetition in lines 1, 3 and 5; 4 and 6) are not solely for euphonic effect, but allow semantic associations between the members of each pair (cf. life: strife; require: desire; save: grave).

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<sup>29</sup>Usually, ambiguity is considered to be a linguistic accident, i.e., it is not planned. Such an accident may occur at any of the three levels specified above. Meanwhile, it may be or rather - is consciously manipulated in riddling.

In the genre of riddles, it is the riddler's advantage to create ambiguity in the form of the text. This advantage can be characterized as double, as, first, only the riddler knows where in the composition of the riddle the cause of ambiguity lies, and of which linguistic type it is.

Another riddle representing the same logical semantic space due to the identical answer – ‘Nothing’ is the following:

*What is greater than God, more evil than the devil: the poor have it, the rich need it and, if you eat it, you will die?*  
([www.truthorfiction.com](http://www.truthorfiction.com))

Along with the effect of the stylistic device of contrast: God vs. the devil, presence vs. absence, wealth vs. poverty: 'having' vs. 'not having', the riddle uses adjectives in the comparative degree “*greater than God*” and “*more evil than the devil*” with a hyperbolic effect.

When viewed against *the metaphorical space*, riddles display lexical items which undergo semantic transformation and generate hidden meanings.

*It walks on four legs in the morning, two legs at mid-day and three legs in the evening. What is it?* (The answer is given as MAN) (Riddle of the Sphinx) ([www.theislandenglishtutor.com/](http://www.theislandenglishtutor.com/))

Central to the overall interpretation of the riddle is the bringing together of the concepts LIFE, TIME and JOURNEY, and in the metaphoric image, the lexemes “morning”, “mid-day” and “evening” refer to the periods of infancy, adulthood, and old age, respectively. Additionally, the lexical unit ‘legs’ evokes the metaphoric concept LIFE IS A JOURNEY, supposed to be shared by the parties.

Olaosun and Faleye also stress the factor of *personal experiential space*, or knowing from one’s experience – to paraphrase the notion (cf. Lakoff and Johnson’s notion of the experiential basis of metaphor).

*There was a green house, inside the green house there was a white house, inside the white house there was a red house,*



*inside the red house there were lots of babies. (Watermelon)*  
(riddlesbrainteasers.com)

As for *linguistic space*, it is closely connected with linguistic competence, knowledge of grammatical structure, phonemic, orthographic systems, and semantic aspects of language:

*I am the beginning of the end, and the end of time and space. I am essential to creation, and I surround every place.*  
(riddlesbrainteasers.com)

The answer to this riddle is the letter ‘E’ present in the spelling of the words ‘end’, ‘time’, ‘space’, ‘creation’ and the phrase ‘every place’. The riddle has a metaphoric reading and the answer would be ‘God’ if we interpreted it in the corresponding space. However, the answer “the letter *e*”, even though personified in the context, can be read to signal the surface structure only.

In the next instance the ambiguous turn is rooted in homonymy:

*What is the difference between a coat and a baby?*

*-One you wear and one you were. (www.riddles.com)*

The examples also illustrate that ambiguity (as a result of punning) may simultaneously involve different cognitive spaces.

### **3. Structural and Prototypical Features of Riddles**

From the definitional descriptions of the phenomenon in Cook 2006, Baumann 1999, Cuddon 1984, and elsewhere we can conclude that different features of the riddle can be stressed as decisive: jocular and paradoxical character, universality, educational and cognitive value, etc. The extensive reading we have done for this paper proves that different cultures (even

different scholars belonging to the same culture) draw heavily on some features, while others do not consider them significant. We believe prototypical variations account for the diversity of definitions.

Two basic types of riddles are identified: *enigmas* and *conundrums*. Enigmas are seen as a class using metaphorical, allegorical, or associational language, and requiring creativity and experience to answer. For example: “*If the sun sets, a flower-garden; but if you look at it after dawn, an empty garden. What is it?*” (Answer: *the sky*) (wikihow.com)

In conundrums the focal point is that they incorporate puns in the question, the answer, or both. For example: “*What flowers can be found between the nose and chin?*” (Answer: *Tulips/Two lips*)<sup>30</sup> (wikihow.com)

Question: *Why don` t football players get hot?*

Answer: *Because all of their fans!*

Question: *What type of bow can never be tied?*

Answer: *A rainbow!* (www.kidsjokesoftheday.com/)

As a dialogue (also because it involves the system question – answer) the riddle has two parts, *the precedent* (query, image) which is uttered or played by the initiating party, and *the sequent* (the answer, response, solution) which is supplied by the responding party. The riddle precedent may be syntactically a question, command, exclamation, or statement. The sequent may be a single word, a longer phrase, or a sentence that accords with the syntactic pattern of the riddle question. It may have an adjunct which explains the appropriateness of the response. The response is meant to be discovered taking into account the clues

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<sup>30</sup> According to Barry J. Blake, the two types of riddle found in Europe are not common elsewhere (Blake 2011).

that have been provided, but more often the interlocutors are expected to remember the standard or acceptable answer. Riddles can have more than one appropriate response, as we saw earlier in connection with cognitive spaces.

Focusing on the problem of definition, Garry and El-Shamy point to a feature of riddles which even if not formally structural can be called semantic-structural – the metaphoric character. They refer to the earliest attempts, observing that the riddle was identified with metaphor. (Aristotle was probably the first to define the riddle in this way.) Thus, they call the riddle ‘a puzzle or cipher’, at the heart of which is metaphor (Garry and El-Shamy 2005).

Another observation concerning the semantic-structural characteristics of riddles is the frequent presence of contradiction or incongruity – “an impossible combination of words”, which is rendered possible “with their metaphorical substitutes” (George and Dundes 1963: 116).

In general, riddles are readily distinguishable by their question-and-answer form and by their brevity (though there can be comparatively long ones). However, clearly the form of riddle varies from culture to culture. A common pattern is an explicit *question* to which a respondent must try to guess the correct answer. Still, a great number of riddles do not follow this pattern. In particular, not all riddles take the form of interrogatives, and the precedent can vary from descriptions to imperative forms. More importantly, they are **intended** as “questions” (i.e. they function as questions). In pragmatic terms, drawing on J. Austin’s theory of speech acts, they have the illocutionary force of a question, in so far as they are meant to elicit a verbal, informational response (See Paronyan 2012).

Some of the riddles at our disposal are representative of the tendency:

*Three eyes have I, all in a row;*

*When the red one opens, all freeze.*

(examples.yourdictionary.com)

This riddle has a declarative form, but by its illocutionary force it implies the question ‘What am I?’ (The answer is traffic lights.)

The question-response pairing remains central throughout, even if not only the answer but the precedent consists of one word only, such as ‘Invisible’ – *The wind*, ‘Innumerable’ – *The grass*, etc. (Finnegan 2012:414)

Despite the structural variation there are certain typical patterns that seem to prevail. Some common stereotyped formulae are: ‘Guess what...’, ‘Who am I’, ‘What is it’, ‘Riddle me’, ‘Riddle me ree’.

*No sooner spoken than broken.*

*What is it?* (It is silence.) (examples.yourdictionary.com)

*Riddle me, riddle me ree,*

*A little man in a tree;*

*A stick in his hand,*

*A stone in his throat,*

*If you read me this riddle*

*I’ll give you a goat.* (Blake 2011:43)

Common/ prototypical interrogative expressions in Armenian riddles are: «Այն ի՞նչ է, ինչը», or with a slight variation in dialects «Էն ի՞նչն ա ինչ», «Էս ի՞նչ ի», «Էն ի՞նչն է», «Էն ի՞նչն է, ի՛նչը», «Էն ի՞նչ, թե ի՛նչ», «Էն ո՞վ էր», «Ըն ի՞նչ մարդ է», «Ի՞նչն է» (Harutyunyan 2008: 3).

Characteristically, in the Armenian tradition of riddling, along with the common formulae the playful use of the names of the phenomenon (առակ-առակք, հանելուկ, բունգրլ/ պընգրլ/ պունգրլ) can signal the start of the play: առակ-առակ դաստառակ...; հանելուկ-հանմանելուկ; Ըդ ինչի՞, պյունգրլ, պյունգրլ... (Harutyunyan 1960:8)<sup>31</sup>.

*Էն ի նչն ա ինչ.*

*Էրկու սինի իրար դափաղ (կափաղիչ):* (Harutyunyan 1965:3)

Introduced with whatever formula, riddles initiate a communicative event, in which the hearer is under the communicative obligation to seek for the solution, and the greater the challenge the more the number of attempts at finding the right answer, and hence the wider the range of further structural variation. Even the roles may be shifted, new challenges initiated.

The next feature, which being semantic-stylistic in nature brings about structural effect, is personification - *What am I?*, asked either at the end of the riddle or at the beginning.

*I am weightless, but you can see me.*

*Put me in a bucket, and I'll make it lighter.*

*What am I?* (A hole) (examples.yourdictionary.com)

Since the feature is prototypical, it may even be left implicit.

*Անծակ մարգարիտ, անոլոր դերձան,*

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<sup>31</sup> Presenting the variants of formulaic expressions in Armenian riddles, as well as the variety of terms for them in Armenian, S. Harutyunyan observes that the word հ ա ն է լ ու կ was used by Shirakatsi for the first time, and earlier variants were: առ ա կ -առ ա կ ք , առ ե դ ծ վ ա ծ , առ ա ս պ ե լ (Harutyunyan 1960:7-8).

*Աստված կուշարե, մարդըն կուքակե:*

(Harutyunyan 1960: 84)

(The riddle is a description of the interior of the pomegranate, its seeds being compared with pearls without holes, pearls that are stringed together by the hand of God and demolished by humans.)

Another strategy very widely used in some districts of Armenia stresses the effort made by the hearer, or the impossibility of the right guess, including elements of exaggeration.

*Մամաս մեկ սավան ունի,*

*Կըծալե, կըծալե, ծալելու չի կրնալ:*

Or

*Կատուտիկ (խատուտիկ), Կպպուտիկ,*

*Անունն քեմ չինաս հանէք:* (Harutyunyan 1965: 3)

Both of the riddles have the same solution - *the sky*, presented from two different angles. In the first, *the sky* is metaphorically compared with a blanket/ bed-cover and represents an action of folding it endlessly, which ‘even the riddler’s mother is not able to perform’. The second one focuses on its colour - *blue* and has wordplay in it, proposing guesswork that the hearer is expected to be unable to perform. While the first riddle involves metaphor, the second one is literal, but with the second the complication is connected with the fact that the property is common for a number of referents: as in this case the *blue* colour of the sky.

The lines of the following riddle can be understood literally, but the referent is partially changed after line one. This riddle refers to a blackberry or bramble and presents its whole process

from ‘birth to death’. The referent of the first line is white blossom/ flower, whereas the fruit is the referent in the next three lines: successively green, red and black.

*First I am as white as snow,  
Then as green as grass I grow,  
Next I am as red as blood,*

*Lastly I'm as black as mud.* (Blake 2011: 44)

We believe that the continuity of the genre, and hence prototypicality, is supported not only by the use of the figurative language, opening formulae and the structure of question-answer, but also meter and rhyme (cf. snow: grow, blood: mud).

Along with representative cases, where the only solution is perceived as an integral part of the text, there can be riddles with multiple solutions even if for the lack of shared knowledge or experience. In particular, one and the same riddle may have different solutions, though it is not always common for one individual to accept all the alternative solutions as correct. The riddlee or even the riddler may accept only one of them, two of them and so on. Or, one option may be correct for the riddler, quite another option can be acceptable for the riddlee.

As an example can be taken Samson’s riddle which appears in the biblical narrative about Samson. Samson posed the riddle to his thirty Philistine guests, in these words: “*Out of the eater came something to eat, and out of the strong came something sweet*” (*biblehub.com*). The riddle was based on a private experience of Samson, who killed a lion and after a while found bees and honey in its corpse. “*What is sweeter than honey? What is stronger than lion?*” The Philistines could not solve the riddle and learnt it from Samson’s wife, who had persuaded Samson to tell it to her.

The moral aspect of the communicative event of riddling arouses questions, it may even seem unfair play – the riddle could hardly be solved, being based on a private experience. Therefore, this riddle can be interpreted in many other ways depending on the responding person's background and individual associations. On the other hand, it may also be stated that this riddle cannot be solved without knowledge of the incident with the lion and the bees. Thus, this riddle becomes unsolvable for the respondent, providing no hint as to its inner form.

#### **4. The Riddle in the (Inter)Textual Perspective**

Being played for so long, riddling as a process, and the riddle as a textual form could have worn out by now. Still, time on the one hand, and the constant wish to handle textual pieces freely and creatively on the other, have not shifted the riddle from its usual place in the system of other genres. Moreover, the fact that it takes a variety of forms does not deprive it of its identity either. We believe it is due to the playful element in riddles, where each of the participants enjoys the freedom of associations, as well as of shuttling between the old and new, known and unknown, literal and metaphorical, written and spoken, performed and thought, etc. And so, riddles are recognized as riddles due to certain inherent features.

Besides, we identify them as different from other texts: jokes, songs, advertising slogans, poems, novels, lectures, etc. As Schirato and Yell notice, "For any text to be recognizable and readable, it needs to draw upon already established and shared sets of meanings. It must be repeatable beyond its context



of production, or what the French theorist Jacques Derrida calls *iterable*". (2000: 52)

Remembering that knowledge (whether linguistic or systemic) is textual in nature, we could say any text resonates with other texts, and other contexts. A text is not meaningful in isolation, but exists in a dialogue with other texts, i.e. in inter-textual links.

Intertextuality is one of the seven standards of textuality that is found in Beaugrande and Dressler's system along with such standards as *cohesion*, *coherence*, *intentionality*, *acceptability*, *informativity*, *situationality*, where if any of the standards is not met, the textual formation is non-communicative, therefore it is non-text. Moreover, the seven standards retain their constitutive validity both in terms of text-production and text-reception (Beaugrande and Dressler 2002). Intertextuality involves factors which make one text dependent upon knowledge of one or more previously encountered texts. If a text receiver does not have prior knowledge of a relevant text, communication may fail because the understanding of the current text is obscured.

In the communicative framework, the communicative strategy of the sender is present in the text in the form of various communicative signals which influence the addressee and their response. On the other hand, the receiver's role is not merely that of the addressee but also of an independent individual capable of interpretation. So, on reading/hearing a textual message, as Frye concludes, our attention goes into two directions at once. One direction is *centripetal*, trying to make sense of the words we are reading/hearing: the other is *centrifugal*, gathering up from memory the conventional

meanings of the words used in the world of language outside the work being read (Frye 1990: 3). That is, the receiver has communicative-pragmatic goals – to decode<sup>32</sup> the intended meaning by using their background knowledge.

Our knowledge of other texts allows us to form intertextual frames on the basis of which we can read still more texts. According to Schirato and Yell, *narratives*, *genres* and *discourse* are three of the main ‘frames’ through which cultural meanings are produced and communicated (Schirato and Yell 2000).

Intertextuality understood as the text-typological dimension of the text, as well as the speaker’s and hearer’s competence of the dimension, is the more general scope of the notion and applies to any text. On the more specific level, intertextuality is conditioned by allusive elements, expressions referring and directing to other sources and/or knowledge. In other words, the actual wording and the choice of verbal means could not be processed automatically as they refer to another context (whether a situation, episode, or textual source).

*A man leaves home. He makes three left turns. He returns home and finds two masked men. Who are the masked men?*  
([www.rejoicing.com](http://www.rejoicing.com))

The riddle refers to a scene in a baseball or softball game. Without having any knowledge about the game the listener will

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<sup>32</sup> In the production stage, the encoding of a message takes place by the sender. It is a system of coded meanings, and in order to create that, the sender needs to understand how the world is comprehensible for the members of the audience. Already in the reproduction stage the decoding of a message takes place. That is how an audience member is able to understand, and interpret the message.

never guess the answer: the two masked men in the riddle are the Catcher and the Umpire<sup>33</sup>.

Even more specific and concrete is the intertextuality triggered by literary allusion, that is, allusive elements referring to other textual (literary) sources. The Bible is the most frequently evoked pre-text in Armenian riddles. Characteristically, allusion serves as a key to the understanding of the whole riddle.

Ի՞նչ նավ էր՝  
Ելավ լեռան գագաթ:  
Ելավ ու էլ չհջավ:  
Այնինչ՝ ուղևորներն  
Իջան ու բազմացան  
Եվ աշխարհ եկող նորերի համար  
Նախահայր ու նախամայր դարձան:  
(Նոյյան տապան) (Petrosyan 2014: 15)

The riddle refers to the Genesis flood, the passengers of the ark that became fore-parents for the people in the world. If the riddlee gets the message right and identifies the pretext, he/she can easily solve the riddle, *Noah's Ark*.

Intertextuality as a literary category thus creates an interrelationship between texts, and “generates” understanding, adding layers of depth to a text. Needless to say, the prior knowledge is bound up with culture, which means that the discourse strategy included in the riddles may cause difficulties for the listeners, as if doubling the difficulty that they face.

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<sup>33</sup> Catcher and Umpire are positions for a baseball or softball player. When the batter takes his/her turn to hit, the catcher crouches behind home plate, in front of the umpire, and receives the ball from the pitcher.

Moreover, if such texts include culturally specific intertextual features, outsiders - those who don't belong to that culture, or don't have enough knowledge about it may fail to understand the borrowings and transformations of the prior text.

Մի սահման են գցել նրա ու **մեր** միջև,  
Աչքը **մեր** կողմ՝  
Նա **մեր պապն** է կանգնած:

-Անհնա՛ր է, - ասում է, - **մեզ** բաժանել.  
Սահմանն ի՞նչ է ... երբ **մենք**  
Արմատո՛վ ենք կապված:  
(Արարատ լեն) (Petrosyan 2014: 14)

To understand the specific context and characterization of this riddle and consequently solve it, one should first be familiar with Armenian history, the biblical as well as cultural meaning of the reference to Mount Ararat as one of the main national symbols of Armenia which is considered a 'holy mountain' by Armenians. One author described the Armenians as having “a feel of possession of Ararat in the sense of symbolic cultural priority”. The riddle, in fact, speaks about this symbol of national identity, using the different forms of the first person plural pronouns: ‘**մեր** (*our*), **մեզ** (*us*), **մենք** (*we*). The inclusive “we” refers to both the Armenian nation and Mount Ararat, and if one does not know the history, one will never ‘open the brackets’. As for the alluded text (Bible), it gives deeper meaning to the message.

The following riddle reads as a further extension:

Նա՛ կանգնած, ապրում է ու հիշում.  
Ինչե՛ր չի տեսել իր կյանքում ...

Չորս բոլոր ջուր էր ու սոսկ ինքն էր  
Գլուխը վեր պահել տարերքում:

Եվ մեկ էլ նկատեց՝ քիչ այն կողմ,  
Մի նա՞վ – ինչ էր օրորվում.  
Իր գլխին առավ ... ու դրանով՝  
Կենդանի աշխարհն էր փրկում:  
(Արարատ լեռ) (Petrosyan 2014: 13)

Further thematic developments are the allusive jokes below.

*How many animals did Moses take on the ark?*  
(azkidsnet.com)

In this text the allusive words are *the ark* and *Moses*. The first biblical allusion is to the Genesis flood narrative: *ark* in association with the name *Noah*. Thus *ark* stands for Noah's ark and the corresponding passage and event. Moses is a biblical character too, and it is the confusing trick, the lack of associative link that needs to be guessed: "None, Moses wasn't on the ark, it was Noah".

*Who was the **straightest** man in the Bible? (Joseph, Pharaoh made a **ruler** out of him.)* (Philips 2006: 26)

The allusive word *Bible* will directly take us to Genesis 41:41 only if we have become aware of the pun based on the two senses of 'ruler' – 'a person who rules/ governs', and 'a straight strip of wood/ plastic/ metal for measuring or for drawing straight lines'. (And Pharaoh said to Joseph, "I hereby put you in charge of the whole land of Egypt".)

In most of these riddles, what is required is that the answerer should identify the object/reference indicated by the allusive elements. In fact many riddles need a double process to

solve them, for the analogy in the riddle may not be immediately obvious; therefore the solver must first select the salient features, identify the reference and then solve the riddle.

Consider the following examples:

*What does **Frankenstein's** wife wear on her face to keep it smooth?* (**MONSTERizer**) (tipspoke.com)

*Why did **Tigger** look in the bathroom?* (To find **Pooh**) (www.lavasurfer.com)

*Why did **King Kong** climb to the top of the Empire State building?* (Because he was too big!) (azkidsnet.com)

The first riddle makes an allusion to a fictional character, Victor Frankenstein. The monster first appeared, without any name, in Mary Shelley's 1818 novel 'Frankenstein, or the Modern Prometheus'. Victor Frankenstein builds the creature in his laboratory by an ambiguous method combining chemistry and alchemy. That is why this riddle gets its funny answer on the basis of wordplay and similarity between the words "MOISTERizer" and "MONSTERizer".

The second riddle is an allusion to the Disney cartoon "My friends Tigger and Pooh", where the main characters are a little boy and his friend.

The third one is created on the basis of an epic monster film "King Kong", which tells the story of an overly ambitious filmmaker, whose cast and hired ship crew travel to the mysterious Skull Island. There they encounter Kong, a legendary giant gorilla, whom they capture and display in New York City, with tragic results. Those people who have seen the film will easily disclose the meaning of the riddle.

In other genres, and literary texts the failure to understand allusive references may not be crucial for the whole

composition, whereas in riddles we should recognize such links in order to be able to reach the right solution<sup>34</sup>.

So, texts, cultures, and authors converse... There are always words, phrases, images, etc. from other texts that we recognize in the new context. Therefore, the concept of intertextuality requires that we understand texts not as self-contained systems but as having traces of other texts, discourses. Especially in the playful mode the manifestations of intertextuality can be a challenge even for intellectuals.

Maybe the best exemplary case in this sense is Edgar Allan Poe's enigma:

The noblest name in Allegory's page,  
The hand that traced inexorable rage;  
A pleasing moralist whose page refined,  
Displays the deepest knowledge of the mind;  
A tender poet of a foreign tongue,  
(Indited in the language that he sung.)  
A bard of brilliant but unlicensed page  
At once the shame and glory of our age,  
The prince of harmony and stirring sense,  
The ancient dramatist of eminence,

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<sup>34</sup> A riddle may refer to itself too:

Էն ի նշն է, ինչ՝

Կապուտիկ, կապուտիկ

Անունը տամ՝ չգտնես:

(Կապուտիկ) (Hovhannisyan-Tumanyan)

The reference lies in the lexical unit “Կապուտիկ”. What is significant in this riddle is not only self-reference but also word play: “Կապուտիկ” and “Կապուտիկ”; the first one is a word group, and in the second a word, brought together as homonyms.

The bard that paints imagination's powers,  
And him whose song revives departed hours,  
Once more an ancient tragic bard recall,  
In boldness of design surpassing all.

These names when rightly read, a name [[make]] known  
Which gathers all their glories in its own. (goodriddlesnow.com)

The poem requires a profound knowledge of literary tradition, the answer actually being the names of 11 authors, poetically summarized in the corresponding lines:

Line - Author

1 - Spenser

2 - Homer

3-4 - Aristotle

5-6 - Kallimachos

7-8 - Shelley

9 - Alexander Pope.

10 - Euripides

11 - Mark Akenside

12 - Samuel Rogers

13-14 - Euripidies

15-16 - William Shakespeare.

However, considering the composition and the structure of the poetic enigma, we could also claim that the answer is another – Shakespeare (cf. the last two lines), portrayed through associations with other authors. And obviously, this is not accidental as Shakespeare himself was an interpreter of tradition, who made use of other sources in his works.



## Summary

As products of literary-linguistic creativity riddles have a semantic core, communicating around which we share knowledge, experience, and moral, aesthetic, and cultural values. Beyond their often humorous content, they can be a serious cognitive challenge testing competence, creativity and ingenuity.

Readily distinguishable by its question-and-answer mechanism – even without a direct question – the riddle may take a variety of surface forms: whether syntactic or stylistic. And as defined by the philosophy of the genre opens up in the inter-textual and inter-discursive dimension.

So well-known to everybody it remains a paradox: the oldest form of text stored and played especially for the youngest – to facilitate wit and sophistication, to check the sharpness of our minds, to inspire creativity.

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## **D. REFLECTIVE-CREATIVE ASSIGNMENTS**

Methodological studies, as well as teaching practice attest to the central role of reflective thinking in class. As a fundamental skill, which once learned is applicable to any domain of knowledge, reflection is the prerequisite of critical thinking – a goal university education pursues too. This section stresses the importance of practical assignments as part of the course of Text Linguistics and presents an experimental model involving verbalization of graphical texts and meta-cognitive awareness through guiding questions. With a focus on both individual and shared experience, the role of emotional response is viewed as a motivating factor.

We do not intend to claim that a university student is not familiar with reflective learning, rather that such activities should be continued at a higher level of theoretical knowledge and with elements of imaginative creativity. The idea is that even with the more conscious choice of specialization, learners need motivation, and the shortest way is through reflection as experience. Besides, apart from strictly logical reasoning, spontaneous, subconscious, inventive and emotional elements may occur in text composition, the re-thinking of which will facilitate both the student's and teacher's awareness of their selves, beliefs, inventive thoughts, emotional-evaluative response, etc in the process.

Concerning the creative/inventive component we believe that, as a meaning-making, and hence creative process (typically expressed by means of verbal language), reflection, however, should not be reduced to the domain of concepts only. And as long as we acknowledge its experiential nature, we could not overlook the other dimension that creativity has – artistic, with its own textuality and forms of reflection.

Also, considering the fact that the field of textual studies is interdisciplinary, and hence extensive, we have included practical assignments/activities of creative and reflective character to develop the feel of ‘knowing from experience’ for the discussion and theorizing of diverse textual phenomena not to seem too abstract or ‘out of reach’. In particular, such fundamental issues as textuality, communication, multimodality, inter-discursivity, as well as more specific ones such as coherence, cohesion, etc., will then be handled as immediate observations as the students are asked to reflect on their own, each other’s or the teacher’s discourse. The same refers to the teacher’s perspective.

For the start, the students are asked to produce their own descriptive texts as verbalizations of graphical images, i.e. translate images into verbal language, at the same time feeling free in the process to include not only factual and concrete details but also their own chains of associations. For such activities nearly any graphical material (e.g. images of places, people, events, etc.) can be useful from the perspectives of defining contexts of situation, compositional structure, informativity, and other parameters defining a text in general. We have decided to include artistic compositions, where the freedom of associations is greater and the reflective process

finer. Obviously, in such cases the students taking on the role of interpreter will focus on their own experience: perception, attitude, etc. along with the shared part of background (knowledge). It is expected that when shaping their verbalized versions, they will strive to make their texts coherent and well-formed. The variety of pieces and their further exchange and analysis should be a rewarding experience both for the students and the teacher.

[The graphic images presented for the activities are collages/ installations created as artistic compositions and visual texts by Gayane Girunyan.]

Thus, the activity involves two stages, the first of which is text production with the awareness of the transition from image to verbal text. The second is the reflective consideration of the results. Both stages are guided by questions initiated by the teacher, and further answered and/or revised by the students. The questions form an open-end set, and variations are possible.

Stage 1- text production:

- ✓ What is the first thing that you notice about the visual text as a compositional whole?
- ✓ Describe the image in structural terms, focusing on the elements, the way they are combined.
- ✓ Are there any unusual elements or structural features, and why do you think they might be included in the composition?
- ✓ Pay attention to the techniques and the use of shapes, colours, materials.
- ✓ What do you find as most/ least appealing?
- ✓ Does the image look unexpected/ paradoxical/ meaningful/ polysemous to you?

- ✓ Is there anything you would like to change about the collage? Why?
- ✓ What would you preserve in the structure/ composition of the collage if you were to make any changes?
- ✓ Do you find anything familiar in the text, i.e. is the image reminiscent of anything else that you have seen, read, felt, etc.?
- ✓ Are there any artistic or literary associations in your mind?
- ✓ Are you thinking of figurative and/ or symbolic dimensions?
- ✓ Think of a context in which to set the image, i.e. of a 'gallery' of other images.
- ✓ Is the visual text a state/ story/ mood, etc. to you?
- ✓ What would you ask the author about?
- ✓ Think of a caption for the image: the choice might range from concrete to abstract, including the option 'Untitled'.

Stage 2 – reflection on the verbalized text; discussion:

- ✓ Comment on your use of figurative language and analogies. Could you do without them?
- ✓ Pay attention to your use of evaluative adjectives.
- ✓ Looking back at the process, how often did you need to shift to your first language? What accounts for such shifts: lack of vocabulary, associations, or any other factors?
- ✓ Did words happen to fail you, and if so, what did you feel like doing?
- ✓ Is the text you have produced coherent?
- ✓ What cohesive means have you used?



- ✓ Specify your text in terms of genre.
- ✓ Comment on your text in terms of lexical choice, stylistic means, etc.
- ✓ Does your text look like a collage?
- ✓ Comment on the connection between the caption and your use of words from related lexical/ semantic fields.
- ✓ Do you think your text is more informative than the graphical one?
- ✓ If you have told a story, is it what you have experienced, or heard/ read? (The student is free to ask the question to him/herself and not speak out the answer.)
- ✓ Does your own text contain any allusive elements? What are they?
- ✓ How 'independent' is your text from you?
- ✓ Do you wish to change anything about your text having heard/ read what the others have written/ told?
- ✓ How different/ similar is your text to what everyone else has produced in terms of thematic development, composition, genre, background, etc.?
- ✓ Make your contribution to the process of discussion by formulating your own question(s).

### **A final remark:**

As a basically communicative phenomenon, at least because it is a way of thinking, reflection can serve for the broadening of the teaching and learning process, if used interactively. With the mechanism of asking questions to trigger the process, and as long as the latter is not taken as a formal type of activity but one that aims at revealing what is shared

















collectively and experienced individually, reflection is awareness of growth, gain due to exchange, and a way to discoveries (even if small).



## E. GLOSSARY OF TERMS (English-Armenian)

### A

Abstraction	վերացարկում
Linguistic ~	լեզվական վերացարկում
Lexical ~	բառային վերացարկում
Acceptability	ընդունելիություն <sup>35*</sup> (որպես տեքստի բնութագրիչ)
Acronymy	սկզբնատառային հապավում՝ ար- տասանվող սովորական բառի նման
Act	ակտ
Communicative ~	հաղորդակցական/ հաղորդման ակտ
Illocutive ~	խոսողական-կատարողական ակտ
Locutive ~	խոսողական ակտ
Perlocutive ~	խոսողական-ներգործական ակտ
Speech ~	խոսքային/ խոսքի ակտ
Actants	գործողության մասնակիցներ
Action	գործողություն
Actualization	առկայացում, գործունացում
Actualized	առկայացված, գործունացված
Actuality	առկայականություն, գործունություն

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<sup>35</sup> The Armenian equivalents marked with the symbol (\*) are variants proposed by the author.

Actual (adj.)	գործուն, ակտուալ
Addressee	հասցեատեր
Adherent (adj.)	ոչ ներակա, ոչ ներհատուկ
Adjectivation	ածականացում
Adjunct	լրացում, վերաբերական
Adjunction	առդրություն
Adverbialization	մակբայացում
Adversative (adj.)	ներհակական, հակադրական
Affective (adj.)	զգացական
Affinity	
Linguistic ~	լեզվական ընդհանրություն
Typological ~	տիպաբանական ընդհանրություն
Agent	ներգործող, գործող
Allegory	այլաբանություն
Allusion	անդրադարձում; անդրադարձ
Ambiguity	երկիմաստություն
Lexical ~	բառային ~
Syntactical ~	շարահյուսական ~
Ambivalence	հակադիր իմաստների համատեղում
Ambivalent (adj.)	հակադիր իմաստներ/ արժեքներ համատեղող
Anagram	գրաշրջություն, բառաշրջում, շրջագրում
Analogy	համաբանություն, նմանակություն
Assimilative ~	առնմանական համաբանություն
Creative ~	ստեղծագործական/ նորակազմական ~
Formal ~	ձևական ~
Grammatical ~	քերականական ~
Lexical ~	բառային ~
Morphological ~	ձևաբանական ~
Conceptual ~	հասկացական ~

Semantic ~	իմաստային ~
Analysis	վերլուծություն
Componential ~	իմակային ~
Contextual ~	համատեքստային/ խոսքաշարային ~
Discourse ~	դիսկուրսի, խոսույթի ~
Distributional ~	բաշխումային ~
Formal ~	ձևական ~
Interdiscursive ~	միջդիսկուրսային* ~
Lexemic ~	բառույթային ~
Syntactical ~	շարահյուսական ~
Morphemic ~	ձևույթային ~
Morphological ~	ձևաբանական ~
Morphonological ~	ձևահնչույթային ~
Qualitative ~	որակական ~
Quantitative ~	քանակական ~
Structural ~	կառուցվածքային ~
Stylistic ~	ոճաբանական/ ոճային ~
Transformational ~	փոխակերպական ~
Text ~	տեքստի, բնագրի ~
Anaphora	սկզբնակրկնություն հարակրկնություն (ասույթի որևէ հատույթի)
Antecedent	նախորդող հարաբերյալ (ասույթի հատույթ)
Anthropocentric (adj.)	մարդակենտրոն
Aphorism	իմաստալից խոսք, իմաստախոսք
Aphoristic (adj.)	ասացվածքային
Arbitrary (adj.)	պայմանական, կամայական
Aspect	
Linguistic ~	լեզվական/ լեզվաբանական հայեցակերպ
Association	զուգորդություն, զուգորդում

Asyndeton	անշաղկապություն
Atemporal (adj.)	արտաժամանակյա
Axis	առանցք
Paradigmatic ~	հարացույցային ~
Syntagmatic ~	շարակարգային ~
<b>B</b>	
Background knowledge	նախագիտելիք
Behaviorism	վարմունքաբանություն
Bilingualism	երկլեզվություն, երկլեզվակրություն
Blocking	արգելափակում* (նոր հոմանիշի առաջացման)
<b>C</b>	
Cataphora	վերջակրկնություն
Categorization	կարգայնացում*
Causal (adj.)	պատճառական
Characterization	բնութագրում, կերպավորում*
Conceptualization	հասկացայնացում*, փոխակերպում հասկացական ձևի/ կերպի*
Construal	մտայնացում*, փոխակերպում մտային ձևի/ կերպի*, հասկացում
Code	կոդ, նշակարգ
Linguistic ~	լեզվական ~
Semantic ~	իմաստային ~
Code-switching	լեզվից լեզվի անցում*
Cognitive (adj.)	ճանաչողական
Coherence	ներբովանդակային կապակցելիություն*, ներկապակցում* համապատասխանություն (ըստ Շ.

Cohesion	Պարոնյանի) կապակցում, հարակցում (ըստ Շ. Պարոնյանի)
Co-hyponyms	համատեսականիշներ
Colligation	բառաշարահյուսական կապակցելիություն
Colouring	
Emotional ~	հուզական երանգ/ երանգավորում
Expressive ~	արտահայտչական երանգ/ երանգավորում
Collocability/ combinability	կապակցելիություն, գուգորդելիություն
Collocation	բառադարձվածային կապակց(ելի)ություն
Communication	հաղորդակցություն
Verbal ~	խոսքային ~
Oral ~	բանավոր ~
Communicative system	հաղորդակցական համակրգ
Community	հանրություն, հանրույթ
Speech ~	լեզվական ~
Compatibility	համատեղելիություն
Competence	իրազեկություն
Communicative ~	հաղորդակցական ~
Communicative- Cognitive ~	հաղորդակցական-ճանաչողական ~
Functional ~	գործառական ~
Linguistic ~	լեզվական ~
Text-typological ~	տեքստատիպաբանական* ~
Socio-cultural ~	մշակութային/ մշակութաբանական ~
Component	բաղադրիչ
Semantic ~	իմաստային ~

Composition	կազմ
Semantic ~	իմաստային ~
Connotation	նշանակցում, հարանշանակություն
Concept	հասկացություն
Generic ~	սեռային ~
Metaphoric ~	փոխաբերական ~
Semantic ~	իմաստաբանական ~
Specific ~	տեսակային ~
Conceptual (adj.)	հասկացական, հասկացութային
Conceptual domain	հասկացական/ իմացական տիրույթ*
Conjunct	համադասական կառույց; վերաբերական
Connected speech	կապակցված խոսք
Construction	կառույց
Contamination	բաղադրվածություն
Content	բովանդակություն
Conceptual ~	հասկացական ~
Semantic ~	իմաստային ~
~ of message	հաղորդման ~
Context	համատեքստ, խոսքաշար
Cultural ~	մշակութային/ մշակութի ~
Linguistic ~	լեզվական/ լեզվի ~
Physical ~	ֆիզիկական/ իրականության ~
Social ~	սոցիալական/ սոցիալական կյանքի ~
~ of situation	իրադրային ~
Contiguity	հարակցություն
Convergence	գումարմանություն, հարամետում
Co-text	անմիջական համատեքստ
Corpus	կորպուս
Correlation	հարաբերակցություն, լծորդում

Correspondence	
Semantic ~	իմաստային
Cultural identity	համապատասխանություն
Cultural literacy	մշակութային ինքնություն մշակութային իրազեկություն*
<b>D</b>	
Data	
Linguistic ~	լեզվական տվյալներ
Decoding	ապակոդավորում, ապանշակագրում
Decomposition	տարրալուծում, մասնատում
Semantic ~	իմաստային ~
Semantic definition	իմաստաբանական սահմանում, բնորոշում
Deadjectival (adj.)	ածականակազմ
Deictics	ցուցային բառեր, ցուցաբառեր
Deixis	ցուցայնություն
Demotivation	ապապատճառաբանում
Denominative (adj.)	անվանակազմ
Denotative (adj.)	հիմնանշանակային, նշողական, նշմանը վերաբերող
Denotation	հիմնանշանակություն նշում
Denotatum	նշվող, նշյալ
Derivation	ածանցում, դերիվացիա, բառածանցում
Descriptive (adj.)	նկարագրական
Designation	նշանակում
Designatum	նշանակվող, նշանակյալ
Determiner	բնորոշիչ անդամ
Deverbal (adj.)	բայակազմ
Diachronic (adj.)	տարածամանակյա

Dialogism	երկխոսայնություն*/ երկխոսականություն*
Dichotomy	երկատում
Differentiation	տարբերակում, տարբերակվածություն
Semantic ~	իմաստային ~
Stylistic ~	ոճական ~
Differential (adj.)	տարբերակիչ
Discourse	դիսկուրս, խոսք, խոսույթ
Discrete (adj.)	անջատ
Disjunct	վերաբերական
Distributive/ distributional (adj.)	բաշխական, բաժանական
Distribution	բաշխում
Divergence	տարամիտում

## E

Effect	
Perlocutionary ~	Խոսողական-ներգործական արդյունք
Stylistic ~	ոճական ներգործություն
Element	տարր
Linguistic ~	լեզվական ~
Redundant ~	հավելլորդային/ ավելլորդային տարր
Significative ~	իմաստակիր/ իմաստավոր տարր
Structural ~	կառուցվածքային ~
Ellypsis	զեղչում, բացթողում
Embedding	ներառում
Emotive (adj.)	հուզական, հուզարտահայտչական
Enantiosemy	հակիմաստություն, ներհականիշություն



Enchainment	շղթայակցում
Encode (v.)	կոդավորել, նշակարգել
Endocentric (adj.)	ներկենտրոն
Entailment	հետևություն, հանգեցում
Enumeration	թվարկում
Episememe	վերիմույթ, վերնշանակույթ
Equivalence	համարժեքություն
Semantic ~	իմաստային ~
Stylistic ~	ոճական ~
Equivocal (adj.)	երկիմաստ
Evaluative (adj.)	գնահատողական
Event	իրադարձություն
Speech ~	խոսքային ~
Evoke (v.)	խթանել ֆրեյմը*
Exocentric (adj.)	արտակենտրոն
Explicative (adj.)	բացատրական
Explication	բացահայտում, արտակայում
Explicit (adj.)	բացահայտ, արտակա
Expressive (adj.)	արտահայտչական, արտահայտիչ
Expression	արտահայտություն
Idiomatic ~	իդիոմոտիկ/ հատկաբանական ~
Figurative ~	փոխաբերական ~
Lexicalised ~	բառայնացած/ բառացած ~
Linguistic ~	լեզվական ~
Phraseological	դարձվածային ~
Proverbial ~	առածային ~, դարձվածք
Extension (of meaning)	իմաստի/ բառիմաստի ընդլայնում

## F

Face	- վարկ
False etymology	կեղծ ստուգաբանություն
Features	հատկանիշներ, բնութագրիչներ
Inherent ~	ներակա/ ներհատուկ ~

Text-external ~	արտատեքստային ~
Text-internal ~	ներտեքստային, բուն տեքստային ~
Fictionality	գեղարվեստականություն, հորինվածություն*
Field	դաշտ
Conceptual ~	հասկացական ~
Lexical ~	բառային ~
Semantic ~	իմաստային ~
Figure (of speech)	խոսքի հնար, բանադարձում, ոճական հնար
Figurative (adj.)	պատկերավոր, փոխաբերական
Focus	ռեմա; թեմատիկ կիզակետ *
Force	
Illocutionary ~ /function	խոսողական-կատարողական ուժ, գործառույթ
Formulaic phrase	կայուն բանաձևում*/ կապակցություն
Formalization of language	լեզվի ձևայնացում, ձևականացում
Frame	ֆրեյմ (ճանաչողական, իմացական)
Cognitive ~	ճանաչողական/ իմացական* ~
Interactional ~	փոխգործակցային* ~
Framework	հենք*, համակարգ*
Communicative ~	հաղորդակցական ~
Situational ~	իրադրային ~
Theoretical ~	տեսական ~
Frequency of usage	գործածման հաճախականություն
Function	գործառություն, գործառույթ
Cognitive ~	ճանաչողական~
Communicative ~	հաղորդակցական ~
Conative ~	հորդորական/ հրամայական ~

Deictic ~	ցուցային ~
Delimitative ~	սահմանազատիչ ~
Denotative ~	նշողական ~
Differential ~	տարբերակիչ ~
Emotive ~	հուզարտահայտչական ~
Expressive ~	արտահայտչական ~
Nominative ~	անվանողական ~
Phatic ~	խոսքարկման ~
Pragmatic ~	գործարանական ~
Primary ~	առաջնային ~
Referential ~	վերաբերային ~
Representative ~	ներկայացման/ ներկայացական
Secondary ~	երկրորդային ~
Stylistic ~	ոճական ~
Functional (adj.)	գործառական, ֆունկցիոնալ
Fusion	ձուլում

## G

Generation	սերում
Generative (adj.)	սերող
Generic (adj.)	սեռանիշ, սեռիմաստ, սեռային
Genre	ժանր (գրական, տեքստային)
Gesture	շարժանշան, ժեստ
Glosseme	լեզվույթ
Grammeme	քերականույթ
Grapheme	գրույթ
Group	խումբ
Kinship ~	բառախումբ՝ ըստ ազգակցականության
Rhythmic ~	ռիթմային ~
Semantic ~	իմաստային ~
Syntactic ~	շարահյուսական ~

## H

Headword

Hedge

Heterogeneous (adj.)

Heteronyms

Hierarchy

Branching ~

Non-branching ~

Homogeneous (adj.)

Homographs

Homonyms

գլխաբառ

թերասություն

տարատեսակ, այլատեսակ,

տարածին

տարանուններ

ստորակարգություն, հիերարխիա

ճյուղավորմամբ\*, ճյուղավորվող\*

~

չճյուղավորվող\*, ոչ ճյուղային\* ~

համասեռ, միատեսակ, համածին

նույնագիր/ համագիր բառեր

համանուն/ նույնանուն բառեր

## I

Icon

Identification

Identification principle

Ideographic (adj.)

Idiolect

Idiomatic (adj.)

Illocutionary (adj.)

Image

Acoustic ~

Mental ~

Motivating ~

Verbal ~

Immanent (adj.)

Implication

Double ~

Unilateral ~

Implicit (adj.)

պատկերանշան

նույնականացում, նույնացում

նույնականացման սկզբունք

գաղափարագիր,

գաղափարագրային

անհատական լեզու, խոսք

հատկաբանական

խոսողական-կատարողական

պատկեր

լսողական ~

մտային ~, մտապատկեր

պատճառաբանող ~

բառային ~, բառապատկեր

ներակա, ներհատուկ

ներակայում (տրամ.)

երկկողմանի ~

միակողմանի ~

ոչ բացահայտ, ներակա

Inclusion	ներառում
Incompatibility	անհամատեղելիություն
Inference	մտահանգում*
Semantic ~	իմաստային ~
Information	տեղեկատվություն, հաղորդում, իմֆորմացիա
Informativity	տեղեկատվականություն* (որպես տեքստի բնութագրիչ)
Inherent (adj.)	ներակա, ներհատուկ
Inseparable (adj.)	անբաժանելի, ամբողջակազմ
Insertion	ներմուծում
Integrity	ամբողջություն, ամբողջականություն
Intention	մտադրություն, միտում, նպատակ
Communicative ~	հաղորդակցական դիտավորություն
Intentionality	մտադրում*/ նպատակադրում* (որպես տեքստի բնութագրիչ)
Interaction	փոխներգործություն, փոխգործակցություն, փոխազդեցություն
Interchangeability	փոխադարձ փոխարինելիություն
Interference	փոխներթափանցում
Interjection	ձայնարկություն
Interpretation	մեկնաբանություն, մեկնություն
Semantic ~	իմաստաբանական ~
Text ~	բնագրի, տեքստի ~
Interdisciplinary (adj.)	միջգիտակարգային
Interlocutors	խոսակիցներ
Inter-semiotic (adj.)	միջնշանաբանական
Inter-textuality	միջտեքստայնություն
Intra-linguistic (adj.)	ներլեզվական
Intrinsic (adj.)	ներհատուկ

Invariable (adj.)	անփոփոխ
Invariant	անփոփոխակ
Semantic ~	իմաստային ~
Invoke (v.)	ճանաչել ֆրեյմը*
Isomorphism	գուգաձևություն
Iterative (adj.)	կրկնական

## J

Juxtaposition	հարադրում, հարադրություն
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## K

Kinesics	շարժաբանություն, շարժումների լեզու
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## L

Level	մակարդակ/ հարթություն*
Emic ~	լեզվի* ~
Etic ~	խոսքի* ~
Morphemic ~	ձևույթային ~
Morphological ~	ձևաբանական ~
Phonological ~	հնչույթային, հնչույթաբանական ~
Proposemic ~	ասույթային ~
Segmental ~	հատույթային ~
Semantic ~	իմաստային ~
Structural ~	կառուցվածքային ~
Supra-proposemic ~	վերասույթային ~
Syntactic ~	շարահյուսական
Lexeme	բառույթ
Lexicalization	բառացում, բառայնացում
Linearity	գծայնություն
Linguistics	լեզվաբանություն
Anthropological ~	մարդաբանական ~
Cognitive ~	ճանաչողական ~

Contrastive ~	զուգադրական ~
Corpus ~	կորպուսային ~
Functional ~	գործառական ~
Text ~	տեքստի ~
Locutionary (adj.)	խոսողական
Loose (adj.)	ազատ, անկախ

## M

Macro-context	մեծ/մակրո համատեքստ/ խոսքաշար
Macro-structure	մակրոկառուցվածք
Marker	նշույթ, ցուցիչ
Syntagmatic ~	շարույթային ցուցիչ
Matrix	մատրից
Domain ~	իմացական տիրույթների* ~
Maxim	խրատախոսք, կարգախոս (գործբն.)
Meaning	իմաստ, նշանակություն
Ameliorative ~	դրական ~
Categorical ~	կարգային, խոսքամասային ~
Cognitive ~	ճանաչողական ~
Contextual ~	համատեքստային ~
Diminutive ~	նվազական ~
Distributive ~	բաշխական ~
Figurative ~	պատկերավոր, փոխաբերական ~
Generic ~	սեռային ~
Grammatical ~	քերականական ~
Lexical ~	բառական, բառային ~
Pejorative ~	բացասական ~
Pragmatic ~	գործաբանական ~
Semantic ~	իմաստաբանական ~
Mental construct	մտային կառույց*
Mental space	մտային (տարածական) տիրույթ*

Message	հաղորդում
Metalanguage	մետալեզու
Metalinguistic (adj.)	մետալեզվական
Metaphor	փոխաբերություն, փոխաբերությ
Lexicalized ~	բառայնացած/ բառացած ~
Poetic ~	բանաստեղծական ~
Stylistic ~	ռճական ~
Dead ~	մթագնած/ մարած ~
Metaphoric concept	փոխաբերական հասկացություն
Metonymy	փոխանունություն
Micro-context	միկրոկոնտեքստ/ միկրոհամատեքստ
Modality	եղանակավորություն, եղանակայնություն
Model	կադապար
Cognitive ~	ճանաչողական ~
Generative ~	սերող ~
Typological ~	տիպաբանական ~
Universal ~	ընդհանրական ~
Morph	ձևակ
Morpheme	ձևույթ
Morphology	ձևաբանություն
Multilingual (adj.)	բազմալեզու, բազմալեզվյան
Multimodality	բազմամոդալականություն*
<b>N</b>	
Narration	պատմողություն
Narrative (adj.)	պատմողական
Narrator	պատմախոս*, պատմասաց*
Neologism	նորակազմություն, նորաբանություն
Node	հանգույց
Nominalization	անվանականացում, անվանական



Nomination	փոխակերպում
Non-motivated (adj.)	անվանում
Norm	չպատճառաբանված
Grammatical ~	նորմ
Lexical ~	քերականական ~
Orthoepical ~	բառային ~
Orthographical ~	ուղղախոսական ~
Phonetic ~	ուղղագրական ~
Stylistic ~	հնչյունական ~
Notation	ռճական ~
Nucleus	նշագրում, նշագրություն
	միջուկ

## O

Occasional (adj.)	դիպվածային, պատահական
Occurrence	հանդիպելիություն
Onomasiology	անվանագիտություն, անվանաբանություն
Onomastics	հատկանունաբանություն, հատկանվանաբանություն
Ontology	գոյաբանություն
Opposition	հակադրություն, հակադրում
Binary ~	երկանդամ ~
Functional ~	գործառական ~
Phonological ~	հնչույթային ~
Semantic ~	իմաստային ~
Origin (of language)	(լեզվի) ծագում

## P

Panchronic (adj.)	հարաժամանակյա
Paradigm	հարացույց
Paradigmatic (adj.)	հարացույցային
Paralanguage	հարալեզու

Paralinguistics	հարալեզվաբանություն
Parallelism	զուգահեռականություն, նույնադասություն
Paraphrase	հարասույթ, հարասություն
Parataxis	անշաղկապ համադասություն
Paremiology	առածաբանություն
Paronyms	հարանուններ
Paronymic (adj.)	հարանվանական
Particle	մասնիկ, բառ-մասնիկ
Periphrasis/ paraphrase	շրջասություն, շրջասույթ
Periphrastic (adj.)	շրջասական, շրջասույթային, նկարագրական
Perlocutionary (adj.)	խոսողական-ներգործական
Phatic (adj.)	խոսքարկման
Phrase	բառակապակցություն
Phraseology	դարձվածաբանություն, դարձվածապաշար
Pictogram	պատկերագիր
Pictographic (adj.)	պատկերագիր, պատկերագրական
Plane of content	բովանդակության պլան
Plane of expression	արտահայտության պլան
Polysemy	բազմիմաստություն
Polysyndeton	բազմաշաղկապություն
Position	դիրք
Possible world	հնարավոր աշխարհ
Postposition	հետադրություն
Pragmatic (adj.)	գործաբանական
Pragmatic intent	գործաբանական միտում*, մտադրություն*
Predicative (adj.)	ստորոգական, ստորոգային,
Predication	ստորոգումային ստորոգում

Presupposition	կանխենթադրույթ
Productivity	կենսունակություն, արտադրողականություն
Pro-form	փոխարինող բառ/ ձև
Pronominalization	դերանվանացում
Proposition	նախադրույթ/ կանխադրույթ
Prototype	նախատիպ
Proverb	առած

## Q

Qualifier	որակական որոշարկիչ
Quantifier	քանակական որոշարկիչ

## R

Realia	իրականություններ, իրույթներ
Reciprocity	փոխադարձություն
Redundancy	հավելականություն, հավելորդայնություն
Reduction	սղում, սեղմում
Reduplicative (adj.)	կրկնավոր, կրկնակ
Reference	վերաբերություն, վերաբերում
Referent	վերաբերյալ
Referential (adj.)	վերաբերային, վերաբերական
Relevance	տեղինություն (ըստ Շ. Պարոնյանի)
Representation	ներկայացում, մտային պատկերի ձևավորում
Restriction	նեղացում (բառիմաստի)
Rheme	ռեմա, ասույթի միջուկ, նորը
Rhetorical (adj.)	հռետորական, ճարտասանական
Rhythm	ռիթմ, կշռույթ

## S

Segment	հատույթ
Segmentation	հատույթավորում
~ of text/ utterance	տեքստի/ ասույթի ~
Semanteme	իմաստույթ
Semantics	իմաստաբանություն
Formal ~	ձևական, տրամաբանական ~
Functional ~	գործառական ~
General ~	ընդհանուր ~
Generative ~	սերող ~
Interpretative ~	մեկնաբանական ~
Lexical ~	բառային ~
Structural ~	կառուցվածքային ~
Syntactic ~	շարահյուսական
Seme	իմակ, նշանակ, տարրական իմաստ
Sememe	իմակաների ամբողջությունը որպես լեզվական միավորի իմաստ
Semiotics	նշանագիտություն, նշանաբանություն
Sense	իմաստ, նշանակություն
Sign	նշան
Actualized ~	առկայացված, գործունացված ~
Linguistic ~	լեզվական ~
Signifier	նշանակող, նշանակիչ
Significative (adj.)	նշանակական
Signification	նշանակում
Signified	նշանակյալ, նշանակվող
Situation	իրադրություն
Speech ~	խոսքային/ խոսքի ~
~ of communication	հաղորդակցական ~
Situationality	իրադրայնություն*

Social identity	(որպես տեքստի բնութագրիչ)
Sociolinguistic (adj.)	սոցիալական ինքնություն
Specialization	հանրալեզվաբանական
Speech act	մասնավորեցում
Stimulus	խոսողական/ խոսքային ակտ
Verbal ~	ազդակ
Structuralism	խոսքային ~
Structure	կառուցվածքաբանություն
	կառուցվածք, կառույց,
	կազմություն, կազմ
Analytical ~	վերլուծական ~
Conceptual ~	հասկացական ~
Deep ~	խորքային ~
Grammatical ~	քերականական ~
Information ~	տեղեկատվական ~
Internal (inner) ~	ներքին ~
Logical ~	(նախադասության)
	տրամաբանական ~
Morphemic ~	ձևույթային կազմ/ ~
Morphological ~	ձևաբանական ~
Morphosyntactic ~	ձևաշարահյուսական ~
Predicative ~	ստորոգական ~
Semantic ~	իմաստային ~
Surface ~	մակերեսային ~
Synthetic ~	համադրական ~
Syntactic ~	շարահյուսական ~
Sentence ~	նախադասության ~
~ of text	տեքստի ~
Style	ոճ
Functional ~	գործառական ~
Individual ~	անհատական ~
Descriptive ~	նկարագրական ~
Poetic ~	բանաստեղծական ~

Rhetorical ~	ճարտասանական ~
Stylistics	ոճագիտություն
Applied ~	կիրառական ~
Comparative ~	համեմատական ~
Functional ~	գործառական ~
General ~	ընդհանուր ~
Linguistic ~	լեզվաբանական ~,
	լեզվաոճագիտություն
Subjunctive (adj.)	ըղձական
Subordination	ստորադասություն
Substantivation	գոյականացում
Substitution	փոխարինում, փոխարկություն
Sequence	շարք, հաջորդականություն
Linear ~	զծային ~
Morphemic ~	ձևային ~
~ of words	բառերի ~, բառաշղթա
Subject	ենթակա
Logical ~	տրամաբանական ~
Super-ordinate	սեռանիշ բառ
Supra-segmental (adj.)	վերհատույթային
Supraphrasal unit/ unity	վերասույթային միասնություն
Symbol	խորհրդանշան, խորհրդանիշ
Linguistic ~	լեզվական ~
Verbal ~	բառային ~
Synchronic	համաժամանակյա
Synonyms	հոմանիշներ
Grammatical ~	քերականական ~
Ideographic ~	գաղափարանիշ, նրբիմաստային ~
Incomplete ~	ոչ լիակատար/ թերի ~
Lexical ~	բառային ~
Partial ~	մասնակի ~
Phraseological ~	դարձվածային ~
Relative ~	հարաբերական ~

Stylistic ~	ոճական ~
Syntactic ~	շարահյուսական ~
Syntagmatics	շարակարգայնություն
Syntagm	շարույթ
Syntax	շարահյուսություն
Semantic ~	իմաստաբանական ~
Synthesis	համադրություն
System	համակարգ
Primary modeling ~	առաջնային մոդելավորման/մոդելավորող ~
Secondary modeling ~	երկրորդային մոդելավորման/մոդելավորող~
<b>T</b>	
Taboo	տաբու, բառարգելում
Tagmeme	շարադասույթ
Tagmemics	շարադասաբանություն
Tautology	նույնաբանություն, կրկնաբանություն
Taxonomy	դասդասում, կարգաբաշխություն
Teleological (adj.)	նպատակադրային*/ նպատակադրամբ*
Term	բառ, եզրույթ
Generic ~	սեռանիշ ~
Text	տեքստ, բնագիր
Allusive/alluding~	անդրադարձնող ~
Secondary ~	երկրորդային ~
Textology	բնագրագիտություն, տեքստաբանություն
Textual universe/ space	տեքստի աշխարհ*/ տարածական տիրույթ*
Textuality	տեքստայնություն
Textualization	տեքստայնացում*

Theme	թեմա, ասույթի հիմքը, հայտնին
Theory	տեսություն
Behaviourist ~	վարքալեզվաբանական ~
Generative ~	սերման ~
Glossematic ~	լեզվոյթաբանական ~
Linguistic ~	լեզվաբանական, լեզվի ~
Mental space ~	մտային (տարածական)
	տիրույթների* ~
Onomatopoeic ~	բնաձայնական ~
Phonological ~	հնչույթաբանական ~
Semantic ~	իմաստաբանական ~
Semiotic ~	նշանաբանական,
	նշանագիտական ~
Structuralist ~	ստրուկտուրալիստական,
	կառուցվածքաբանական ~
Syntagmatic ~	շարույթաբանական ~
Transformational ~	փոխակերպման ~
~ of grammar	քերականական ~
~ of information	տեղեկատվության ~
~ of prototypes	նախատիպերի ~
~ of translation	թարգմանության ~
Time	Ժամանակ
Emotive/	
Perceptual ~	հուզական* ~ (ըստ ընկալման)
Individual ~	անհատական ~
Topic	թեմա
Toponymy	տեղանունաբանություն
Translation	թարգմանություն
Bilateral ~	երկկողմանի ~
Direct ~	ուղղակի ~
Explicative ~	բացատրական, նկարագրական ~
Equivalent ~	համարժեք/ ճշգրիտ ~
Inter-lingual ~	միջլեզվական ~



Intersemiotic ~	միջնշանաբանական ~
Intra-lingual ~	ներլեզվական ~
Free ~	ազատ ~
Literal ~	բառացի ~
Word- for-word ~	բառ առ բառ ~
Simultaneous ~	համաժամանակյա ~
Transcoding	վերակոդավորում/ վերանշանակարգում
Transcription	տառադարձություն
Transference	փոխաբերում, փոխանցում
Semantic ~	իմաստային, իմաստի
~ by similarity	~ ըստ նմանության
~ by contiguity	~ ըստ հարակցության
Transformation	փոխակերպում
Transitive (adj.)	անցողական
Transphrastic (adj.)	անդրասույթային
Transposition	դրափոխություն
Truncation	բառահատում
Trope	դարձույթ, այլաբերություն
Typology	տիպաբանություն

## U

Unit	միավոր
Lexical ~	բառային ~
Linguistic ~	լեզվական ~
Phraseological ~	դարձվածային ~
Rhythmic ~	ռիթմիկական/ կշռությային ~
Semantic ~	իմաստային ~
Syntactic ~	շարահյուսական ~
~ of communication	հաղորդակցական ~
~ of utterance	ասությային ~
~ of information	հաղորդման ~
~ of translation	թարգմանության ~

Lexicographic ~	բառարանագրական ~
Vocabulary ~	բառապաշարի ~
Unity	միասնություն
Grammatical ~	քերականական ~
Semantic ~	իմաստային ~
Transphrastic ~	անդրասույթային ~
Univalent (adj.)	միարժույթ, միավալենտ
Universal	
Linguistic ~	լեզվական ընդհանրույթ
Usage	կիրարկություն
Unmarked	չնշույթավորված, աննշույթ
Utterance	ասույթ
Constative ~	հաստատողական ասույթ
Performative ~	կատարողական ասույթ
<b>V</b>	
Valency	արժույթ, արժութականություն
Value	արժեք, նշանակություն
Communicative ~	հաղորդակցական ~
Connotative ~	նշանակցական ~
Denotative ~	հիմնանշանակային ~
Expressive ~	(հուզ)արտահայտչական ~
Functional ~	գործառական ~
Pragmatic ~	գործարանական ~
Quantitative ~	քանակական ~
Stylistic ~	ոճական ~
Variability	փոփոխականություն
Variant	տարբերակ, փոփոխակ
Variation	տարբերակայնություն, փոփոխակայնություն
Verbal	խոսքային, բառային, բայական, բայակազմ
Verbal art	խոսքարվեստ

Virtual	ներունակ, հնարավոր
Vocabulary	բառապաշար
Active ~	ակտիվ ~
Common ~	համագործածական, ընդհանուր ~
Essential ~	հիմնական ~
Passive ~	պասիվ ~
Terminological ~	տերմինային բառաշերտ

FOR NOTES

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**GAYANE GIRUNYAN**

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